]> git.karo-electronics.de Git - karo-tx-linux.git/blob - security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
70f888de880de0dab9d5f9a58438ee94afb4dbef
[karo-tx-linux.git] / security / integrity / ima / ima_policy.c
1 /*
2  * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
3  * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
4  *
5  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7  * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
8  *
9  * ima_policy.c
10  *      - initialize default measure policy rules
11  *
12  */
13 #include <linux/module.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
15 #include <linux/security.h>
16 #include <linux/magic.h>
17 #include <linux/parser.h>
18 #include <linux/slab.h>
19
20 #include "ima.h"
21
22 /* flags definitions */
23 #define IMA_FUNC        0x0001
24 #define IMA_MASK        0x0002
25 #define IMA_FSMAGIC     0x0004
26 #define IMA_UID         0x0008
27 #define IMA_FOWNER      0x0010
28
29 #define UNKNOWN         0
30 #define MEASURE         0x0001  /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
31 #define DONT_MEASURE    0x0002
32 #define APPRAISE        0x0004  /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
33 #define DONT_APPRAISE   0x0008
34 #define AUDIT           0x0040
35
36 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
37 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
38         LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
39 };
40
41 struct ima_rule_entry {
42         struct list_head list;
43         int action;
44         unsigned int flags;
45         enum ima_hooks func;
46         int mask;
47         unsigned long fsmagic;
48         kuid_t uid;
49         kuid_t fowner;
50         struct {
51                 void *rule;     /* LSM file metadata specific */
52                 void *args_p;   /* audit value */
53                 int type;       /* audit type */
54         } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
55 };
56
57 /*
58  * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
59  * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
60  */
61
62 /*
63  * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage.  Measures all files
64  * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root.  Dangerous because
65  * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
66  * and running executables.
67  */
68 static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
69         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
70         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
71         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
72         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
73         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
74         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
75         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
76         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
77         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
78         {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
79          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
80         {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
81          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
82         {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
83          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
84         {.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
85 };
86
87 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
88         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
89         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
90         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
91         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
92         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
93         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
94         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
95         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
96         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
97         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
98         {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
99 };
100
101 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
102 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
103 static struct list_head *ima_rules;
104
105 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
106
107 static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
108 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
109 {
110         ima_use_tcb = 1;
111         return 1;
112 }
113 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
114
115 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
116 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
117 {
118         ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
119         return 1;
120 }
121 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
122
123 /* 
124  * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
125  * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
126  * stale LSM policy.
127  *
128  * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. 
129  * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
130  */
131 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
132 {
133         struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
134         int result;
135         int i;
136
137         mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
138         list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
139                 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
140                         if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
141                                 continue;
142                         result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type,
143                                                            Audit_equal,
144                                                            entry->lsm[i].args_p,
145                                                            &entry->lsm[i].rule);
146                         BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule);
147                 }
148         }
149         mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
150 }
151
152 /**
153  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
154  * @rule: a pointer to a rule
155  * @inode: a pointer to an inode
156  * @func: LIM hook identifier
157  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
158  *
159  * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
160  */
161 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
162                             struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
163 {
164         struct task_struct *tsk = current;
165         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
166         int i;
167
168         if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
169                 return false;
170         if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
171                 return false;
172         if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
173             && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
174                 return false;
175         if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
176                 return false;
177         if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
178                 return false;
179         for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
180                 int rc = 0;
181                 u32 osid, sid;
182                 int retried = 0;
183
184                 if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
185                         continue;
186 retry:
187                 switch (i) {
188                 case LSM_OBJ_USER:
189                 case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
190                 case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
191                         security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
192                         rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
193                                                         rule->lsm[i].type,
194                                                         Audit_equal,
195                                                         rule->lsm[i].rule,
196                                                         NULL);
197                         break;
198                 case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
199                 case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
200                 case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
201                         security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
202                         rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
203                                                         rule->lsm[i].type,
204                                                         Audit_equal,
205                                                         rule->lsm[i].rule,
206                                                         NULL);
207                 default:
208                         break;
209                 }
210                 if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) {
211                         retried = 1;
212                         ima_lsm_update_rules();
213                         goto retry;
214                 } 
215                 if (!rc)
216                         return false;
217         }
218         return true;
219 }
220
221 /**
222  * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
223  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
224  * @func: IMA hook identifier
225  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
226  *
227  * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
228  * conditions.
229  *
230  * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list,
231  * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
232  * change.)
233  */
234 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
235                      int flags)
236 {
237         struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
238         int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
239
240         list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
241
242                 if (!(entry->action & actmask))
243                         continue;
244
245                 if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
246                         continue;
247
248                 action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
249                 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
250                         actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
251                 else
252                         actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
253
254                 if (!actmask)
255                         break;
256         }
257
258         return action;
259 }
260
261 /**
262  * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
263  *
264  * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
265  * the new ima_policy_rules.
266  */
267 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
268 {
269         int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
270
271         /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
272         measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
273         appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
274                          ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
275         
276         for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
277                 if (i < measure_entries)
278                         list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
279                                       &ima_default_rules);
280                 else {
281                         int j = i - measure_entries;
282
283                         list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[j].list,
284                                       &ima_default_rules);
285                 }
286         }
287
288         ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
289 }
290
291 /**
292  * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
293  *
294  * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
295  * policy.  Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be
296  * added to the policy.
297  */
298 void ima_update_policy(void)
299 {
300         const char *op = "policy_update";
301         const char *cause = "already exists";
302         int result = 1;
303         int audit_info = 0;
304
305         if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
306                 ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
307                 cause = "complete";
308                 result = 0;
309         }
310         integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
311                             NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info);
312 }
313
314 enum {
315         Opt_err = -1,
316         Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
317         Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
318         Opt_audit,
319         Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
320         Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
321         Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner
322 };
323
324 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
325         {Opt_measure, "measure"},
326         {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
327         {Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
328         {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
329         {Opt_audit, "audit"},
330         {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
331         {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
332         {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
333         {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
334         {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
335         {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
336         {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
337         {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
338         {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
339         {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
340         {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
341         {Opt_err, NULL}
342 };
343
344 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
345                              substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
346 {
347         int result;
348
349         if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
350                 return -EINVAL;
351
352         entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
353         if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p)
354                 return -ENOMEM;
355
356         entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
357         result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
358                                            Audit_equal,
359                                            entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
360                                            &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
361         if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
362                 kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
363                 return -EINVAL;
364         }
365
366         return result;
367 }
368
369 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
370 {
371         audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
372         audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
373         audit_log_format(ab, " ");
374 }
375
376 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
377 {
378         struct audit_buffer *ab;
379         char *p;
380         int result = 0;
381
382         ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
383
384         entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
385         entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
386         entry->action = UNKNOWN;
387         while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
388                 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
389                 int token;
390                 unsigned long lnum;
391
392                 if (result < 0)
393                         break;
394                 if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
395                         continue;
396                 token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
397                 switch (token) {
398                 case Opt_measure:
399                         ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
400
401                         if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
402                                 result = -EINVAL;
403
404                         entry->action = MEASURE;
405                         break;
406                 case Opt_dont_measure:
407                         ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
408
409                         if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
410                                 result = -EINVAL;
411
412                         entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
413                         break;
414                 case Opt_appraise:
415                         ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
416
417                         if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
418                                 result = -EINVAL;
419
420                         entry->action = APPRAISE;
421                         break;
422                 case Opt_dont_appraise:
423                         ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
424
425                         if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
426                                 result = -EINVAL;
427
428                         entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
429                         break;
430                 case Opt_audit:
431                         ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit");
432
433                         if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
434                                 result = -EINVAL;
435
436                         entry->action = AUDIT;
437                         break;
438                 case Opt_func:
439                         ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
440
441                         if (entry->func)
442                                 result = -EINVAL;
443
444                         if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
445                                 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
446                         /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
447                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
448                                 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
449                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
450                                 entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
451                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
452                                 entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
453                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
454                                 entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
455                         else
456                                 result = -EINVAL;
457                         if (!result)
458                                 entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
459                         break;
460                 case Opt_mask:
461                         ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
462
463                         if (entry->mask)
464                                 result = -EINVAL;
465
466                         if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
467                                 entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
468                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
469                                 entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
470                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
471                                 entry->mask = MAY_READ;
472                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
473                                 entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
474                         else
475                                 result = -EINVAL;
476                         if (!result)
477                                 entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
478                         break;
479                 case Opt_fsmagic:
480                         ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
481
482                         if (entry->fsmagic) {
483                                 result = -EINVAL;
484                                 break;
485                         }
486
487                         result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
488                                                 &entry->fsmagic);
489                         if (!result)
490                                 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
491                         break;
492                 case Opt_uid:
493                         ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
494
495                         if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
496                                 result = -EINVAL;
497                                 break;
498                         }
499
500                         result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
501                         if (!result) {
502                                 entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
503                                 if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
504                                         result = -EINVAL;
505                                 else
506                                         entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
507                         }
508                         break;
509                 case Opt_fowner:
510                         ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
511
512                         if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
513                                 result = -EINVAL;
514                                 break;
515                         }
516
517                         result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
518                         if (!result) {
519                                 entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
520                                 if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
521                                         result = -EINVAL;
522                                 else
523                                         entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
524                         }
525                         break;
526                 case Opt_obj_user:
527                         ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
528                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
529                                                    LSM_OBJ_USER,
530                                                    AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
531                         break;
532                 case Opt_obj_role:
533                         ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
534                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
535                                                    LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
536                                                    AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
537                         break;
538                 case Opt_obj_type:
539                         ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
540                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
541                                                    LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
542                                                    AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
543                         break;
544                 case Opt_subj_user:
545                         ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
546                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
547                                                    LSM_SUBJ_USER,
548                                                    AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
549                         break;
550                 case Opt_subj_role:
551                         ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
552                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
553                                                    LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
554                                                    AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
555                         break;
556                 case Opt_subj_type:
557                         ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
558                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
559                                                    LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
560                                                    AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
561                         break;
562                 case Opt_err:
563                         ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
564                         result = -EINVAL;
565                         break;
566                 }
567         }
568         if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
569                 result = -EINVAL;
570
571         audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
572         audit_log_end(ab);
573         return result;
574 }
575
576 /**
577  * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
578  * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
579  *
580  * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
581  * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
582  */
583 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
584 {
585         const char *op = "update_policy";
586         char *p;
587         struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
588         ssize_t result, len;
589         int audit_info = 0;
590
591         /* Prevent installed policy from changing */
592         if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) {
593                 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
594                                     NULL, op, "already exists",
595                                     -EACCES, audit_info);
596                 return -EACCES;
597         }
598
599         entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
600         if (!entry) {
601                 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
602                                     NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
603                 return -ENOMEM;
604         }
605
606         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
607
608         p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
609         len = strlen(p) + 1;
610
611         if (*p == '#') {
612                 kfree(entry);
613                 return len;
614         }
615
616         result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
617         if (result) {
618                 kfree(entry);
619                 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
620                                     NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
621                                     audit_info);
622                 return result;
623         }
624
625         mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
626         list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
627         mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
628
629         return len;
630 }
631
632 /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
633 void ima_delete_rules(void)
634 {
635         struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
636         int i;
637
638         mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
639         list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
640                 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
641                         kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
642
643                 list_del(&entry->list);
644                 kfree(entry);
645         }
646         mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
647 }