2 * AppArmor security module
4 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
15 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
16 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
18 #include <linux/mman.h>
19 #include <linux/mount.h>
20 #include <linux/namei.h>
21 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
22 #include <linux/ctype.h>
23 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
24 #include <linux/audit.h>
25 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
26 #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
29 #include "include/apparmor.h"
30 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
31 #include "include/audit.h"
32 #include "include/capability.h"
33 #include "include/context.h"
34 #include "include/file.h"
35 #include "include/ipc.h"
36 #include "include/path.h"
37 #include "include/policy.h"
38 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
39 #include "include/procattr.h"
41 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
42 int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
44 DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
52 * free the associated aa_task_ctx and put its profiles
54 static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
56 aa_free_task_context(cred_ctx(cred));
57 cred_ctx(cred) = NULL;
61 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
63 static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
65 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
66 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
76 * prepare new aa_task_ctx for modification by prepare_cred block
78 static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
81 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
82 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
87 aa_dup_task_context(ctx, cred_ctx(old));
93 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
95 static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
97 const struct aa_task_ctx *old_ctx = cred_ctx(old);
98 struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(new);
100 aa_dup_task_context(new_ctx, old_ctx);
103 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
106 return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
109 static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
111 return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
114 /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
115 static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
116 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
118 struct aa_profile *profile;
119 const struct cred *cred;
122 cred = __task_cred(target);
123 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
126 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
127 * initialize effective and permitted.
129 if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
130 *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
131 *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
138 static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
141 struct aa_profile *profile;
144 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
145 if (!unconfined(profile))
146 error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
151 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
152 * @op: operation being checked
153 * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
154 * @mask: requested permissions mask
155 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
157 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
159 static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
160 struct path_cond *cond)
162 struct aa_profile *profile;
165 profile = __aa_current_profile();
166 if (!unconfined(profile))
167 error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
173 * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond
174 * @op: operation being checked
175 * @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
176 * @mask: requested permissions mask
178 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
180 static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
182 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
183 d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
186 if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry))
189 return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
193 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
194 * @op: operation being checked
195 * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
196 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
197 * @mask: requested permissions mask
198 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
200 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
202 static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
203 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
204 struct path_cond *cond)
206 struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
208 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
212 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
213 * @op: operation being checked
214 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
215 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
216 * @mask: requested permission mask
218 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
220 static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
221 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
223 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
224 struct path_cond cond = { };
226 if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
229 cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
230 cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
232 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
236 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
237 * @op: operation being checked
238 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
239 * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
240 * @mask: request permission mask
241 * @mode: created file mode
243 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
245 static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
246 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
248 struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
250 if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry))
253 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
256 static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
258 return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
261 static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
264 return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
268 static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
270 return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
273 static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
274 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
276 return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
279 static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
281 return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE);
284 static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
285 const char *old_name)
287 return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
291 static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
292 struct dentry *new_dentry)
294 struct aa_profile *profile;
297 if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
300 profile = aa_current_profile();
301 if (!unconfined(profile))
302 error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
306 static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
307 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
309 struct aa_profile *profile;
312 if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
315 profile = aa_current_profile();
316 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
317 struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
318 .dentry = old_dentry };
319 struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
320 .dentry = new_dentry };
321 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
322 d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
325 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
326 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
327 AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
330 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
331 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
332 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
338 static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
340 return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
343 static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
345 return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
348 static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
350 return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_META_READ);
353 static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
355 struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file->f_security;
356 struct aa_profile *profile;
359 if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
362 /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
363 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
364 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
365 * actually execute the image.
367 if (current->in_execve) {
368 fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
372 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
373 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
374 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
375 struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
377 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
378 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
379 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
380 fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
386 static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
388 /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
389 file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
390 if (!file->f_security)
396 static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
398 struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file->f_security;
400 aa_free_file_context(ctx);
403 static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
405 struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file->f_security;
406 struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
411 if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
412 !path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
415 profile = __aa_current_profile();
417 /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
418 * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
421 * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
422 * delegation from unconfined tasks
424 if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
425 ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fctx->allow)))
426 error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
431 static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
433 return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
436 static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
438 u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
443 return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
446 static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
451 if (!file || !file->f_security)
454 if (prot & PROT_READ)
457 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
458 * write back to the files
460 if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
462 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
463 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
465 return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
468 static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
469 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
471 return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
474 static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
475 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
477 return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
478 !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
481 static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
486 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
487 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
488 struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
490 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
491 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ctx->profile);
492 else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous)
493 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ctx->previous);
494 else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
495 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ctx->onexec);
500 error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value);
502 aa_put_profile(profile);
508 static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
511 char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
514 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR);
519 /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
520 if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
522 largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
525 memcpy(args, value, size);
531 command = strsep(&args, " ");
534 args = skip_spaces(args);
538 arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
539 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
540 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
541 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
543 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
544 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
546 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
547 error = aa_change_profile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
549 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
550 error = aa_change_profile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, AA_DO_TEST,
554 } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
555 if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
556 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_ONEXEC, !AA_DO_TEST,
561 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
571 aad(&sa)->profile = aa_current_profile();
572 aad(&sa)->info = name;
573 aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL;
574 aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
578 static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
579 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
581 struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
584 if (!unconfined(profile))
585 error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim);
590 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
591 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
592 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
593 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
594 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
596 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
597 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
598 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
599 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
600 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
601 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
602 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
603 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
604 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
605 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
606 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
608 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
609 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
610 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
611 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
612 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
613 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
614 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
616 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
617 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
619 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
620 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
621 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
622 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
624 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
625 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
626 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
627 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
629 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
633 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
636 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
637 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
638 #define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
639 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
640 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
641 .set = param_set_aabool,
642 .get = param_get_aabool
645 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
646 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
647 #define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
648 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
649 .set = param_set_aauint,
650 .get = param_get_aauint
653 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
654 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
655 #define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
656 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
657 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
658 .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
659 .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
662 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
663 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
665 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
666 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
668 /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
669 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
672 /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
673 enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
674 module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
675 &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
677 /* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
678 bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
679 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
680 module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
684 bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
685 module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
688 enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
689 module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
690 &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
692 /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
693 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
695 bool aa_g_audit_header = 1;
696 module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
699 /* lock out loading/removal of policy
700 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
701 * load policy, if lock_policy is set
703 bool aa_g_lock_policy;
704 module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
707 /* Syscall logging mode */
708 bool aa_g_logsyscall;
709 module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
711 /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
712 unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
713 module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
715 /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
716 * on the loaded policy is done.
717 * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
718 * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
720 bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
721 module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
723 /* Boot time disable flag */
724 static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
725 module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
727 static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
729 unsigned long enabled;
730 int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
732 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
736 __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
738 /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
739 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
741 if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
743 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
746 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
748 if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
750 if (!apparmor_enabled)
752 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
755 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
757 if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
759 if (!apparmor_enabled)
761 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
764 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
766 if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
768 if (!apparmor_enabled)
770 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
773 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
775 if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
777 if (!apparmor_enabled)
779 return param_set_uint(val, kp);
782 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
784 if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
786 if (!apparmor_enabled)
788 return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
791 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
793 if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
796 if (!apparmor_enabled)
799 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
802 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
805 if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
808 if (!apparmor_enabled)
814 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
815 if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
824 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
826 if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
829 if (!apparmor_enabled)
832 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
835 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
838 if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
841 if (!apparmor_enabled)
847 for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
848 if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
849 aa_g_profile_mode = i;
858 * AppArmor init functions
862 * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task.
864 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
866 static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
868 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
869 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
871 ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
875 ctx->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
876 cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
881 static void destroy_buffers(void)
885 for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
886 for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
887 kfree(per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j]);
888 per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = NULL;
893 static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
897 for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
898 for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
901 if (cpu_to_node(i) > num_online_nodes())
902 /* fallback to kmalloc for offline nodes */
903 buffer = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL);
905 buffer = kmalloc_node(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL,
911 per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = buffer;
919 static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
920 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
922 if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
924 if (!apparmor_enabled)
927 return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
930 static struct ctl_path apparmor_sysctl_path[] = {
931 { .procname = "kernel", },
935 static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
937 .procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy",
938 .data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy,
939 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
941 .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec,
946 static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
948 return register_sysctl_paths(apparmor_sysctl_path,
949 apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
952 static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
956 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
958 static int __init apparmor_init(void)
962 if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
963 aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
964 apparmor_enabled = 0;
968 error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
970 AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
974 error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
976 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
980 error = apparmor_init_sysctl();
982 AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n");
987 error = alloc_buffers();
989 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n");
993 error = set_init_ctx();
995 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
999 security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
1002 /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
1003 apparmor_initialized = 1;
1004 if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
1005 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
1006 else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
1007 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
1009 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
1018 aa_teardown_dfa_engine();
1020 apparmor_enabled = 0;
1024 security_initcall(apparmor_init);