1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
21 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
23 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
24 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
26 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
27 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
28 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 #include <linux/init.h>
33 #include <asm/atomic.h>
34 #include <asm/types.h>
36 #include <linux/module.h>
38 #include <linux/audit.h>
39 #include <linux/personality.h>
40 #include <linux/time.h>
41 #include <asm/unistd.h>
44 1 = put_count checking
45 2 = verbose put_count checking
49 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
50 extern int audit_enabled;
52 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
53 * for saving names from getname(). */
54 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
56 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
57 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
59 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
61 /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
62 a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
63 the syscall filter. */
65 AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
66 * No syscall-specific audit records can
68 AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
69 * but don't necessarily fill it in at
70 * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
72 AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
73 * and always fill it in at syscall
74 * entry time. This makes a full
75 * syscall record available if some
76 * other part of the kernel decides it
77 * should be recorded. */
78 AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
79 * always fill it in at syscall entry
80 * time, and always write out the audit
81 * record at syscall exit time. */
84 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
85 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
86 * pointers at syscall exit time).
88 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
99 struct audit_aux_data {
100 struct audit_aux_data *next;
104 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
106 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
107 struct audit_aux_data d;
109 unsigned long qbytes;
116 /* The per-task audit context. */
117 struct audit_context {
118 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
119 enum audit_state state;
120 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
121 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
122 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
123 int major; /* syscall number */
124 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
125 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
126 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
127 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
129 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
130 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
131 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
133 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
135 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
136 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
137 unsigned long personality;
147 /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
148 * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
149 * syscall exit time. */
150 static LIST_HEAD(audit_tsklist);
151 static LIST_HEAD(audit_entlist);
152 static LIST_HEAD(audit_extlist);
155 struct list_head list;
157 struct audit_rule rule;
160 /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
161 * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
162 static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
166 if (a->flags != b->flags)
169 if (a->action != b->action)
172 if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
175 for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
176 if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
177 || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
181 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
182 if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
188 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
189 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
190 * audit_netlink_sem. */
191 static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
192 struct list_head *list)
194 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_PREPEND) {
195 entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_PREPEND;
196 list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
198 list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
203 static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
205 struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
209 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
210 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
211 * audit_netlink_sem. */
212 static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
213 struct list_head *list)
215 struct audit_entry *e;
217 /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
218 * deletion routine. */
219 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
220 if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
221 list_del_rcu(&e->list);
222 call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
226 return -EFAULT; /* No matching rule */
230 /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called during
232 static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
236 if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
237 && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
238 && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
240 if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
244 d->action = s->action;
245 d->field_count = s->field_count;
246 for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
247 d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
248 d->values[i] = s->values[i];
250 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
254 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data)
257 struct audit_entry *entry;
262 /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
263 always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
264 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_tsklist, list)
265 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
266 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
267 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_entlist, list)
268 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
269 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
270 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_extlist, list)
271 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
272 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
273 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
276 if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
278 if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) {
282 flags = entry->rule.flags;
283 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
284 err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_tsklist);
285 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
286 err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_entlist);
287 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
288 err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_extlist);
291 flags =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags;
292 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
293 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_tsklist);
294 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
295 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_entlist);
296 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
297 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_extlist);
307 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
309 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
310 struct audit_rule *rule,
311 struct audit_context *ctx,
312 enum audit_state *state)
316 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
317 u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
318 u32 value = rule->values[i];
323 result = (tsk->pid == value);
326 result = (tsk->uid == value);
329 result = (tsk->euid == value);
332 result = (tsk->suid == value);
335 result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
338 result = (tsk->gid == value);
341 result = (tsk->egid == value);
344 result = (tsk->sgid == value);
347 result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
350 result = (tsk->personality == value);
354 result = (ctx->arch == value);
358 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
359 result = (ctx->return_code == value);
362 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
363 result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
367 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
368 if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
377 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
378 if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
387 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
388 if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
398 result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
405 result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
409 if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
414 switch (rule->action) {
415 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
416 case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
417 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
422 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
423 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
424 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
426 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
428 struct audit_entry *e;
429 enum audit_state state;
432 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_tsklist, list) {
433 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
439 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
442 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
443 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
444 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write and audit
445 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
447 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
448 struct audit_context *ctx,
449 struct list_head *list)
451 struct audit_entry *e;
452 enum audit_state state;
453 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
454 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
457 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
458 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
459 && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
465 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
468 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
469 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
473 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
475 if (likely(!context))
477 context->return_valid = return_valid;
478 context->return_code = return_code;
480 if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
481 enum audit_state state;
482 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_extlist);
483 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
484 context->auditable = 1;
487 context->pid = tsk->pid;
488 context->uid = tsk->uid;
489 context->gid = tsk->gid;
490 context->euid = tsk->euid;
491 context->suid = tsk->suid;
492 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
493 context->egid = tsk->egid;
494 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
495 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
496 context->personality = tsk->personality;
497 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
501 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
506 if (context->auditable
507 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
508 printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
509 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
510 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
512 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
513 context->name_count, context->put_count,
515 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
516 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
517 context->names[i].name,
518 context->names[i].name);
524 context->put_count = 0;
525 context->ino_count = 0;
528 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
529 if (context->names[i].name)
530 __putname(context->names[i].name);
531 context->name_count = 0;
534 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
536 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
538 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
539 context->aux = aux->next;
544 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
545 enum audit_state state)
547 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
549 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
550 context->state = state;
551 context->loginuid = loginuid;
554 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
556 struct audit_context *context;
558 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
560 audit_zero_context(context, state);
564 /* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
565 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
566 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
568 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
570 struct audit_context *context;
571 enum audit_state state;
573 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
574 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
576 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
577 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
580 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
581 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
585 /* Preserve login uid */
586 context->loginuid = -1;
587 if (current->audit_context)
588 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
590 tsk->audit_context = context;
591 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
595 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
597 struct audit_context *previous;
601 previous = context->previous;
602 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
604 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
605 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
606 context->serial, context->major,
607 context->name_count, count);
609 audit_free_names(context);
610 audit_free_aux(context);
615 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
618 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
620 char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
621 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
622 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
624 get_task_comm(name, current);
625 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=%s", name);
630 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
633 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
635 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
636 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
637 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
642 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
645 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
648 struct audit_buffer *ab;
650 ab = audit_log_start(context);
652 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
653 audit_log_format(ab, "syscall=%d", context->major);
654 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
655 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
656 audit_log_format(ab, " arch=%x", context->arch);
657 if (context->return_valid)
658 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
659 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
660 context->return_code);
662 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
663 " pid=%d loginuid=%d uid=%d gid=%d"
664 " euid=%d suid=%d fsuid=%d"
665 " egid=%d sgid=%d fsgid=%d",
675 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
676 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
677 audit_log_task_info(ab);
679 while (context->aux) {
680 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
682 ab = audit_log_start(context);
684 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
687 context->aux = aux->next;
689 audit_log_format(ab, "auxitem=%d", aux->type);
691 case AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM: {
692 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
694 " qbytes=%lx uid=%d gid=%d mode=%x",
695 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
702 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
703 ab = audit_log_start(context);
705 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
706 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
707 if (context->names[i].name) {
708 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
709 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
711 if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
712 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
713 " uid=%d gid=%d rdev=%02x:%02x",
714 context->names[i].ino,
715 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
716 MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
717 context->names[i].mode,
718 context->names[i].uid,
719 context->names[i].gid,
720 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
721 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
726 /* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
727 * __put_task_struct. */
728 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
730 struct audit_context *context;
733 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
736 if (likely(!context))
739 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
740 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */
741 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
742 audit_log_exit(context);
744 audit_free_context(context);
747 /* Compute a serial number for the audit record. Audit records are
748 * written to user-space as soon as they are generated, so a complete
749 * audit record may be written in several pieces. The timestamp of the
750 * record and this serial number are used by the user-space daemon to
751 * determine which pieces belong to the same audit record. The
752 * (timestamp,serial) tuple is unique for each syscall and is live from
753 * syscall entry to syscall exit.
755 * Atomic values are only guaranteed to be 24-bit, so we count down.
757 * NOTE: Another possibility is to store the formatted records off the
758 * audit context (for those records that have a context), and emit them
759 * all at syscall exit. However, this could delay the reporting of
760 * significant errors until syscall exit (or never, if the system
762 static inline unsigned int audit_serial(void)
764 static atomic_t serial = ATOMIC_INIT(0xffffff);
768 a = atomic_read(&serial);
769 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&serial))
770 atomic_set(&serial, 0xffffff);
771 b = atomic_read(&serial);
772 } while (b != a - 1);
777 /* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
778 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
779 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
780 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
781 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
782 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
784 void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
785 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
786 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
788 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
789 enum audit_state state;
793 /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
794 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
795 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
796 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
797 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
801 * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
803 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
804 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
806 if (context->in_syscall) {
807 struct audit_context *newctx;
809 #if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
810 /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
811 if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
816 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
817 " entering syscall=%d\n",
818 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
820 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
822 newctx->previous = context;
824 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
826 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
827 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
828 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
829 * to abandon auditing. */
830 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
833 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
838 context->arch = arch;
839 context->major = major;
840 context->argv[0] = a1;
841 context->argv[1] = a2;
842 context->argv[2] = a3;
843 context->argv[3] = a4;
845 state = context->state;
846 if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
847 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_entlist);
848 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
851 context->serial = audit_serial();
852 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
853 context->in_syscall = 1;
854 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
857 /* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
858 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
859 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
860 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
861 * free the names stored from getname(). */
862 void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
864 struct audit_context *context;
866 get_task_struct(tsk);
868 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
871 /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
872 * called __put_task_struct. */
873 if (likely(!context))
876 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
877 audit_log_exit(context);
879 context->in_syscall = 0;
880 context->auditable = 0;
882 if (context->previous) {
883 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
884 context->previous = NULL;
885 audit_free_context(context);
886 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
888 audit_free_names(context);
889 audit_free_aux(context);
890 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
891 tsk->audit_context = context;
893 put_task_struct(tsk);
896 /* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
897 void audit_getname(const char *name)
899 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
901 if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
904 if (!context->in_syscall) {
906 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
907 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
912 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
913 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
914 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
915 ++context->name_count;
918 /* Intercept a putname request. Called from
919 * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
920 * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
922 void audit_putname(const char *name)
924 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
927 if (!context->in_syscall) {
929 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
930 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
931 if (context->name_count) {
933 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
934 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
935 context->names[i].name,
936 context->names[i].name);
943 ++context->put_count;
944 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
945 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
946 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
949 context->serial, context->major,
950 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
958 /* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
959 * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
960 void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
963 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
965 if (!context->in_syscall)
967 if (context->name_count
968 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
969 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
970 idx = context->name_count - 1;
971 else if (context->name_count > 1
972 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
973 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
974 idx = context->name_count - 2;
976 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
977 * associated name? */
978 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
980 idx = context->name_count++;
981 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
983 ++context->ino_count;
986 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
987 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
988 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
989 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
990 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
991 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
994 void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
995 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
998 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
999 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1000 *serial = ctx->serial;
1008 extern int audit_set_type(struct audit_buffer *ab, int type);
1010 int audit_set_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx, uid_t loginuid)
1013 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1015 ab = audit_log_start(NULL);
1017 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1018 "old loginuid=%u new loginuid=%u",
1019 ctx->pid, ctx->uid, ctx->loginuid, loginuid);
1020 audit_set_type(ab, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1023 ctx->loginuid = loginuid;
1028 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1030 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1033 int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
1035 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1036 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1038 if (likely(!context))
1041 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
1045 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1050 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM;
1051 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1052 context->aux = (void *)ax;