1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/module.h>
52 #include <linux/mount.h>
53 #include <linux/socket.h>
54 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
55 #include <linux/audit.h>
56 #include <linux/personality.h>
57 #include <linux/time.h>
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/compiler.h>
60 #include <asm/unistd.h>
61 #include <linux/security.h>
62 #include <linux/list.h>
63 #include <linux/tty.h>
64 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
65 #include <linux/highmem.h>
66 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
67 #include <linux/inotify.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
72 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
73 * for saving names from getname(). */
74 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
76 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
77 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
79 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
80 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
82 /* number of audit rules */
85 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
88 struct audit_cap_data {
89 kernel_cap_t permitted;
90 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
92 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
93 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
97 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
98 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
99 * pointers at syscall exit time).
101 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
104 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
105 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
113 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
114 unsigned int fcap_ver;
117 struct audit_aux_data {
118 struct audit_aux_data *next;
122 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
124 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
125 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
127 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
128 struct audit_aux_data d;
131 struct mm_struct *mm;
134 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
135 struct audit_aux_data d;
139 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
140 struct audit_aux_data d;
141 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
142 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
143 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
144 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
145 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
146 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
150 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
151 struct audit_aux_data d;
152 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
153 unsigned int fcap_ver;
154 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
155 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
158 struct audit_aux_data_capset {
159 struct audit_aux_data d;
161 struct audit_cap_data cap;
164 struct audit_tree_refs {
165 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
166 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
169 /* The per-task audit context. */
170 struct audit_context {
171 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
172 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
173 enum audit_state state;
174 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
175 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
176 int major; /* syscall number */
177 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
178 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
179 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
180 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
182 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
183 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
185 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
186 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
187 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
188 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
190 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
192 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
193 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
194 unsigned long personality;
200 unsigned int target_sessionid;
202 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
204 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
222 unsigned long qbytes;
226 struct mq_attr mqstat;
235 unsigned int msg_prio;
236 struct timespec abs_timeout;
251 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
252 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
254 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
255 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
256 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
260 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
267 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
269 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
270 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
272 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
273 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
275 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
276 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
279 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
280 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
281 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
283 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
284 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
286 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
287 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
291 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
293 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
294 case 4: /* socketcall */
295 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
297 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
303 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
305 unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
306 mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
311 if (index >= ctx->name_count)
313 if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
315 if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
321 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
322 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
323 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
324 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
325 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
326 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
327 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
330 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
331 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
333 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
334 int left = ctx->tree_count;
336 p->c[--left] = chunk;
337 ctx->tree_count = left;
346 ctx->tree_count = 30;
352 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
354 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
355 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
361 p->next = ctx->trees;
363 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
364 ctx->tree_count = 31;
369 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
370 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
372 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
373 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
376 /* we started with empty chain */
377 p = ctx->first_trees;
379 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
384 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
386 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
390 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
391 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
395 ctx->tree_count = count;
399 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
401 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
402 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
408 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
410 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
411 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
416 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
417 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
418 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
423 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
424 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
431 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
432 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
434 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
435 struct audit_krule *rule,
436 struct audit_context *ctx,
437 struct audit_names *name,
438 enum audit_state *state)
440 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
441 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
444 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
445 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
450 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
455 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
456 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
460 result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
463 result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
466 result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
469 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
472 result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
475 result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
478 result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
481 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
484 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
488 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
492 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
493 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
496 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
498 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
500 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
505 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
508 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
509 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
518 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
521 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
522 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
531 result = (name->ino == f->val);
533 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
534 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
542 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
543 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
544 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
548 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
553 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
555 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
556 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
557 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
560 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
561 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
562 match for now to avoid losing information that
563 may be wanted. An error message will also be
567 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
570 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
579 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
580 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
581 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
584 /* Find files that match */
586 result = security_audit_rule_match(
587 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
590 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
591 if (security_audit_rule_match(
600 /* Find ipc objects that match */
601 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
603 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
614 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
616 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
617 /* ignore this field for filtering */
621 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
624 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
633 if (rule->filterkey && ctx)
634 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
635 switch (rule->action) {
636 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
637 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
643 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
644 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
645 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
647 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
649 struct audit_entry *e;
650 enum audit_state state;
653 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
654 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
660 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
663 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
664 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
665 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
666 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
668 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
669 struct audit_context *ctx,
670 struct list_head *list)
672 struct audit_entry *e;
673 enum audit_state state;
675 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
676 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
679 if (!list_empty(list)) {
680 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
681 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
683 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
684 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
685 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
693 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
696 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
697 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
698 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
699 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
701 enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
702 struct audit_context *ctx)
705 struct audit_entry *e;
706 enum audit_state state;
708 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
709 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
712 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
713 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
714 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
715 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
716 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
717 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
719 if (list_empty(list))
722 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
723 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
724 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
731 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
734 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
739 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
743 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
745 if (likely(!context))
747 context->return_valid = return_valid;
750 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
751 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
754 * This is actually a test for:
755 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
756 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
758 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
760 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
761 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
762 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
763 context->return_code = -EINTR;
765 context->return_code = return_code;
767 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
768 enum audit_state state;
770 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
771 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
772 context->auditable = 1;
776 state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
777 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
778 context->auditable = 1;
784 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
788 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
793 if (context->auditable
794 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
795 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
796 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
797 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
799 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
800 context->name_count, context->put_count,
802 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
803 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
804 context->names[i].name,
805 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
812 context->put_count = 0;
813 context->ino_count = 0;
816 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
817 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
818 __putname(context->names[i].name);
820 context->name_count = 0;
821 path_put(&context->pwd);
822 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
823 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
826 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
828 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
830 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
831 context->aux = aux->next;
834 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
835 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
840 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
841 enum audit_state state)
843 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
844 context->state = state;
847 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
849 struct audit_context *context;
851 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
853 audit_zero_context(context, state);
858 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
861 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
862 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
863 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
866 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
868 struct audit_context *context;
869 enum audit_state state;
871 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
872 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
874 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
875 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
878 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
879 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
883 tsk->audit_context = context;
884 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
888 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
890 struct audit_context *previous;
894 previous = context->previous;
895 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
897 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
898 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
899 context->serial, context->major,
900 context->name_count, count);
902 audit_free_names(context);
903 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
904 free_tree_refs(context);
905 audit_free_aux(context);
906 kfree(context->filterkey);
907 kfree(context->sockaddr);
912 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
915 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
922 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
926 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
928 if (error != -EINVAL)
933 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
934 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
938 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
942 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
944 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
946 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
947 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
948 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
952 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
953 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
954 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
957 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
960 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
962 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
963 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
968 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
970 audit_log_task_context(ab);
973 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
974 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
977 struct audit_buffer *ab;
982 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
986 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
988 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
989 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
992 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
993 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
995 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
996 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1003 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1004 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1005 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
1007 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1008 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1009 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1010 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1011 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1013 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1014 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1017 const char __user *p,
1020 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1021 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1022 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
1023 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3;
1024 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1025 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1026 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1029 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1030 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1033 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1034 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1035 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1038 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1040 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1044 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1046 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1047 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1050 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1052 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1053 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1058 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1061 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1062 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1065 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1066 * send half as much in each message
1068 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1071 len_left -= to_send;
1073 } while (len_left > 0);
1077 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1080 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1081 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1084 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1085 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1089 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1090 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1092 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1094 room_left -= to_send;
1095 if (room_left < 0) {
1098 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1104 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1105 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1107 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1108 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num,
1109 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1112 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1113 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1114 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1116 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1117 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1122 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1125 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1127 /* actually log it */
1128 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num);
1130 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1131 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1133 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1135 audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf);
1136 audit_log_format(*ab, "\n");
1139 len_left -= to_send;
1140 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1142 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1144 *len_sent += to_send;
1146 /* include the null we didn't log */
1150 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1151 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1152 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1155 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1156 const char __user *p;
1159 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1160 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1162 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1164 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc);
1167 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1168 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1169 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1170 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1172 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1174 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1178 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1179 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1188 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1192 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1193 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1194 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1198 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1200 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1201 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1204 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1205 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1208 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1209 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1214 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1217 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1219 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1222 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1226 switch (context->type) {
1227 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1228 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1229 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1230 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1231 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1232 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1235 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1237 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1238 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
1242 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1243 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1246 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1247 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1250 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1252 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1253 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1254 audit_log_format(ab,
1255 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1256 context->ipc.qbytes,
1257 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1258 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1259 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1264 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1265 audit_log_format(ab,
1266 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1267 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1268 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1269 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1270 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1271 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1272 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1274 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1275 audit_log_format(ab,
1276 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1277 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1278 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1279 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1280 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1281 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1282 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1284 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1285 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1286 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1287 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1289 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1290 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1291 audit_log_format(ab,
1292 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1294 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1295 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1296 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1302 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1304 const struct cred *cred;
1305 int i, call_panic = 0;
1306 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1307 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1310 /* tsk == current */
1311 context->pid = tsk->pid;
1313 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
1314 cred = current_cred();
1315 context->uid = cred->uid;
1316 context->gid = cred->gid;
1317 context->euid = cred->euid;
1318 context->suid = cred->suid;
1319 context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
1320 context->egid = cred->egid;
1321 context->sgid = cred->sgid;
1322 context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
1323 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1325 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1327 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1328 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1329 context->arch, context->major);
1330 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1331 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1332 if (context->return_valid)
1333 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1334 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1335 context->return_code);
1337 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1338 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1339 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1342 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1344 audit_log_format(ab,
1345 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1346 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1347 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1348 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1353 context->name_count,
1359 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
1360 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1364 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1365 if (context->filterkey) {
1366 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
1367 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
1369 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
1372 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1374 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1376 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1378 switch (aux->type) {
1380 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1381 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1382 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1385 case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
1386 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
1387 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
1390 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1391 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1392 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1393 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1394 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1395 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1396 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1397 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1398 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1399 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1400 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1401 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1404 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1405 struct audit_aux_data_capset *axs = (void *)aux;
1406 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", axs->pid);
1407 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &axs->cap.inheritable);
1408 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &axs->cap.permitted);
1409 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &axs->cap.effective);
1417 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1419 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1420 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1422 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1423 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1424 context->sockaddr_len);
1429 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1430 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1432 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1433 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1434 axs->target_auid[i],
1436 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1438 axs->target_comm[i]))
1442 if (context->target_pid &&
1443 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1444 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1445 context->target_sessionid,
1446 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1449 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1450 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1452 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1456 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
1457 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
1459 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1461 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1463 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
1466 switch(n->name_len) {
1467 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1468 /* log the full path */
1469 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1470 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1473 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1474 * directory component is the cwd */
1475 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1478 /* log the name's directory component */
1479 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1480 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1484 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1486 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1487 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1488 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1489 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1502 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1503 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1504 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1507 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1508 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1512 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1517 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1518 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1522 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1526 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1527 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1529 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1531 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1533 struct audit_context *context;
1535 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1536 if (likely(!context))
1539 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1540 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1541 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1542 * in the context of the idle thread */
1543 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1544 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1545 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1547 audit_free_context(context);
1551 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1552 * @arch: architecture type
1553 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1554 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1555 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1556 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1557 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1559 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1560 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1561 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1562 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1563 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1564 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1567 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1568 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1569 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1571 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1572 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1573 enum audit_state state;
1575 if (unlikely(!context))
1579 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1580 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1581 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1582 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1583 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1587 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1589 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1590 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1592 if (context->in_syscall) {
1593 struct audit_context *newctx;
1597 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1598 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1599 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1601 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1603 newctx->previous = context;
1605 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1607 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1608 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1609 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1610 * to abandon auditing. */
1611 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1614 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1619 context->arch = arch;
1620 context->major = major;
1621 context->argv[0] = a1;
1622 context->argv[1] = a2;
1623 context->argv[2] = a3;
1624 context->argv[3] = a4;
1626 state = context->state;
1627 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1628 if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
1629 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1630 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1633 context->serial = 0;
1634 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1635 context->in_syscall = 1;
1636 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1640 void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child)
1642 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1643 struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context;
1644 if (!p || !ctx || !ctx->auditable)
1646 p->arch = ctx->arch;
1647 p->major = ctx->major;
1648 memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv));
1649 p->ctime = ctx->ctime;
1650 p->dummy = ctx->dummy;
1651 p->auditable = ctx->auditable;
1652 p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall;
1653 p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
1654 p->ppid = current->pid;
1658 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1659 * @valid: success/failure flag
1660 * @return_code: syscall return value
1662 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1663 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1664 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1665 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1666 * free the names stored from getname().
1668 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1670 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1671 struct audit_context *context;
1673 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1675 if (likely(!context))
1678 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1679 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1681 context->in_syscall = 0;
1682 context->auditable = 0;
1684 if (context->previous) {
1685 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1686 context->previous = NULL;
1687 audit_free_context(context);
1688 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1690 audit_free_names(context);
1691 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1692 audit_free_aux(context);
1693 context->aux = NULL;
1694 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1695 context->target_pid = 0;
1696 context->target_sid = 0;
1697 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1699 kfree(context->filterkey);
1700 context->filterkey = NULL;
1701 tsk->audit_context = context;
1705 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1707 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1708 struct audit_context *context;
1709 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1710 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1712 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
1714 context = current->audit_context;
1716 count = context->tree_count;
1718 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1722 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1724 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1725 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1726 audit_set_auditable(context);
1727 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1728 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1731 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1735 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1737 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1738 struct audit_context *context;
1739 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1740 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1741 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1745 context = current->audit_context;
1747 count = context->tree_count;
1752 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1754 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1755 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
1756 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1757 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1759 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1765 parent = d->d_parent;
1770 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1773 /* just a race with rename */
1774 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1777 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1778 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1779 /* OK, got more space */
1780 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1785 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1786 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1787 audit_set_auditable(context);
1795 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1796 * @name: name to add
1798 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1799 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1801 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1803 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1805 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1808 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1809 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1810 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1811 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1816 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1817 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1818 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1819 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1820 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1821 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
1822 ++context->name_count;
1823 if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
1824 read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
1825 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
1826 path_get(¤t->fs->pwd);
1827 read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
1832 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1833 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1835 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1836 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1837 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1839 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1841 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1844 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1845 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1846 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1847 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1848 if (context->name_count) {
1850 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1851 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1852 context->names[i].name,
1853 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1860 ++context->put_count;
1861 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1862 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1863 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1866 context->serial, context->major,
1867 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1868 context->put_count);
1875 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1876 const struct inode *inode)
1878 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1880 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
1881 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
1882 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1883 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1887 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
1890 context->name_count++;
1892 context->ino_count++;
1898 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1900 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1903 memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1904 memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1911 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1915 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1916 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1917 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1918 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1924 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1925 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1926 const struct inode *inode)
1928 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1929 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1930 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1931 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1932 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1933 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1934 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1935 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1939 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1940 * @name: name being audited
1941 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1943 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1945 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1948 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1949 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1951 if (!context->in_syscall)
1953 if (context->name_count
1954 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1955 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1956 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1957 else if (context->name_count > 1
1958 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1959 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1960 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1962 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1963 * associated name? */
1964 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1966 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1967 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1969 handle_path(dentry);
1970 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
1974 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1975 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1976 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1977 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1979 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1980 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1981 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1982 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1983 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1984 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1985 * unsuccessful attempts.
1987 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
1988 const struct inode *parent)
1991 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1992 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1993 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1996 if (!context->in_syscall)
2001 /* determine matching parent */
2005 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2006 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2007 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
2012 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
2013 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2014 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
2015 found_parent = n->name;
2020 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2021 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2022 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
2027 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2028 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2029 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2031 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
2033 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2034 found_child = n->name;
2040 if (!found_parent) {
2041 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
2043 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2044 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2045 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
2049 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
2051 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2053 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2054 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2055 * audit_free_names() */
2057 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
2058 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2059 /* don't call __putname() */
2060 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
2062 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2066 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
2068 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2071 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2074 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2075 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2076 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2077 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2079 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2081 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2082 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2084 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2087 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2088 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2089 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2090 *serial = ctx->serial;
2095 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2096 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2099 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
2100 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
2101 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2105 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2107 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
2109 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2110 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
2112 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2113 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2115 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2117 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2118 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2119 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2120 task->pid, task_uid(task),
2121 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2122 task->sessionid, sessionid);
2126 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2127 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2132 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2135 * @u_attr: queue attributes
2138 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2140 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2143 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2145 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2147 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2148 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2150 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2154 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2155 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2156 * @msg_len: Message length
2157 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2158 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2161 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2162 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2164 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2165 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2168 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2170 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2172 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2173 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2174 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2176 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2180 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2181 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2182 * @u_notification: Notification event
2186 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2188 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2191 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2193 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2195 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2196 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2200 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2201 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2205 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2207 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2208 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2209 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2210 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2214 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2215 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2218 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2220 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2221 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2222 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2223 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2224 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2225 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2226 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2230 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2231 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2232 * @uid: msgq user id
2233 * @gid: msgq group id
2234 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2236 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2238 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
2240 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2242 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2243 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2244 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2245 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2246 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2249 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2251 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2252 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2254 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2257 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2261 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2262 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2264 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2265 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2266 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2272 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2273 * @nargs: number of args
2277 void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2279 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2281 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2284 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2285 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2286 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2290 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2291 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2292 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2294 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2296 int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2298 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2299 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *ax;
2301 if (likely(!context)) {
2305 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2313 ax->d.type = AUDIT_FD_PAIR;
2314 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2315 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2320 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2321 * @len: data length in user space
2322 * @a: data address in kernel space
2324 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2326 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2328 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2330 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2333 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2334 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2337 context->sockaddr = p;
2340 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2341 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2345 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2347 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2349 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2350 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2351 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2352 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2353 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2354 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2358 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2359 * @sig: signal value
2360 * @t: task being signaled
2362 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2363 * and uid that is doing that.
2365 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2367 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2368 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2369 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2370 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2372 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2373 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2374 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2375 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2376 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2378 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2379 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2381 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2385 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2386 * in audit_context */
2387 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2388 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2389 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2390 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2391 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2392 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2393 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2397 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2398 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2399 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2403 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2404 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2405 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2407 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2409 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2410 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2411 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2412 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2413 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2414 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2421 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2422 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2423 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2424 * @old: the old credentials
2426 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2427 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2431 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2432 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2434 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2435 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2436 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2437 struct dentry *dentry;
2439 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2443 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2444 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2445 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2447 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2448 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2451 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2452 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2453 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2454 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2456 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2457 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2458 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2460 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2461 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2462 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2467 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2468 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2469 * @new: the new credentials
2470 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2472 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2473 * audit system if applicable
2475 int __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
2476 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2478 struct audit_aux_data_capset *ax;
2479 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2481 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2484 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2488 ax->d.type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2489 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2490 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2493 ax->cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2494 ax->cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2495 ax->cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2501 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2502 * @signr: signal value
2504 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2505 * should record the event for investigation.
2507 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2509 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2511 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
2513 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2518 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2521 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2522 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2523 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2524 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
2525 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
2530 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
2531 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
2533 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
2534 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
2537 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2538 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2539 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);