2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
79 #include <linux/syslog.h>
90 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
91 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
93 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
129 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
132 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
135 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
136 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
137 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
138 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
141 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
147 * initialise the security for the init task
149 static void cred_init_security(void)
151 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
152 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
154 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
156 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
158 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
159 cred->security = tsec;
163 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
165 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
167 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
169 tsec = cred->security;
174 * get the objective security ID of a task
176 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
181 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
187 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
189 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
191 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
196 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
198 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
200 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
201 u32 sid = current_sid();
203 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
207 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
208 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
210 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
211 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
212 isec->task_sid = sid;
213 inode->i_security = isec;
218 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
220 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
223 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
224 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
225 list_del_init(&isec->list);
226 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
228 inode->i_security = NULL;
229 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
232 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
234 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
235 u32 sid = current_sid();
237 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
242 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
243 file->f_security = fsec;
248 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
250 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
251 file->f_security = NULL;
255 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
257 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
259 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
263 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
264 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
265 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
267 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
268 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
269 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
270 sb->s_security = sbsec;
275 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
277 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
278 sb->s_security = NULL;
282 /* The security server must be initialized before
283 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
284 extern int ss_initialized;
286 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
288 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
290 "uses transition SIDs",
292 "uses genfs_contexts",
293 "not configured for labeling",
294 "uses mountpoint labeling",
297 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
299 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
301 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
310 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
313 static const match_table_t tokens = {
314 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
317 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
318 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
322 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
324 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
325 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
326 const struct cred *cred)
328 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
331 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
332 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
336 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
337 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
341 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
342 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
343 const struct cred *cred)
345 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
347 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
348 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
352 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
353 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
357 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
359 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
360 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
361 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
364 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
365 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
366 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
367 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
368 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
369 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
370 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
371 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
372 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
376 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
377 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
378 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
379 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
380 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
381 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
383 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
384 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
385 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
390 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
392 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
393 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
394 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
396 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
397 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
398 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
400 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
401 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
402 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
403 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
404 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
406 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
407 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
408 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
410 /* Initialize the root inode. */
411 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
413 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
414 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
415 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
417 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
419 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
420 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
421 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
422 struct inode_security_struct, list);
423 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
424 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
425 inode = igrab(inode);
427 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
431 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
432 list_del_init(&isec->list);
435 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
441 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
442 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
443 * mount options, or whatever.
445 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
446 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
449 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
450 char *context = NULL;
454 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
456 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
462 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
463 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
464 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
466 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
469 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
470 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
471 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
473 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
474 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
479 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
480 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
486 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
487 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
490 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
491 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
493 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
494 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
497 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
498 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
500 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
501 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
504 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
505 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
507 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
508 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
509 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
511 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
514 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
515 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
517 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
518 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
519 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
522 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
527 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
531 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
532 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
534 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
536 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
537 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
538 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
539 (old_sid != new_sid))
542 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
543 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
545 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
546 if (mnt_flags & flag)
552 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
553 * labeling information.
555 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
556 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
558 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
560 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
561 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
562 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
563 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
564 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
565 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
566 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
567 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
568 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
570 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
572 if (!ss_initialized) {
574 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
575 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
576 server is ready to handle calls. */
580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
581 "before the security server is initialized\n");
586 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
587 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
588 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
589 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
591 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
592 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
593 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
594 * will be used for both mounts)
596 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
601 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
602 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
603 * than once with different security options.
605 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
608 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
610 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
611 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
613 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
614 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
615 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
622 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
624 goto out_double_mount;
626 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
631 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
633 goto out_double_mount;
635 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
637 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
638 rootcontext_sid = sid;
640 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
642 goto out_double_mount;
644 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
648 defcontext_sid = sid;
650 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
652 goto out_double_mount;
654 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
663 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
664 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
665 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
666 goto out_double_mount;
671 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
672 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
674 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
675 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
677 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
678 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
682 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
684 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
688 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
692 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
693 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
694 * the superblock context if not already set.
697 if (!fscontext_sid) {
698 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
702 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
704 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
709 if (!rootcontext_sid)
710 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
712 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
713 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
716 if (rootcontext_sid) {
717 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
722 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
723 root_isec->initialized = 1;
726 if (defcontext_sid) {
727 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
729 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
730 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
734 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
735 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
741 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
744 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
746 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
750 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
751 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
755 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
756 struct super_block *newsb)
758 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
759 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
761 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
762 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
763 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
766 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
767 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
772 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
773 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
775 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
776 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
779 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
781 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
783 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
784 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
785 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
788 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
792 if (!set_rootcontext) {
793 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
794 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
797 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
799 if (set_rootcontext) {
800 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
802 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
803 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
805 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
808 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
809 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
812 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
813 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
816 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
817 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
818 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
820 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
822 /* Standard string-based options. */
823 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
825 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
830 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
834 if (context || defcontext) {
836 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
839 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
849 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
852 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
859 case Opt_rootcontext:
862 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
865 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
873 if (context || defcontext) {
875 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
878 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
884 case Opt_labelsupport:
888 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
895 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
899 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
901 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
906 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
907 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
910 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
911 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
914 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
915 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
918 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
919 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
922 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
933 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
935 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
938 char *options = data;
939 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
941 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
946 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
948 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
953 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
956 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
960 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
961 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
966 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
969 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
970 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
974 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
976 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
979 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
981 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
982 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
985 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
989 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
994 /* we need a comma before each option */
999 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1005 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1007 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1010 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1012 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1018 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1020 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1025 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1027 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1029 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1031 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1033 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1035 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1037 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1039 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1041 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1045 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1048 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1050 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1053 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1055 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1058 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1064 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1065 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1067 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1074 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1075 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1077 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1079 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1080 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1082 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1084 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1086 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1093 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1095 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1100 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1101 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1102 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1104 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1105 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1106 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1107 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1108 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1109 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1110 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1112 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1115 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1117 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1122 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1125 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1126 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1131 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1133 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1138 end = buffer+buflen;
1143 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1144 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1148 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1153 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1154 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1158 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1166 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1167 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1169 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1170 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1172 struct dentry *dentry;
1173 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1174 char *context = NULL;
1178 if (isec->initialized)
1181 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1182 if (isec->initialized)
1185 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1186 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1187 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1188 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1189 server is ready to handle calls. */
1190 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1191 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1192 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1193 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1197 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1198 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1199 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1200 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1204 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1205 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1207 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1208 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1210 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1211 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1215 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1216 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1217 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1218 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1219 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1220 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1221 * be used again by userspace.
1226 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1227 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1233 context[len] = '\0';
1234 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1236 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1239 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1240 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1247 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1253 context[len] = '\0';
1254 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1260 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1261 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1262 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1263 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1267 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1268 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1271 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1275 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1276 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1278 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1279 if (printk_ratelimit())
1280 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1281 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1282 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1284 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1285 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1286 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1289 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1297 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1298 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1300 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1301 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1302 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1304 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1305 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1306 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1314 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1315 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1318 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1319 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1321 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1322 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1324 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1325 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1336 isec->initialized = 1;
1339 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1341 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1342 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1346 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1347 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1353 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1354 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1357 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1358 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1361 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1362 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1365 /* All other signals. */
1366 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1374 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1375 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1377 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1378 const struct cred *target,
1381 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1383 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1387 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1388 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1389 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1390 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1392 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1393 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1396 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1400 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1401 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1403 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1407 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1408 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1409 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1410 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1412 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1417 sid = current_sid();
1418 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1419 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1422 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1423 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1426 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1427 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1428 const struct cred *cred,
1431 struct common_audit_data ad;
1432 struct av_decision avd;
1434 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1435 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1438 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1442 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1444 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1447 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1451 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1455 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1456 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1457 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1461 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1462 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1465 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1467 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1468 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1471 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1472 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1473 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1474 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1475 struct inode *inode,
1477 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1479 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1480 struct common_audit_data ad;
1483 validate_creds(cred);
1485 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1488 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1489 isec = inode->i_security;
1493 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1494 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1497 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1500 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1501 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1502 pathname if needed. */
1503 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1504 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1505 struct dentry *dentry,
1508 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1509 struct common_audit_data ad;
1511 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1512 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1513 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1514 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1517 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1518 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1519 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1520 check a particular permission to the file.
1521 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1522 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1523 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1524 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1525 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1529 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1530 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1531 struct common_audit_data ad;
1532 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1535 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1536 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1538 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1539 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1547 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1550 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1556 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1557 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1558 struct dentry *dentry,
1561 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1562 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1563 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1565 struct common_audit_data ad;
1568 dsec = dir->i_security;
1569 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1572 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1574 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1575 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1577 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1578 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1583 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1584 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1589 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1593 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1594 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1595 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1598 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1599 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1600 struct task_struct *ctx)
1602 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1604 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1608 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1611 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1612 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1613 struct dentry *dentry,
1617 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1618 struct common_audit_data ad;
1619 u32 sid = current_sid();
1623 dsec = dir->i_security;
1624 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1626 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1627 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1630 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1631 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1646 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1651 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1655 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1656 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1657 struct inode *new_dir,
1658 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1660 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1661 struct common_audit_data ad;
1662 u32 sid = current_sid();
1664 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1667 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1668 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1669 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1670 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1672 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1674 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1675 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1676 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1679 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1680 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1683 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1684 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1685 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1690 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1691 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1692 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1693 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1694 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1697 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1698 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1699 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1700 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1702 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1710 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1711 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1712 struct super_block *sb,
1714 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1716 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1717 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1719 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1720 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1723 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1724 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1728 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1729 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1730 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1731 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1734 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1736 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1740 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1742 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1744 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1751 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1752 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1756 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1758 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1759 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1766 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1775 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1778 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1780 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1782 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1783 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1785 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1789 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1790 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1791 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1792 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1793 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1794 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1795 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1797 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
1798 av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
1800 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1801 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1806 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1808 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1813 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1817 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1818 u32 sid = current_sid();
1819 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1820 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1823 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1826 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1830 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1834 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1837 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1838 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1842 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1846 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1849 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1850 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1851 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1852 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1856 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1857 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1861 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1865 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1866 * which was removed).
1868 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1869 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1870 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1871 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1874 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1879 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1883 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1886 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1889 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1892 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1897 end = buffer+buflen;
1903 const char *name = table->procname;
1904 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1905 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1909 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1912 table = table->parent;
1918 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1920 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1922 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1927 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1934 sid = current_sid();
1936 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1937 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1939 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1940 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1943 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1944 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1946 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1947 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1955 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1956 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1962 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1964 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1976 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1981 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1984 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1990 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1992 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1994 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1997 static int selinux_syslog(int type, bool from_file)
2001 rc = cap_syslog(type, from_file);
2006 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2007 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2008 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2010 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2011 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2012 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2013 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2014 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2016 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2017 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2018 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2019 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2020 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2022 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2029 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2030 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2031 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2033 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2034 * processes that allocate mappings.
2036 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2038 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2040 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2041 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2045 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2048 /* binprm security operations */
2050 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2052 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2053 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2054 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2055 struct common_audit_data ad;
2056 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2059 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2063 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2064 * the script interpreter */
2065 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2068 old_tsec = current_security();
2069 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2070 isec = inode->i_security;
2072 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2073 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2074 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2076 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2077 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2078 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2079 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2081 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2082 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2083 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2084 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2086 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2087 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2088 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2093 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2094 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2096 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2097 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2099 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2100 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2101 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2105 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2106 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2107 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2111 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2112 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2116 /* Check for shared state */
2117 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2118 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2119 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2125 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2126 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2128 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2129 struct task_struct *tracer;
2130 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2134 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2135 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2136 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2142 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2144 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2150 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2151 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2157 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2159 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2167 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2168 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2169 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2170 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2172 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2175 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2178 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2179 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2181 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2182 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2183 struct files_struct *files)
2185 struct common_audit_data ad;
2186 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2187 struct tty_struct *tty;
2188 struct fdtable *fdt;
2192 tty = get_current_tty();
2195 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2196 struct inode *inode;
2198 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2199 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2200 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2201 file may belong to another process and we are only
2202 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2203 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2204 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2205 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2206 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2213 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2217 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2219 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2221 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2223 unsigned long set, i;
2228 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2229 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2231 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2234 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2235 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2240 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2242 file_to_av(file))) {
2244 fd = get_unused_fd();
2254 devnull = dentry_open(
2256 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2258 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2265 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2270 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2273 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2277 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2279 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2281 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2282 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2285 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2286 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2289 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2290 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2292 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2293 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2295 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2296 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2297 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2299 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2300 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2301 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2302 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2303 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2305 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2306 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2308 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2309 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2310 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2311 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2313 update_rlimit_cpu(current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur);
2318 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2321 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2323 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2324 struct itimerval itimer;
2334 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2335 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2336 * flush and unblock signals.
2338 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2339 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2341 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2343 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2344 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2345 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2346 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2347 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2348 __flush_signals(current);
2349 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2350 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2352 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2355 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2356 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2357 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2358 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2359 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2362 /* superblock security operations */
2364 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2366 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2369 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2371 superblock_free_security(sb);
2374 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2379 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2382 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2384 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2385 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2386 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2387 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2388 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2391 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2398 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2402 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2405 int current_size = 0;
2413 while (current_size < len) {
2423 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2425 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2426 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2427 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2433 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2441 in_save = in_end = orig;
2445 open_quote = !open_quote;
2446 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2448 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2450 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2451 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2453 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2455 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2457 } while (*in_end++);
2459 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2460 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2465 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2467 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2468 struct common_audit_data ad;
2471 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2475 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2476 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2479 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2480 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2481 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2484 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2486 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2487 struct common_audit_data ad;
2489 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2490 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2491 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2494 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2497 unsigned long flags,
2500 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2502 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2503 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2504 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2506 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2510 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2512 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2514 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2515 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2518 /* inode security operations */
2520 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2522 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2525 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2527 inode_free_security(inode);
2530 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2531 char **name, void **value,
2534 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2535 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2536 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2537 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2539 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2541 dsec = dir->i_security;
2542 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2545 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2547 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2548 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2549 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2552 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2553 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2556 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2561 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2562 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2563 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2564 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2566 isec->initialized = 1;
2569 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2573 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2580 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2592 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2594 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2597 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2599 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2602 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2604 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2607 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2609 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2612 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2614 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2617 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2619 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2622 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2624 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2627 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2628 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2630 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2633 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2635 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2637 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2640 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2642 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2644 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2647 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2649 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2652 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2656 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2657 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2660 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2662 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2663 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2665 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2666 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2667 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2673 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2674 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2675 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2677 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2680 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2682 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2684 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2687 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2689 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2691 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2692 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2693 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2694 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2696 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2697 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2698 Restrict to administrator. */
2703 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2704 ordinary setattr permission. */
2705 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2708 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2709 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2711 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2712 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2713 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2714 struct common_audit_data ad;
2715 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2718 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2719 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2721 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2722 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2725 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2728 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2729 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2731 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2732 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2736 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2737 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2738 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2740 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2745 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2746 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2750 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2755 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2757 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2758 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2762 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2763 const void *value, size_t size,
2766 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2767 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2771 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2772 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2776 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2778 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2779 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2780 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2788 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2790 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2792 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2795 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2797 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2799 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2802 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2804 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2805 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2807 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2808 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2813 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2815 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2817 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2821 char *context = NULL;
2822 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2824 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2828 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2829 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2830 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2831 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2832 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2833 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2834 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2836 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2837 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2839 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2842 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2855 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2856 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2858 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2862 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2865 if (!value || !size)
2868 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2873 isec->initialized = 1;
2877 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2879 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2880 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2881 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2885 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2887 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2891 /* file security operations */
2893 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2895 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2896 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2898 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2899 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2902 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2903 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2906 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2908 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2909 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2910 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2911 u32 sid = current_sid();
2914 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2917 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2918 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2919 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2922 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2925 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2927 return file_alloc_security(file);
2930 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2932 file_free_security(file);
2935 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2938 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2941 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2943 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2948 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2951 static int default_noexec;
2953 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2955 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2958 if (default_noexec &&
2959 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2961 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2962 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2963 * This has an additional check.
2965 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2971 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2972 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2974 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2975 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2978 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2979 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2981 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2988 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2989 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2990 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2993 u32 sid = current_sid();
2996 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
2997 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
2998 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
2999 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3001 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3002 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3003 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3008 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3009 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3010 if (rc || addr_only)
3013 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3016 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3017 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3020 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3021 unsigned long reqprot,
3024 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3026 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3029 if (default_noexec &&
3030 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3032 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3033 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3034 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3035 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3036 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3037 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3038 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3039 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3041 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3042 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3043 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3044 * modified content. This typically should only
3045 * occur for text relocations.
3047 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3053 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3056 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3058 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3060 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3063 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3066 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3071 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3076 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3077 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3086 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3087 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3092 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3097 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3101 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3108 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3110 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3112 fsec = file->f_security;
3113 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3118 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3119 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3122 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3124 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3126 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3127 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3129 fsec = file->f_security;
3132 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3134 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3136 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3137 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3140 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3142 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3144 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3147 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3149 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3150 struct inode *inode;
3151 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3153 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3154 fsec = file->f_security;
3155 isec = inode->i_security;
3157 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3158 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3159 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3160 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3161 * struct as its SID.
3163 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3164 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3166 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3167 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3168 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3169 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3170 * new inode label or new policy.
3171 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3173 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3176 /* task security operations */
3178 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3180 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3184 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3186 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3188 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3190 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3194 cred->security = tsec;
3199 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3201 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3203 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3205 BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3206 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3211 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3213 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3216 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3217 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3219 old_tsec = old->security;
3221 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3225 new->security = tsec;
3230 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3232 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3234 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3235 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3241 * set the security data for a kernel service
3242 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3244 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3246 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3247 u32 sid = current_sid();
3250 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3251 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3252 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3256 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3257 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3258 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3264 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3265 * objective context of the specified inode
3267 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3269 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3270 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3271 u32 sid = current_sid();
3274 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3275 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3276 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3280 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3284 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3287 struct common_audit_data ad;
3289 sid = task_sid(current);
3291 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3292 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3294 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3295 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3298 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3300 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3303 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3305 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3308 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3310 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3313 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3315 *secid = task_sid(p);
3318 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3322 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3326 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3329 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3333 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3337 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3340 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3342 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3345 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3347 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3349 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3350 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3351 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3352 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3353 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3354 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3359 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3363 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3367 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3370 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3372 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3375 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3377 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3380 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3387 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3389 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3391 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3392 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3394 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3398 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3400 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3403 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3404 struct inode *inode)
3406 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3407 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3410 isec->initialized = 1;
3413 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3414 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3415 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3417 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3418 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3420 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3421 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3425 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3426 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3429 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3430 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3434 *proto = ih->protocol;
3436 switch (ih->protocol) {
3438 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3440 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3444 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3448 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3449 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3454 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3456 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3460 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3464 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3465 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3469 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3470 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3472 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3476 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3480 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3481 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3492 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3494 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3495 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3496 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3499 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3500 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3502 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3503 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3507 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3508 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3511 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3512 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3513 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3522 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3524 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3528 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3529 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3534 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3536 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3540 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3541 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3545 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3546 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3548 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3552 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3553 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3557 /* includes fragments */
3567 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3568 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3573 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3575 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3578 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3579 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3582 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3584 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3587 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3588 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3598 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3599 " unable to parse packet\n");
3609 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3611 * @family: protocol family
3612 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3615 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3616 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3617 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3618 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3619 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3623 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3630 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3631 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3633 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3634 if (unlikely(err)) {
3636 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3637 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3644 /* socket security operations */
3646 static u32 socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec)
3648 return tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3651 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3653 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3654 struct common_audit_data ad;
3655 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3657 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3660 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3663 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3666 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3667 int protocol, int kern)
3669 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3676 newsid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
3677 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3678 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3681 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3682 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3684 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3685 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3686 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3690 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3692 isec->sid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
3694 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3695 isec->initialized = 1;
3698 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3699 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3700 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3701 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3707 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3708 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3709 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3711 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3713 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3717 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3722 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3723 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3724 * check the first address now.
3726 family = sk->sk_family;
3727 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3729 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3730 struct common_audit_data ad;
3731 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3732 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3733 unsigned short snum;
3736 if (family == PF_INET) {
3737 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3738 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3739 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3741 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3742 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3743 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3749 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3751 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3752 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3756 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3757 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3758 ad.u.net.family = family;
3759 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3761 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3767 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3768 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3769 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3772 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3773 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3776 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3777 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3781 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3785 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3789 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3790 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3791 ad.u.net.family = family;
3793 if (family == PF_INET)
3794 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3796 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3798 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3799 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3807 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3809 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3810 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3813 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3818 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3820 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3821 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3822 struct common_audit_data ad;
3823 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3824 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3825 unsigned short snum;
3828 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3829 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3830 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3832 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3834 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3835 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3837 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3840 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3844 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3845 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3847 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3848 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3849 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3850 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3855 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3861 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3863 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3866 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3869 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3870 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3872 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3876 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3878 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3879 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3880 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3881 newisec->initialized = 1;
3886 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3889 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3892 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3893 int size, int flags)
3895 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3898 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3900 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3903 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3905 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3908 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3912 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3916 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3919 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3922 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3925 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3927 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3930 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3931 struct socket *other,
3934 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk->sk_security;
3935 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk->sk_security;
3936 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
3937 struct common_audit_data ad;
3940 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3941 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3943 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
3944 sksec_other->sclass,
3945 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3949 /* server child socket */
3950 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
3951 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
3956 /* connecting socket */
3957 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
3962 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3963 struct socket *other)
3965 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3966 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
3967 struct common_audit_data ad;
3969 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3970 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3972 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
3976 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3978 struct common_audit_data *ad)
3984 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3987 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3988 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3992 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3995 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3996 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
3999 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4003 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4005 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4006 struct common_audit_data ad;
4009 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4010 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4011 ad.u.net.family = family;
4012 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4016 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4017 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4023 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4024 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4027 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4028 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4030 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4032 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4035 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4041 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4044 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4045 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4046 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4047 struct common_audit_data ad;
4052 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4055 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4056 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4059 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4060 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4061 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4062 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4063 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4064 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4066 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4067 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4068 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4071 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4072 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4073 ad.u.net.family = family;
4074 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4078 if (peerlbl_active) {
4081 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4084 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4087 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4090 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4093 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4096 if (secmark_active) {
4097 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4106 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4107 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4112 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4113 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4115 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4116 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4117 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4118 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4119 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4121 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4125 if (scontext_len > len) {
4130 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4134 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4140 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4142 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4145 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4147 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4150 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4154 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4155 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4157 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4160 *secid = peer_secid;
4161 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4166 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4168 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4170 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4174 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4175 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4176 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4177 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4182 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4184 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4186 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4187 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4191 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4193 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4194 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4196 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4197 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4198 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4200 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4203 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4206 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4208 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4210 *secid = sksec->sid;
4214 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4216 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4217 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4219 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4220 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4221 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4222 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4225 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4226 struct request_sock *req)
4228 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4230 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4234 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4235 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4238 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4241 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4242 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4243 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4245 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4248 req->secid = newsid;
4249 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4252 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4255 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4256 const struct request_sock *req)
4258 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4260 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4261 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4262 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4263 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4264 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4265 time it will have been created and available. */
4267 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4268 * thread with access to newsksec */
4269 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4272 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4274 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4275 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4277 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4278 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4281 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4284 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4287 fl->secid = req->secid;
4290 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4292 u32 sid = current_sid();
4294 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4295 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4296 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4297 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4298 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4299 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4301 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4305 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4307 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4309 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4310 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4311 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4312 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4313 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4314 * protocols were being used */
4316 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4317 * the sockcreate SID here */
4319 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4320 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4323 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4325 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4326 u32 sid = current_sid();
4329 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4330 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4333 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4334 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4343 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4347 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4348 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4350 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4354 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4356 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4358 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4359 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4360 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4361 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4362 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4363 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4373 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4378 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4380 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4386 struct common_audit_data ad;
4391 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4394 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4395 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4396 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4397 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4400 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4403 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4404 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4405 ad.u.net.family = family;
4406 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4409 if (peerlbl_active) {
4410 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4413 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4419 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4420 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4424 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4425 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4426 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4428 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4434 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4435 struct sk_buff *skb,
4436 const struct net_device *in,
4437 const struct net_device *out,
4438 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4440 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4443 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4444 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4445 struct sk_buff *skb,
4446 const struct net_device *in,
4447 const struct net_device *out,
4448 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4450 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4454 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4459 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4462 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4463 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4464 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4466 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4469 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4470 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4476 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4477 struct sk_buff *skb,
4478 const struct net_device *in,
4479 const struct net_device *out,
4480 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4482 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4485 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4489 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4490 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4491 struct common_audit_data ad;
4497 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4499 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4500 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4501 ad.u.net.family = family;
4502 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4505 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4506 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4507 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4510 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4511 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4517 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4523 struct common_audit_data ad;
4528 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4529 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4530 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4531 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4532 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4533 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4535 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4536 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4537 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4538 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4539 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4540 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4541 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4544 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4545 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4546 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4549 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4550 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4551 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4552 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4557 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4558 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4560 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4563 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4564 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4566 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4571 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4572 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4575 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4577 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4578 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4579 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4582 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4583 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4584 ad.u.net.family = family;
4585 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4589 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4590 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4593 if (peerlbl_active) {
4597 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4599 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4600 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4603 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4605 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4606 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4613 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4614 struct sk_buff *skb,
4615 const struct net_device *in,
4616 const struct net_device *out,
4617 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4619 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4622 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4623 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4624 struct sk_buff *skb,
4625 const struct net_device *in,
4626 const struct net_device *out,
4627 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4629 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4633 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4635 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4639 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4643 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4646 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4649 struct common_audit_data ad;
4651 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4655 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4656 ad.u.cap = capability;
4658 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4659 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4662 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4663 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4666 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4669 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4673 sid = task_sid(task);
4674 isec->sclass = sclass;
4676 perm->security = isec;
4681 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4683 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4684 perm->security = NULL;
4688 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4690 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4692 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4696 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4697 msg->security = msec;
4702 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4704 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4706 msg->security = NULL;
4710 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4713 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4714 struct common_audit_data ad;
4715 u32 sid = current_sid();
4717 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4719 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4720 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4722 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4725 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4727 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4730 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4732 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4735 /* message queue security operations */
4736 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4738 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4739 struct common_audit_data ad;
4740 u32 sid = current_sid();
4743 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4747 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4749 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4750 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4752 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4755 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4761 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4763 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4766 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4768 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4769 struct common_audit_data ad;
4770 u32 sid = current_sid();
4772 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4774 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4775 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4777 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4778 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4781 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4789 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4790 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4793 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4796 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4799 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4805 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4809 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4811 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4812 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4813 struct common_audit_data ad;
4814 u32 sid = current_sid();
4817 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4818 msec = msg->security;
4821 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4823 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4825 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4826 * message queue this message will be stored in
4828 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4834 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4835 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4837 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4838 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4841 /* Can this process send the message */
4842 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4845 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4846 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4847 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4852 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4853 struct task_struct *target,
4854 long type, int mode)
4856 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4857 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4858 struct common_audit_data ad;
4859 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4862 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4863 msec = msg->security;
4865 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4866 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4868 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4869 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4871 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4872 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4876 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4877 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4879 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4880 struct common_audit_data ad;
4881 u32 sid = current_sid();
4884 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4888 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4890 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4891 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4893 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4896 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4902 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4904 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4907 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4909 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4910 struct common_audit_data ad;
4911 u32 sid = current_sid();
4913 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4915 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4916 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4918 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4919 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4922 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4923 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4931 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4932 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4935 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4938 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4945 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4951 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4955 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4956 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4960 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4963 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4965 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4968 /* Semaphore security operations */
4969 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4971 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4972 struct common_audit_data ad;
4973 u32 sid = current_sid();
4976 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4980 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4982 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4983 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4985 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4988 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4994 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4996 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4999 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5001 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5002 struct common_audit_data ad;
5003 u32 sid = current_sid();
5005 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5007 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5008 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5010 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5011 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5014 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5015 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5023 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5024 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5028 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5039 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5042 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5046 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5052 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5056 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5057 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5062 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5066 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5069 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5075 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5077 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5082 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5085 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5087 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5091 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5094 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5097 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5098 char *name, char **value)
5100 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5106 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5112 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5114 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5116 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5118 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5119 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5120 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5121 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5122 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5123 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5124 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5125 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5133 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5143 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5144 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5146 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5147 struct task_struct *tracer;
5154 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5155 security attributes. */
5160 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5161 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5162 * above restriction is ever removed.
5164 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5165 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5166 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5167 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5168 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5169 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5170 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5171 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5172 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5173 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5179 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5180 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5181 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5185 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5186 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5187 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5189 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5196 new = prepare_creds();
5200 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5201 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5202 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5203 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5204 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5205 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5206 tsec = new->security;
5207 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5208 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5209 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5210 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5211 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5212 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5215 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5216 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5217 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5218 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5223 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5225 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5226 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5231 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5232 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5233 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5237 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5238 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5241 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5243 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5247 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5248 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5267 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5269 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5272 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5274 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5277 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5283 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5285 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5287 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5291 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5293 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5295 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5298 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5301 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5310 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5311 unsigned long flags)
5313 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5314 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5316 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5320 tsec = cred->security;
5321 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5322 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5324 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5330 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5332 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5338 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5339 const struct cred *cred,
5343 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5346 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5347 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5348 appear to be created. */
5352 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5354 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5355 ksec = key->security;
5357 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5360 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5362 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5363 char *context = NULL;
5367 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5376 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5379 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5380 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5381 .capget = selinux_capget,
5382 .capset = selinux_capset,
5383 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5384 .capable = selinux_capable,
5385 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5386 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5387 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5388 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5390 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5391 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5393 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5394 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5395 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5396 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5398 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5399 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5400 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5401 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5402 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5403 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5404 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5405 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5406 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5407 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5408 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5411 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5412 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5413 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5414 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5415 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5416 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5417 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5418 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5419 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5420 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5421 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5422 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5423 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5424 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5425 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5426 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5427 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5428 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5429 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5430 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5431 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5432 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5433 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5434 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5435 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5437 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5438 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5439 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5440 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5441 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5442 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5443 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5444 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5445 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5446 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5447 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5449 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5451 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5452 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5453 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5454 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5455 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5456 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5457 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5458 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5459 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5460 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5461 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5462 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5463 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5464 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5465 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5466 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5467 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5468 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5469 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5470 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5471 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5472 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5474 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5475 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5477 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5478 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5480 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5481 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5482 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5483 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5484 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5485 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5487 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5488 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5489 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5490 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5491 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5493 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5494 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5495 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5496 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5497 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5499 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5501 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5502 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5504 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5505 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5506 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5507 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5508 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5509 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5511 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5512 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5514 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5515 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5516 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5517 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5518 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5519 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5520 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5521 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5522 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5523 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5524 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5525 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5526 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5527 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5528 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5529 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5530 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5531 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5532 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5533 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5534 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5535 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5536 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5537 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5538 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5539 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5540 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5541 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5543 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5544 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5545 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5546 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5547 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5548 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5549 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5550 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5551 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5552 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5553 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5557 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5558 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5559 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5560 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5564 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5565 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5566 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5567 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5571 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5573 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5574 selinux_enabled = 0;
5578 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5579 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5583 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5585 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5586 cred_init_security();
5588 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5590 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5591 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5592 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5595 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5596 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5598 if (selinux_enforcing)
5599 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5601 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5606 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5608 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5611 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5613 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5615 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5616 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5617 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5620 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5621 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5622 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5624 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5626 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5628 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5629 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5631 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5632 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5635 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5636 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5638 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5639 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5642 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5643 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5645 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5646 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5650 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5652 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5654 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5655 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5657 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5658 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5661 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5662 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5664 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5665 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5671 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5675 if (!selinux_enabled)
5678 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5680 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5682 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5684 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5685 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5687 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5694 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5696 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5697 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5699 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5701 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5702 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5703 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5708 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5710 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5711 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5714 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5716 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5717 static int selinux_disabled;
5719 int selinux_disable(void)
5721 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5723 if (ss_initialized) {
5724 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5728 if (selinux_disabled) {
5729 /* Only do this once. */
5733 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5735 selinux_disabled = 1;
5736 selinux_enabled = 0;
5738 reset_security_ops();
5740 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5743 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5744 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5746 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */