2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
21 #include <linux/config.h>
22 #include <linux/module.h>
23 #include <linux/init.h>
24 #include <linux/kernel.h>
25 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
26 #include <linux/errno.h>
27 #include <linux/sched.h>
28 #include <linux/security.h>
29 #include <linux/xattr.h>
30 #include <linux/capability.h>
31 #include <linux/unistd.h>
33 #include <linux/mman.h>
34 #include <linux/slab.h>
35 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
36 #include <linux/swap.h>
37 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
38 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
39 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
40 #include <linux/file.h>
41 #include <linux/namei.h>
42 #include <linux/mount.h>
43 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
44 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
48 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
51 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
52 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
53 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/quota.h>
62 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
63 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <linux/parser.h>
65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
68 #include <linux/personality.h>
69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
70 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
77 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
79 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
80 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
82 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
83 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
85 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
87 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
90 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
93 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
94 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
96 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
98 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
101 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
104 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
105 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
107 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
108 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
109 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
110 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
111 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
113 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
114 before the policy was loaded. */
115 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
116 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
118 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
120 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
122 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
124 tsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
128 memset(tsec, 0, sizeof(struct task_security_struct));
129 tsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
131 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
132 task->security = tsec;
137 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
139 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
141 if (!tsec || tsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
144 task->security = NULL;
148 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
150 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
151 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
153 isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
157 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct inode_security_struct));
158 init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
159 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
160 isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
162 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
163 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
164 if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC)
165 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
167 isec->task_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
168 inode->i_security = isec;
173 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
175 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
176 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
178 if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
181 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
182 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
183 list_del_init(&isec->list);
184 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
186 inode->i_security = NULL;
190 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
192 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
193 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
195 fsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_ATOMIC);
199 memset(fsec, 0, sizeof(struct file_security_struct));
200 fsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
202 if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) {
203 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
204 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
206 fsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
207 fsec->fown_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
209 file->f_security = fsec;
214 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
216 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
218 if (!fsec || fsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
221 file->f_security = NULL;
225 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
227 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
229 sbsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
233 memset(sbsec, 0, sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct));
234 init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
235 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
236 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
237 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
238 sbsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
240 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
241 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
242 sb->s_security = sbsec;
247 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
249 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
251 if (!sbsec || sbsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
254 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
255 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
256 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
257 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
259 sb->s_security = NULL;
263 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
264 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
266 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
268 if (family != PF_UNIX)
271 ssec = kmalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
275 memset(ssec, 0, sizeof(*ssec));
276 ssec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
278 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
279 sk->sk_security = ssec;
284 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
286 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
288 if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX || ssec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
291 sk->sk_security = NULL;
294 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
296 /* The security server must be initialized before
297 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
298 extern int ss_initialized;
300 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
302 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
304 "uses transition SIDs",
306 "uses genfs_contexts",
307 "not configured for labeling",
308 "uses mountpoint labeling",
311 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
313 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
315 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
324 static match_table_t tokens = {
325 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
326 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
327 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
330 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
332 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
334 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
337 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
338 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
344 name = sb->s_type->name;
346 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
348 /* NFS we understand. */
349 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
350 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
352 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
356 context = d->context;
363 /* Standard string-based options. */
364 char *p, *options = data;
366 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
368 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
373 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
379 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
382 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
393 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
395 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
398 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
405 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
409 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
412 "defcontext option is invalid "
413 "for this filesystem type\n");
416 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
418 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
421 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
428 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
433 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
445 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
447 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
448 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
449 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
453 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
454 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
458 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
459 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
465 if (seen & Opt_context)
466 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
470 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
472 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
473 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
474 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
478 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
481 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
482 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
486 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
487 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
491 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
503 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
505 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
506 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
507 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
511 if (sbsec->initialized)
514 if (!ss_initialized) {
515 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
516 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
517 server is ready to handle calls. */
518 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
519 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
520 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
521 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
525 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
526 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
528 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
529 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
533 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
537 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
538 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
539 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
540 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
541 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
542 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
543 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
544 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
545 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
549 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
550 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
551 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
552 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
553 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
554 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
556 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
557 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
558 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
563 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
566 sbsec->initialized = 1;
568 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
569 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
570 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
573 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
574 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
575 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
578 /* Initialize the root inode. */
579 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
581 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
582 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
583 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
585 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
587 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
588 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
589 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
590 struct inode_security_struct, list);
591 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
592 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
593 inode = igrab(inode);
595 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
599 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
600 list_del_init(&isec->list);
603 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
609 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
611 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
613 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
615 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
617 return SECCLASS_FILE;
619 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
623 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
625 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
629 return SECCLASS_FILE;
632 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
639 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
641 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
648 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
650 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
652 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
658 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
659 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
660 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
661 case NETLINK_TCPDIAG:
662 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
664 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
666 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
667 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
668 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
670 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
672 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
673 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
674 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
675 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
676 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
678 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
681 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
683 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
686 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
689 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
690 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
695 char *buffer, *path, *end;
697 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
707 while (de && de != de->parent) {
708 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
712 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
717 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
718 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
722 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
730 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
731 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
733 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
734 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
736 struct dentry *dentry;
737 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
738 char *context = NULL;
743 if (isec->initialized)
748 if (isec->initialized)
751 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
752 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
753 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
754 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
755 server is ready to handle calls. */
756 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
757 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
758 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
759 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
763 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
764 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
765 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
766 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
770 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
771 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
773 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
774 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
776 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
777 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
780 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
781 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
786 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
787 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
793 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
796 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
797 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
805 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
811 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
817 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
818 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
819 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
820 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
824 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
825 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
828 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, rc, &sid);
830 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
831 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
832 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
833 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
835 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
843 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
844 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
846 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
847 /* Default to the fs SID. */
848 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
850 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
851 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
852 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
861 /* Default to the fs SID. */
862 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
865 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
867 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
868 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
879 isec->initialized = 1;
882 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
883 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
890 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
891 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
897 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
898 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
901 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
902 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
905 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
906 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
909 /* All other signals. */
910 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
917 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
918 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
919 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
920 struct task_struct *tsk2,
923 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
925 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
926 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
927 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
928 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
931 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
932 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
935 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
936 struct avc_audit_data ad;
938 tsec = tsk->security;
940 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
944 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
945 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
948 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
949 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
952 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
954 tsec = tsk->security;
956 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
957 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
960 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
961 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
962 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
963 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
966 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
968 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
969 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
970 struct avc_audit_data ad;
972 tsec = tsk->security;
973 isec = inode->i_security;
977 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
978 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
981 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
984 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
985 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
986 pathname if needed. */
987 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
988 struct vfsmount *mnt,
989 struct dentry *dentry,
992 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
993 struct avc_audit_data ad;
994 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
996 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
997 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1000 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1001 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1002 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1003 check a particular permission to the file.
1004 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1005 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1006 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1007 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1008 static inline int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1012 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1013 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1014 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1015 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1016 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1017 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1020 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1022 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1024 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1025 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1033 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1035 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1040 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1041 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1042 struct dentry *dentry,
1045 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1046 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1047 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1049 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1052 tsec = current->security;
1053 dsec = dir->i_security;
1054 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1056 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1057 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1059 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1060 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1065 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1066 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1068 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1074 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1078 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1079 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1080 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1084 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1087 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1088 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1089 struct dentry *dentry,
1093 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1094 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1095 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1099 tsec = current->security;
1100 dsec = dir->i_security;
1101 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1103 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1104 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1107 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1108 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1123 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1127 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1131 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1132 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1133 struct inode *new_dir,
1134 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1136 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1137 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1138 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1140 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1143 tsec = current->security;
1144 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1145 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1146 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1147 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1149 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1151 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1152 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1153 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1156 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1157 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1160 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1161 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1162 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1167 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1168 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1169 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1170 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1171 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1174 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1175 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1176 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1177 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1179 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1187 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1188 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1189 struct super_block *sb,
1191 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1193 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1194 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1196 tsec = tsk->security;
1197 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1198 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1202 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1203 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1207 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1208 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1209 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1210 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1213 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1215 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1219 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1221 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1223 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1230 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1231 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1235 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1237 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1238 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1247 /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
1248 static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
1250 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1251 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1253 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1254 /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
1259 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1261 isec->initialized = 1;
1266 /* Set the security attributes on a newly created file. */
1267 static int post_create(struct inode *dir,
1268 struct dentry *dentry)
1271 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1272 struct inode *inode;
1273 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1274 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1280 tsec = current->security;
1281 dsec = dir->i_security;
1282 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1284 inode = dentry->d_inode;
1286 /* Some file system types (e.g. NFS) may not instantiate
1287 a dentry for all create operations (e.g. symlink),
1288 so we have to check to see if the inode is non-NULL. */
1289 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: no inode, dir (dev=%s, "
1290 "ino=%ld)\n", dir->i_sb->s_id, dir->i_ino);
1294 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1295 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1297 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
1298 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
1301 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: "
1302 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
1304 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1309 rc = inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
1311 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: inode_security_set_sid "
1312 "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
1313 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1317 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
1318 inode->i_op->setxattr) {
1319 /* Use extended attributes. */
1320 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &len);
1322 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: sid_to_context "
1323 "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
1324 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1327 down(&inode->i_sem);
1328 rc = inode->i_op->setxattr(dentry,
1334 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: setxattr failed, "
1335 "rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
1336 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1345 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1347 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1349 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1350 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1353 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1357 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1358 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1360 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1364 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1365 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1369 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1373 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1376 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1377 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1381 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1385 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1388 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1389 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1391 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1394 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1398 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1402 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1405 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1409 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1413 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1417 tsec = current->security;
1419 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1420 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1422 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1423 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1426 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1427 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1429 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1430 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1438 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1439 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1445 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1458 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1460 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1465 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1467 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1470 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1476 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1478 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1481 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1485 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1490 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1491 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1492 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1494 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1495 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1496 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1497 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1499 case 0: /* Close log */
1500 case 1: /* Open log */
1501 case 2: /* Read from log */
1502 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1503 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1505 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1512 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1513 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1514 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1516 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1517 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1518 * the capability is granted.
1520 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1521 * processes that allocate mappings.
1523 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1525 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1526 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1528 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1530 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1531 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1532 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1538 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1541 /* binprm security operations */
1543 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1545 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1547 bsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1551 memset(bsec, 0, sizeof *bsec);
1552 bsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
1554 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1557 bprm->security = bsec;
1561 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1563 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1564 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1565 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1566 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1568 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1571 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1575 bsec = bprm->security;
1580 tsec = current->security;
1581 isec = inode->i_security;
1583 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1584 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1586 /* Reset create SID on execve. */
1587 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1589 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1590 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1591 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1594 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1595 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1596 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1601 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1602 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1603 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1605 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1608 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1609 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1610 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1614 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1615 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1616 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1620 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1621 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1625 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1626 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1628 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1636 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1638 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1642 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1644 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1647 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1648 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1649 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1650 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1651 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1653 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1656 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1659 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1661 kfree(bprm->security);
1662 bprm->security = NULL;
1665 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1666 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1668 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1669 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1671 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1672 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1673 struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
1678 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_list);
1680 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1681 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1682 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1683 file may belong to another process and we are only
1684 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1685 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1686 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1687 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1688 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1689 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1690 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1696 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1698 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1700 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1702 unsigned long set, i;
1707 if (i >= files->max_fds || i >= files->max_fdset)
1709 set = files->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1712 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1713 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1718 if (file_has_perm(current,
1720 file_to_av(file))) {
1722 fd = get_unused_fd();
1730 atomic_inc(&devnull->f_count);
1732 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1739 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1744 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1747 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1750 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1752 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1753 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1757 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1759 tsec = current->security;
1761 bsec = bprm->security;
1764 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1766 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1767 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1768 unchanged and kill. */
1769 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1770 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1771 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1778 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1779 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1780 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1781 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1782 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1794 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1796 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1798 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1799 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1800 struct itimerval itimer;
1801 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1804 tsec = current->security;
1805 bsec = bprm->security;
1808 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1811 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1814 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1815 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1817 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1818 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1819 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1820 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1821 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1822 will be checked against the new SID. */
1823 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1824 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1826 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1827 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1828 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1829 flush_signals(current);
1830 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1831 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1832 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
1833 recalc_sigpending();
1834 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1837 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1838 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1839 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1840 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1841 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1842 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1843 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1844 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1845 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1847 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1848 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1850 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1851 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1852 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1853 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1855 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1857 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1860 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1864 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1865 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1866 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1869 /* superblock security operations */
1871 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1873 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1876 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1878 superblock_free_security(sb);
1881 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1886 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1889 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1891 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1892 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1893 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
1896 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1904 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1908 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1910 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1911 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1912 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1917 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1918 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1919 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1923 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1931 in_save = in_end = orig;
1934 if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
1935 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1937 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1938 take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1940 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1942 in_curr = in_end + 1;
1944 } while (*in_end++);
1946 copy_page(in_save, nosec_save);
1947 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1952 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1954 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1957 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
1961 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1962 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1963 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
1966 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb)
1968 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1970 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1971 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1972 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1975 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
1976 struct nameidata *nd,
1978 unsigned long flags,
1983 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
1987 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
1988 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
1989 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
1991 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
1995 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
1999 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2003 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2004 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2007 /* inode security operations */
2009 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2011 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2014 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2016 inode_free_security(inode);
2019 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2021 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2024 static void selinux_inode_post_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2026 post_create(dir, dentry);
2029 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2033 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2036 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2039 static void selinux_inode_post_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2044 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2048 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2051 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2054 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2056 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2059 static void selinux_inode_post_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2061 post_create(dir, dentry);
2064 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2066 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2069 static void selinux_inode_post_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2071 post_create(dir, dentry);
2074 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2076 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2079 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2083 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2087 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2090 static void selinux_inode_post_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2092 post_create(dir, dentry);
2095 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2096 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2098 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2101 static void selinux_inode_post_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2102 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2107 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2109 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2112 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2116 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2119 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2122 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2123 struct nameidata *nd)
2127 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2132 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2136 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2137 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2140 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2144 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2148 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2151 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2152 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2153 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2155 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2158 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2160 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2163 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2165 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2166 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2167 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2168 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2169 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2173 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2174 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2175 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2176 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2177 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2178 Restrict to administrator. */
2182 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2183 ordinary setattr permission. */
2184 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2187 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2188 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2191 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2194 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2195 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2197 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2198 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2202 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2206 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2207 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2211 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2216 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2218 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2219 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2223 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2224 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2226 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2227 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2231 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2232 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2236 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2238 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2239 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2247 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2249 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2250 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2252 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2255 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2258 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2260 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2263 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2265 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2266 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2267 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2268 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2269 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2270 Restrict to administrator. */
2274 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2275 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2276 permission for removexattr. */
2277 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2280 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2281 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2285 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
2287 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2292 /* Permission check handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.*/
2294 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2297 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
2301 if (!buffer || !size) {
2309 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
2314 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2315 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2317 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2321 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2324 if (!value || !size)
2327 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2335 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2337 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2338 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2339 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2343 /* file security operations */
2345 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2347 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2350 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2354 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2355 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2358 return file_has_perm(current, file,
2359 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2362 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2364 return file_alloc_security(file);
2367 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2369 file_free_security(file);
2372 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2384 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2386 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2387 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2390 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2392 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2393 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2396 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2400 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2405 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2408 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2409 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2412 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2418 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2420 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2421 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2423 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2424 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2425 * This has an additional check.
2427 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2434 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2435 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2437 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2438 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2441 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2442 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2444 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2449 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2450 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2454 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2458 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2461 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2462 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2465 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2466 unsigned long reqprot,
2471 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2475 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2478 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2479 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
2480 (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2481 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk)) {
2483 * We are making an executable mapping in the brk region.
2484 * This has an additional execheap check.
2486 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2490 if (vma->vm_file != NULL && vma->anon_vma != NULL && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
2492 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2493 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been written,
2494 * check ability to execute the possibly modified content.
2495 * This typically should only occur for text relocations.
2497 int rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
2501 if (!vma->vm_file && (prot & PROT_EXEC) &&
2502 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2503 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2504 /* Attempt to make the process stack executable.
2505 * This has an additional execstack check.
2507 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2513 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2516 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2518 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2521 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2528 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2533 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2534 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2543 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2544 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2549 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2554 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2558 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2565 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2567 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2568 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2570 tsec = current->security;
2571 fsec = file->f_security;
2572 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2577 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2578 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2582 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2583 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2585 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2586 file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2588 tsec = tsk->security;
2589 fsec = file->f_security;
2592 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2594 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2596 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2597 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2600 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2602 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2605 /* task security operations */
2607 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2611 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2615 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2618 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2620 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2623 tsec1 = current->security;
2625 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2628 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2630 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2631 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2633 /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */
2634 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2635 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2637 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2638 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2639 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2640 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2645 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2647 task_free_security(tsk);
2650 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2652 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2653 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2654 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2655 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2656 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2661 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2663 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2666 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2668 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2672 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2674 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2677 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2679 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2682 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2684 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2687 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2689 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2693 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2697 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2701 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2704 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2706 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2709 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2713 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2714 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2715 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2716 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2717 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2718 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2723 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2725 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2728 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2730 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2733 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
2738 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
2742 if (info && ((unsigned long)info == 1 ||
2743 (unsigned long)info == 2 || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2747 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2749 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2751 return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2754 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2760 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2761 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2762 the state of the current process. */
2766 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2770 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2772 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2775 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2777 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2779 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2782 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2783 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2787 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2788 struct inode *inode)
2790 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2791 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2793 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2794 isec->initialized = 1;
2798 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
2800 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2801 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2803 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2804 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2806 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2807 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2811 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2812 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2815 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2816 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2819 switch (ih->protocol) {
2821 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2823 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2827 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2831 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2832 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2837 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2839 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2843 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2847 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2848 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2859 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2861 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2862 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2865 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2866 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2868 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2869 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2873 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2874 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2877 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2878 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2879 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2885 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2887 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2891 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2892 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2897 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2899 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2903 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2904 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2908 /* includes fragments */
2918 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
2919 char **addrp, int *len, int src)
2923 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
2925 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
2929 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
2930 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
2933 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2935 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
2939 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
2940 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
2950 /* socket security operations */
2951 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
2954 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2955 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2956 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2959 tsec = task->security;
2960 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2962 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
2965 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
2966 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
2967 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
2973 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
2974 int protocol, int kern)
2977 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2982 tsec = current->security;
2983 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2984 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
2985 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
2991 static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2992 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2994 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2995 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2997 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2999 tsec = current->security;
3000 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3001 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
3002 isec->initialized = 1;
3007 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3008 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3009 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3010 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
3011 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
3013 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3018 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3023 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3025 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3026 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3028 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3029 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3030 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3031 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3032 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3033 unsigned short snum;
3034 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3035 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3037 tsec = current->security;
3038 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3040 if (family == PF_INET) {
3041 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3042 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3043 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3044 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3046 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3047 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3048 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3049 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3052 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3053 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3054 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3055 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3058 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3059 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3060 ad.u.net.family = family;
3061 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3063 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3068 switch(sk->sk_protocol) {
3070 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3074 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3078 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3082 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3086 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3087 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3088 ad.u.net.family = family;
3090 if (family == PF_INET)
3091 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3093 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3095 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3096 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3104 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3106 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3109 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3114 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3116 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3117 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3118 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3119 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3120 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3121 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3122 unsigned short snum;
3125 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3126 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3127 if (addrlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3129 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3131 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3132 if (addrlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
3134 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3137 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3138 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3142 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3143 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3144 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3145 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3146 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3155 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3157 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3160 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3163 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3164 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3166 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3170 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3172 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3173 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3174 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3175 newisec->initialized = 1;
3180 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3183 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3186 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3187 int size, int flags)
3189 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3192 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3194 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3197 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3199 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3202 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3204 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3207 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3210 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3213 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3215 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3218 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3219 struct socket *other,
3222 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3223 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3224 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3225 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3228 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3232 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3233 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3235 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3236 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3238 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3240 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3244 /* connecting socket */
3245 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3246 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3248 /* server child socket */
3249 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3250 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3255 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3256 struct socket *other)
3258 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3259 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3260 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3263 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3264 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3266 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3267 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3269 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3270 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3277 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3282 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3285 struct socket *sock;
3286 struct net_device *dev;
3287 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3289 family = sk->sk_family;
3290 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3293 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3294 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3297 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3298 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3300 struct inode *inode;
3301 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3303 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3304 isec = inode->i_security;
3305 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3306 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3309 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3317 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3321 switch (sock_class) {
3322 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3323 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3324 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3325 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3328 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3329 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3330 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3331 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3335 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3336 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3340 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3341 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3342 ad.u.net.family = family;
3344 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3348 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad);
3352 /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3353 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3357 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad);
3364 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3365 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3366 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport),
3371 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3372 sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
3378 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3379 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3384 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3385 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3387 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3388 if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3393 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3395 err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3399 if (scontext_len > len) {
3404 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3408 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3416 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
3418 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3421 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3423 sk_free_security(sk);
3426 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3430 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3431 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3432 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3434 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3438 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3440 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3442 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3443 audit_log(current->audit_context, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3444 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3445 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3446 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3447 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3457 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3462 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3464 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3465 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3466 const struct net_device *in,
3467 const struct net_device *out,
3468 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3472 int len, err = NF_ACCEPT;
3473 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3475 struct socket *sock;
3476 struct inode *inode;
3477 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3478 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3479 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3480 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3486 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3490 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3494 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3498 isec = inode->i_security;
3500 switch (isec->sclass) {
3501 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3502 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3503 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3504 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3507 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3508 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3509 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3510 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3514 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3515 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3520 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3521 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3522 ad.u.net.family = family;
3524 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp,
3525 &len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3526 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3529 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF,
3530 netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3531 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3534 /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3535 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len,
3536 &node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3537 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3540 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
3541 node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3542 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3548 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3549 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3552 ntohs(ad.u.net.dport),
3553 &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3554 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3557 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3558 send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3565 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3566 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3567 const struct net_device *in,
3568 const struct net_device *out,
3569 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3571 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3574 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3576 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3577 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3578 const struct net_device *in,
3579 const struct net_device *out,
3580 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3582 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3587 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3591 static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3596 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
3598 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3600 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3601 struct av_decision avd;
3604 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3608 tsec = current->security;
3611 avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
3612 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
3613 cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
3615 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3616 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3621 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
3623 if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
3628 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3629 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3632 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3633 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3635 isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3639 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct));
3640 isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
3641 isec->sclass = sclass;
3642 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3644 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3646 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3648 perm->security = isec;
3653 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3655 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3656 if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
3659 perm->security = NULL;
3663 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3665 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3667 msec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3671 memset(msec, 0, sizeof(struct msg_security_struct));
3672 msec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
3674 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3675 msg->security = msec;
3680 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3682 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3683 if (!msec || msec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
3686 msg->security = NULL;
3690 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3693 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3694 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3695 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3697 tsec = current->security;
3698 isec = ipc_perms->security;
3700 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3701 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3703 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3706 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3708 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3711 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3713 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3716 /* message queue security operations */
3717 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3719 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3720 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3721 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3724 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3728 tsec = current->security;
3729 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3731 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3732 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3734 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3737 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3743 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3745 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3748 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3750 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3751 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3752 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3754 tsec = current->security;
3755 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3757 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3758 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3760 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3761 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3764 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3772 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3773 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3776 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
3779 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
3782 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
3788 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
3792 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
3794 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3795 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3796 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3797 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3800 tsec = current->security;
3801 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3802 msec = msg->security;
3805 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
3807 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
3809 * Compute new sid based on current process and
3810 * message queue this message will be stored in
3812 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3820 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3821 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3823 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
3824 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3827 /* Can this process send the message */
3828 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3829 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
3831 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
3832 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
3833 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
3838 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3839 struct task_struct *target,
3840 long type, int mode)
3842 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3843 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3844 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3845 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3848 tsec = target->security;
3849 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3850 msec = msg->security;
3852 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3853 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3855 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
3856 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
3858 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3859 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
3863 /* Shared Memory security operations */
3864 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3866 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3867 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3868 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3871 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
3875 tsec = current->security;
3876 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3878 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3879 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3881 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3884 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3890 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3892 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3895 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3897 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3898 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3899 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3901 tsec = current->security;
3902 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3904 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3905 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3907 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3908 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3911 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
3912 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3920 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3921 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3924 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
3927 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
3934 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
3940 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3944 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
3945 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
3950 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
3954 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
3957 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
3959 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3962 /* Semaphore security operations */
3963 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3965 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3966 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3967 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3970 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
3974 tsec = current->security;
3975 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3977 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3978 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3980 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3983 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3989 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3991 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3994 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3996 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3997 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3998 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4000 tsec = current->security;
4001 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4003 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4004 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4006 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4007 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4010 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4011 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4019 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4020 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4024 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4035 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4038 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4042 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4048 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4052 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4053 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4058 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4062 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4065 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4071 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4073 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4078 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4081 /* module stacking operations */
4082 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4084 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4085 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4086 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4090 secondary_ops = ops;
4092 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4099 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4101 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4102 printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4103 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4107 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4112 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4115 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4118 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4119 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4121 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4127 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4137 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4139 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4141 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4142 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4143 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4144 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4151 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
4158 memcpy(value, context, len);
4163 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4164 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4166 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4172 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4173 security attributes. */
4178 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4179 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4180 * above restriction is ever removed.
4182 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4183 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4184 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4185 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4186 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4187 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4193 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4194 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4195 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4199 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4204 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4205 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4206 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4207 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4208 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4209 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4211 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4212 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4213 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4214 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4215 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4216 struct av_decision avd;
4221 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4222 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4223 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4224 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4225 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4226 do_each_thread(g, t)
4227 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4228 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4231 while_each_thread(g, t);
4232 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4235 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4236 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4237 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4241 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4242 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4244 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4245 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4247 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4251 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4252 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4266 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4267 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4268 .capget = selinux_capget,
4269 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4270 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4271 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4272 .capable = selinux_capable,
4273 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4274 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4275 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4276 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4278 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4279 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4281 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4282 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4283 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4284 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4285 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4286 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4287 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4289 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4290 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4291 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4292 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4293 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4294 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4295 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4297 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4298 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4299 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4300 .inode_post_create = selinux_inode_post_create,
4301 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4302 .inode_post_link = selinux_inode_post_link,
4303 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4304 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4305 .inode_post_symlink = selinux_inode_post_symlink,
4306 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4307 .inode_post_mkdir = selinux_inode_post_mkdir,
4308 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4309 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4310 .inode_post_mknod = selinux_inode_post_mknod,
4311 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4312 .inode_post_rename = selinux_inode_post_rename,
4313 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4314 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4315 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4316 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4317 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4318 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4319 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4320 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4321 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4322 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4323 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4324 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4325 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4327 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4328 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4329 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4330 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4331 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4332 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4333 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4334 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4335 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4336 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4337 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4339 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4340 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4341 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4342 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4343 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4344 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4345 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4346 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4347 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4348 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4349 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4350 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4351 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4352 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4353 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4354 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4355 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4356 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4357 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4359 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4361 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4362 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4364 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4365 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4366 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4367 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4368 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4369 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4371 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4372 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4373 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4374 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4375 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4377 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4378 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4379 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4380 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4381 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4383 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4384 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4386 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4388 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4389 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4391 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
4392 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4393 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4395 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4396 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4397 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4398 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4399 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4400 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4401 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4402 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4403 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4404 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4405 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4406 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4407 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4408 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4409 .socket_getpeersec = selinux_socket_getpeersec,
4410 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4411 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4415 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4417 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4419 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4420 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4424 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4426 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4427 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4428 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4429 tsec = current->security;
4430 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4434 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4436 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4437 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4438 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4440 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4441 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4443 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4448 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4450 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4452 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4453 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4454 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4456 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4457 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4458 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4459 struct superblock_security_struct,
4461 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4462 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4464 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4465 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4466 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4468 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4470 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4471 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4474 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4477 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4478 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4479 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4481 #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4483 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4484 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4485 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4487 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4488 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4491 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4493 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4494 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4495 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4497 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4498 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4503 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4507 if (!selinux_enabled)
4510 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4512 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4514 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4516 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4518 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4520 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4527 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4529 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4530 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4532 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4534 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4535 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4536 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4541 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4543 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4544 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4547 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4549 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4550 int selinux_disable(void)
4552 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4553 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4555 if (ss_initialized) {
4556 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4560 if (selinux_disabled) {
4561 /* Only do this once. */
4565 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
4567 selinux_disabled = 1;
4569 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4570 security_ops = secondary_ops;
4572 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4573 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4575 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */