2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
58 #include <net/netlabel.h>
59 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
60 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
61 #include <linux/atomic.h>
62 #include <linux/bitops.h>
63 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
64 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65 #include <net/netlink.h>
66 #include <linux/tcp.h>
67 #include <linux/udp.h>
68 #include <linux/dccp.h>
69 #include <linux/quota.h>
70 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
72 #include <linux/parser.h>
73 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
75 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
76 #include <linux/personality.h>
77 #include <linux/audit.h>
78 #include <linux/string.h>
79 #include <linux/selinux.h>
80 #include <linux/mutex.h>
81 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
82 #include <linux/syslog.h>
83 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
84 #include <linux/export.h>
85 #include <linux/msg.h>
86 #include <linux/shm.h>
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
129 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
132 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
135 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
136 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
137 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
138 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
139 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
142 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
144 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
148 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
151 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
152 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
153 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
154 * is always considered enabled.
157 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
159 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
162 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
164 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
174 * initialise the security for the init task
176 static void cred_init_security(void)
178 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
179 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
181 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
183 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
185 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
186 cred->security = tsec;
190 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
192 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
194 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
196 tsec = cred->security;
201 * get the objective security ID of a task
203 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
208 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
214 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
216 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
218 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
223 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
225 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
227 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
228 u32 sid = current_sid();
230 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
234 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
235 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
237 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
238 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
239 isec->task_sid = sid;
240 inode->i_security = isec;
245 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
247 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
249 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
250 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
253 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
255 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
256 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
258 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
259 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
260 list_del_init(&isec->list);
261 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
264 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
265 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
266 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
267 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
268 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
269 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
270 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
272 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
275 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
277 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
278 u32 sid = current_sid();
280 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
285 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
286 file->f_security = fsec;
291 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
293 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
294 file->f_security = NULL;
298 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
300 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
302 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
306 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
307 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
308 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
310 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
312 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
313 sb->s_security = sbsec;
318 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
320 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
321 sb->s_security = NULL;
325 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
327 static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
329 "uses transition SIDs",
331 "uses genfs_contexts",
332 "not configured for labeling",
333 "uses mountpoint labeling",
334 "uses native labeling",
337 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
339 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
341 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
350 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
354 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
356 static const match_table_t tokens = {
357 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
358 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
359 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
365 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
367 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
368 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
369 const struct cred *cred)
371 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
374 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
375 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
379 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
380 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
384 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
385 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
386 const struct cred *cred)
388 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
390 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
391 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
395 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
396 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
400 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
402 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
404 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
405 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
406 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK)
409 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
410 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
414 * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
415 * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
417 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
423 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
425 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
426 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
427 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
430 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
431 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
432 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
433 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
434 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
435 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
436 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
437 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
438 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
442 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
443 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
444 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
445 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
446 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
447 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
449 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
450 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
451 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
456 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
457 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
458 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
460 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
461 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
462 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
464 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
465 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
466 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
468 /* Initialize the root inode. */
469 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
471 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
472 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
473 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
475 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
477 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
478 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
479 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
480 struct inode_security_struct, list);
481 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
482 list_del_init(&isec->list);
483 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
484 inode = igrab(inode);
486 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
490 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
493 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
499 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
500 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
501 * mount options, or whatever.
503 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
504 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
507 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
508 char *context = NULL;
512 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
514 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
520 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
521 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
523 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
524 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
525 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
527 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
530 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
531 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
532 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
534 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
535 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
541 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
547 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
548 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
551 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
552 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
554 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
555 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
558 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
559 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
561 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
562 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
565 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
566 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
568 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
569 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
570 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
572 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
575 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
576 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
578 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
579 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
580 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
583 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
588 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
592 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
593 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
595 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
597 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
598 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
599 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
600 (old_sid != new_sid))
603 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
604 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
606 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
607 if (mnt_flags & flag)
613 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
614 * labeling information.
616 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
617 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
618 unsigned long kern_flags,
619 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
621 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
623 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
624 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
625 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
626 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
627 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
628 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
629 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
630 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
631 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
633 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
635 if (!ss_initialized) {
637 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
638 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
639 server is ready to handle calls. */
643 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
644 "before the security server is initialized\n");
647 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
648 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
649 * place the results is not allowed */
655 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
656 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
657 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
658 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
660 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
661 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
662 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
663 * will be used for both mounts)
665 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
670 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
671 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
672 * than once with different security options.
674 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
677 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
679 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
680 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
682 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
683 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
684 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
691 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
693 goto out_double_mount;
695 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
700 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
702 goto out_double_mount;
704 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
706 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
707 rootcontext_sid = sid;
709 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
711 goto out_double_mount;
713 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
717 defcontext_sid = sid;
719 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
721 goto out_double_mount;
723 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
732 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
733 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
734 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
735 goto out_double_mount;
740 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
741 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
743 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
745 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
748 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
751 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
752 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
756 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
758 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
762 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
766 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
767 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
768 * the superblock context if not already set.
770 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
771 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
772 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
776 if (!fscontext_sid) {
777 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
781 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
783 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
788 if (!rootcontext_sid)
789 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
791 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
792 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
795 if (rootcontext_sid) {
796 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
801 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
802 root_isec->initialized = 1;
805 if (defcontext_sid) {
806 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
807 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
809 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
810 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
814 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
815 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
821 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
824 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
826 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
830 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
831 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
835 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
836 const struct super_block *newsb)
838 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
839 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
840 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
841 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
843 if (oldflags != newflags)
845 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
847 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
849 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
851 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
852 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = oldsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
853 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = newsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
854 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
859 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
860 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
861 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
865 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
866 struct super_block *newsb)
868 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
869 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
871 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
872 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
873 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
876 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
877 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
882 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
883 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
885 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
886 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
887 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
889 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
891 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
893 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
894 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
895 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
898 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
902 if (!set_rootcontext) {
903 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
904 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
907 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
909 if (set_rootcontext) {
910 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
911 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
912 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
913 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
915 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
918 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
919 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
923 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
924 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
927 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
928 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
929 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
931 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
933 /* Standard string-based options. */
934 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
936 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
941 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
945 if (context || defcontext) {
947 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
950 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
960 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
963 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
970 case Opt_rootcontext:
973 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
976 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
984 if (context || defcontext) {
986 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
989 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
995 case Opt_labelsupport:
999 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
1006 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
1007 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
1010 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
1011 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
1012 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1017 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1018 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1021 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1022 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1025 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1026 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1029 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1030 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1033 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1044 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1046 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1049 char *options = data;
1050 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1052 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1057 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1059 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1064 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1067 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1071 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1072 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1077 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1080 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1081 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1085 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1087 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1090 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1092 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1093 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1095 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1096 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1100 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1106 /* we need a comma before each option */
1108 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1111 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1117 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1119 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1122 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1124 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1130 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1132 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1137 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1139 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1141 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1143 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1145 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1147 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1149 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1151 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1153 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1157 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1160 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1162 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1165 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1167 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1170 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1176 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1177 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1179 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1186 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1187 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1189 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1191 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1192 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1194 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1196 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1198 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1205 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1207 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1208 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1210 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1212 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1213 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1214 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1216 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1217 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1218 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1219 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1220 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1221 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1222 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1224 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1227 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1229 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1231 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1234 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1237 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1238 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1243 char *buffer, *path;
1245 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1249 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1253 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1254 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1255 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1256 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1260 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1262 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1266 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1274 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1275 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1277 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1278 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1280 struct dentry *dentry;
1281 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1282 char *context = NULL;
1286 if (isec->initialized)
1289 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1290 if (isec->initialized)
1293 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1294 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1295 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1296 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1297 server is ready to handle calls. */
1298 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1299 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1300 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1301 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1305 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1306 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1308 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1309 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1310 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1314 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1315 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1317 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1318 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1320 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1321 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1325 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1326 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1327 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1328 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1329 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1330 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1331 * be used again by userspace.
1336 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1337 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1343 context[len] = '\0';
1344 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1346 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1349 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1350 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1357 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1363 context[len] = '\0';
1364 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1370 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1371 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1372 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1373 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1377 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1378 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1381 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1385 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1386 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1388 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1389 if (printk_ratelimit())
1390 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1391 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1392 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1394 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1395 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1396 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1399 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1407 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1408 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1410 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1411 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1412 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1414 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1415 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1416 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1417 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1422 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1423 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1426 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1427 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1429 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1430 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1433 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1434 * d_splice_alias. */
1435 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1437 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1439 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1441 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1442 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1443 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1444 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1445 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1446 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1447 * could be used again by userspace.
1451 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1452 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
1461 isec->initialized = 1;
1464 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1466 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1467 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1471 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1472 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1478 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1479 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1482 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1483 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1486 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1487 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1490 /* All other signals. */
1491 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1499 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1500 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1502 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1503 const struct cred *target,
1506 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1508 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1512 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1513 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1514 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1515 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1517 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1518 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1521 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1525 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1526 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1528 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1532 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1533 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1534 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1535 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1537 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1542 sid = current_sid();
1543 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1544 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1547 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1548 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1551 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1552 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1555 struct common_audit_data ad;
1556 struct av_decision avd;
1558 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1559 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1562 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1565 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1567 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1570 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1574 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1579 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1580 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1581 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1588 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1589 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1592 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1594 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1595 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1598 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1599 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1600 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1601 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1602 struct inode *inode,
1604 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1606 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1609 validate_creds(cred);
1611 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1614 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1615 isec = inode->i_security;
1617 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1620 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1621 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1622 pathname if needed. */
1623 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1624 struct dentry *dentry,
1627 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1628 struct common_audit_data ad;
1630 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1631 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1632 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1635 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1636 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1637 pathname if needed. */
1638 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1642 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1643 struct common_audit_data ad;
1645 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1647 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1650 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1651 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1655 struct common_audit_data ad;
1657 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1658 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1659 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1662 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1663 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1664 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1665 check a particular permission to the file.
1666 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1667 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1668 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1669 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1670 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1674 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1675 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1676 struct common_audit_data ad;
1677 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1680 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1681 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1683 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1684 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1692 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1695 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1701 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1702 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1703 struct dentry *dentry,
1706 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1707 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1708 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1710 struct common_audit_data ad;
1713 dsec = dir->i_security;
1714 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1717 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1719 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1720 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1722 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1723 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1728 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
1729 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1730 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1735 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1739 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1740 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1741 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1744 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1745 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1746 struct task_struct *ctx)
1748 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1750 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1754 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1757 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1758 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1759 struct dentry *dentry,
1763 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1764 struct common_audit_data ad;
1765 u32 sid = current_sid();
1769 dsec = dir->i_security;
1770 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1772 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1773 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1776 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1777 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1792 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1797 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1801 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1802 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1803 struct inode *new_dir,
1804 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1806 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1807 struct common_audit_data ad;
1808 u32 sid = current_sid();
1810 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1813 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1814 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1815 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1816 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1818 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1820 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1821 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1822 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1825 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1826 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1829 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1830 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1831 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1836 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1837 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1838 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1839 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1840 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1843 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1844 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1845 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1846 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1848 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1856 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1857 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1858 struct super_block *sb,
1860 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1862 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1863 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1865 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1866 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1869 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1870 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1874 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1875 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1876 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1877 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1880 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1882 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1886 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1888 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1890 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1897 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1898 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1902 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1904 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1905 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1912 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1921 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1924 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1926 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1928 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1934 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1936 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1941 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1945 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1946 u32 sid = current_sid();
1947 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1948 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1951 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1954 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1958 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1962 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1965 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1966 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1970 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1974 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1977 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1978 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1979 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1980 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1984 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1985 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1989 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1993 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1994 * which was removed).
1996 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1997 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1998 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1999 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2002 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2007 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
2011 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
2014 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2016 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2028 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2033 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2036 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2042 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2044 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2046 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2049 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2054 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2055 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2056 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2058 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2059 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2060 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2061 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2062 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2064 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2065 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2066 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2067 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2068 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2070 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2077 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2078 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2079 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2081 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2082 * processes that allocate mappings.
2084 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2086 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2088 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2089 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2093 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2096 /* binprm security operations */
2098 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2099 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2100 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2102 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2103 int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
2106 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2107 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2109 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2110 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2113 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2114 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2115 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2116 * of the current SID.
2118 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2121 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2122 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2123 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2133 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2135 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2136 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2137 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2138 struct common_audit_data ad;
2139 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2142 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2146 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2147 * the script interpreter */
2148 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2151 old_tsec = current_security();
2152 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2153 isec = inode->i_security;
2155 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2156 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2157 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2159 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2160 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2161 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2162 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2164 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2165 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2166 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2167 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2169 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2170 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2174 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2175 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2176 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2182 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2185 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2187 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2190 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2191 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2193 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2194 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2195 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2199 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2200 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2201 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2205 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2206 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2210 /* Check for shared state */
2211 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2212 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2213 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2219 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2220 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2222 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2223 struct task_struct *tracer;
2224 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2228 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2229 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2230 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2236 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2238 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2244 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2245 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2251 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2253 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2261 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2262 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2263 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2264 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2266 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2269 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2272 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2274 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2277 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2278 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2279 struct files_struct *files)
2281 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2282 struct tty_struct *tty;
2286 tty = get_current_tty();
2288 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2289 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2290 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2292 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2293 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2294 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2295 open file may belong to another process and we are
2296 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2297 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2298 struct tty_file_private, list);
2299 file = file_priv->file;
2300 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2303 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2306 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2310 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2311 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2312 if (!n) /* none found? */
2315 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2316 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2318 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2320 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2321 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2327 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2329 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2331 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2332 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2335 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2336 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2339 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2340 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2342 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2343 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2345 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2346 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2347 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2349 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2350 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2351 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2352 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2353 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2355 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2356 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2358 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2360 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2361 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2362 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2363 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2365 task_unlock(current);
2366 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2371 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2374 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2376 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2377 struct itimerval itimer;
2387 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2388 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2389 * flush and unblock signals.
2391 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2392 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2394 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2396 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2397 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2398 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2399 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2400 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2401 __flush_signals(current);
2402 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2403 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2405 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2408 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2409 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2410 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2411 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2412 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2415 /* superblock security operations */
2417 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2419 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2422 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2424 superblock_free_security(sb);
2427 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2432 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2435 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2437 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2438 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2439 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2440 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2441 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2444 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2451 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2455 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2458 int current_size = 0;
2466 while (current_size < len) {
2476 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2478 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2479 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2480 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2486 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2494 in_save = in_end = orig;
2498 open_quote = !open_quote;
2499 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2501 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2503 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2504 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2506 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2508 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2510 } while (*in_end++);
2512 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2513 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2518 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2521 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2522 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2523 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2525 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2531 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2534 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2535 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2538 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2540 goto out_free_secdata;
2542 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2544 goto out_free_secdata;
2546 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2547 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2549 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2553 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2555 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2556 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
2559 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2560 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2561 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2567 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2568 goto out_bad_option;
2571 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2572 goto out_bad_option;
2574 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2575 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2576 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2578 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2579 goto out_bad_option;
2582 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2583 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2584 goto out_bad_option;
2593 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2595 free_secdata(secdata);
2598 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2599 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2604 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2606 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2607 struct common_audit_data ad;
2610 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2614 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2615 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2618 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2619 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2620 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2623 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2625 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2626 struct common_audit_data ad;
2628 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2629 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2630 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2633 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2636 unsigned long flags,
2639 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2641 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2642 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2643 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2645 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2648 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2650 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2652 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2653 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2656 /* inode security operations */
2658 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2660 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2663 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2665 inode_free_security(inode);
2668 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2669 struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2672 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2673 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2674 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2675 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2676 struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
2680 tsec = cred->security;
2681 dsec = dir->i_security;
2682 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2684 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2685 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2687 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2688 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2693 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2699 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2702 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2703 const struct qstr *qstr,
2705 void **value, size_t *len)
2707 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2708 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2709 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2710 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2714 dsec = dir->i_security;
2715 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2718 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2720 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2721 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2722 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2723 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
2724 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2725 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2728 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2729 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2732 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2737 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2738 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2739 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2740 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2742 isec->initialized = 1;
2745 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2749 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2752 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2762 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2764 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2767 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2769 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2772 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2774 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2777 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2779 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2782 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2784 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2787 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2789 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2792 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2794 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2797 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2798 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2800 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2803 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2805 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2807 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2810 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2812 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2814 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2817 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2818 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2822 struct common_audit_data ad;
2823 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2826 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2829 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2830 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
2836 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2838 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2841 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2842 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2844 struct av_decision avd;
2846 u32 audited, denied;
2848 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2849 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2851 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2855 validate_creds(cred);
2857 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2860 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2862 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2863 isec = inode->i_security;
2865 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2866 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2867 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2869 if (likely(!audited))
2872 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
2878 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2880 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2881 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2882 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2884 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2885 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2886 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2892 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2893 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2894 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2896 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2899 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2902 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2904 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2907 path.dentry = dentry;
2910 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2913 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2915 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2917 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2918 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2919 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2920 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2922 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2923 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2924 Restrict to administrator. */
2929 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2930 ordinary setattr permission. */
2931 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2934 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2935 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2937 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2938 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2939 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2940 struct common_audit_data ad;
2941 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2944 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2945 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2947 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2948 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2951 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2954 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2955 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2957 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2958 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2962 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
2963 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2964 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2965 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2969 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2970 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2973 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
2974 audit_size = size - 1;
2981 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
2982 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2983 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
2988 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2993 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2994 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2998 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
3003 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3005 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3006 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3010 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3011 const void *value, size_t size,
3014 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
3015 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3019 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3020 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3024 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3026 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3027 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3028 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3032 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3034 isec->initialized = 1;
3039 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3041 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3043 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3046 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3048 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3050 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3053 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3055 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3056 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3058 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3059 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3064 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3066 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3068 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3072 char *context = NULL;
3073 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3075 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3079 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3080 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3081 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3082 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3083 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3084 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3085 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3087 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3088 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3090 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3093 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3106 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3107 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3109 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3113 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3116 if (!value || !size)
3119 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3123 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3125 isec->initialized = 1;
3129 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3131 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3132 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3133 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3137 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3139 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3143 /* file security operations */
3145 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3147 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3148 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3150 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3151 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3154 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3155 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3158 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3160 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3161 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3162 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3163 u32 sid = current_sid();
3166 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3169 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3170 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3171 /* No change since file_open check. */
3174 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3177 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3179 return file_alloc_security(file);
3182 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3184 file_free_security(file);
3187 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3190 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3200 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3202 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3203 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3206 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3208 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3209 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3212 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3216 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3221 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3222 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3225 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3226 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3229 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3234 static int default_noexec;
3236 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3238 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3241 if (default_noexec &&
3242 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3244 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3245 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3246 * This has an additional check.
3248 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3254 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3255 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3257 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3258 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3261 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3262 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3264 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3271 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3275 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3276 rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3280 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3281 u32 sid = current_sid();
3282 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3283 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3289 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3290 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3292 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3295 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3296 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3299 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3300 unsigned long reqprot,
3303 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3305 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3308 if (default_noexec &&
3309 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3311 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3312 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3313 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3314 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3315 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3316 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3317 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3318 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3320 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3321 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3322 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3323 * modified content. This typically should only
3324 * occur for text relocations.
3326 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3332 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3335 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3337 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3339 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3342 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3345 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3350 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3351 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3360 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3361 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3362 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3370 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3375 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3382 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3384 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3386 fsec = file->f_security;
3387 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3390 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3391 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3394 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3396 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3398 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3399 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3401 fsec = file->f_security;
3404 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3406 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3408 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3409 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3412 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3414 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3416 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3419 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3421 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3422 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3424 fsec = file->f_security;
3425 isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3427 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3428 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3429 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3430 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3431 * struct as its SID.
3433 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3434 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3436 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3437 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3438 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3439 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3440 * new inode label or new policy.
3441 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3443 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3446 /* task security operations */
3448 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3450 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3454 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3456 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3458 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3460 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3464 cred->security = tsec;
3469 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3471 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3473 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3476 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3477 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3479 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3480 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3485 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3487 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3490 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3491 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3493 old_tsec = old->security;
3495 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3499 new->security = tsec;
3504 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3506 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3508 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3509 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3515 * set the security data for a kernel service
3516 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3518 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3520 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3521 u32 sid = current_sid();
3524 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3525 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3526 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3530 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3531 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3532 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3538 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3539 * objective context of the specified inode
3541 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3543 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3544 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3545 u32 sid = current_sid();
3548 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3549 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3550 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3554 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3558 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3561 struct common_audit_data ad;
3563 sid = task_sid(current);
3565 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3566 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3568 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3569 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3572 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3574 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3577 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3579 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3582 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3584 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3587 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3589 *secid = task_sid(p);
3592 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3596 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3600 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3603 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3607 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3611 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3614 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3616 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3619 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3620 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3622 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3624 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3625 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3626 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3627 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3628 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3629 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3634 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3638 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3642 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3645 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3647 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3650 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3652 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3655 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3662 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3664 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3666 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3667 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3669 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3673 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3675 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3678 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3679 struct inode *inode)
3681 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3682 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3685 isec->initialized = 1;
3688 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3689 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3690 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3692 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3693 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3695 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3696 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3700 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3701 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3704 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3705 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3709 *proto = ih->protocol;
3711 switch (ih->protocol) {
3713 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3715 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3719 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3723 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3724 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3729 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3731 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3735 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3739 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3740 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3744 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3745 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3747 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3751 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3755 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3756 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3767 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3769 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3770 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3771 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3774 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3775 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3778 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3779 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3783 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3784 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3787 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3788 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3789 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3798 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3800 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3804 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3805 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3810 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3812 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3816 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3817 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3821 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3822 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3824 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3828 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3829 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3833 /* includes fragments */
3843 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3844 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3849 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3851 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3854 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3855 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3858 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3860 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3863 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3864 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3874 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3875 " unable to parse packet\n");
3885 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3887 * @family: protocol family
3888 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3891 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3892 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3893 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3894 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3895 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3899 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3906 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3909 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3913 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3914 if (unlikely(err)) {
3916 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3917 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3925 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3926 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3927 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3928 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3930 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3931 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3932 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3933 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3936 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
3940 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
3941 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
3948 /* socket security operations */
3950 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3951 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3953 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3954 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3958 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3962 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3964 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3965 struct common_audit_data ad;
3966 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3967 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3969 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3972 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3976 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3979 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3980 int protocol, int kern)
3982 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3990 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3991 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3995 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3998 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3999 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4001 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4002 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4003 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4006 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4009 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4011 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
4016 isec->initialized = 1;
4019 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4020 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
4021 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4022 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4028 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4029 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4030 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4032 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4034 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4038 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4043 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4044 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4045 * check the first address now.
4047 family = sk->sk_family;
4048 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4050 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4051 struct common_audit_data ad;
4052 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4053 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4054 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4055 unsigned short snum;
4058 if (family == PF_INET) {
4059 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4060 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4061 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4063 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4064 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4065 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4071 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4073 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4074 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4078 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4080 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4081 ad.u.net->family = family;
4082 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4084 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4090 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4091 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4092 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4095 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4096 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4099 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4100 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4104 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4108 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4112 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4114 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4115 ad.u.net->family = family;
4117 if (family == PF_INET)
4118 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4120 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4122 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4123 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4131 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4133 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4134 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4137 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4142 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4144 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4145 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4146 struct common_audit_data ad;
4147 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4148 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4149 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4150 unsigned short snum;
4153 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4154 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4155 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4157 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4159 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4160 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4162 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4165 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4169 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4170 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4172 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4174 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4175 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4176 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4181 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4187 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4189 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4192 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4195 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4196 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4198 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4202 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4204 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4205 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4206 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4207 newisec->initialized = 1;
4212 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4215 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4218 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4219 int size, int flags)
4221 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4224 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4226 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4229 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4231 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4234 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4238 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4242 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4245 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4248 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4251 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4253 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4256 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4260 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4261 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4262 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4263 struct common_audit_data ad;
4264 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4267 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4269 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4271 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4272 sksec_other->sclass,
4273 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4277 /* server child socket */
4278 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4279 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4284 /* connecting socket */
4285 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4290 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4291 struct socket *other)
4293 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4294 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4295 struct common_audit_data ad;
4296 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4298 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4300 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4302 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4306 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4307 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4308 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4314 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4317 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4318 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4322 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4325 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4326 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4329 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4333 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4334 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4335 struct common_audit_data ad;
4336 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4339 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4341 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4342 ad.u.net->family = family;
4343 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4347 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4348 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4354 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4357 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4362 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4365 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4366 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4367 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4368 struct common_audit_data ad;
4369 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4374 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4377 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4378 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4381 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4382 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4383 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4384 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4385 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4386 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4388 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4389 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4390 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4393 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4395 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4396 ad.u.net->family = family;
4397 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4401 if (peerlbl_active) {
4404 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4407 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4408 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4410 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4413 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4416 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4421 if (secmark_active) {
4422 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4431 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4432 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4437 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4438 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4440 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4441 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4442 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4443 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4444 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4446 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4450 if (scontext_len > len) {
4455 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4459 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4465 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4467 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4470 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4472 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4475 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4479 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4480 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4482 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4485 *secid = peer_secid;
4486 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4491 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4493 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4495 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4499 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4500 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4501 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4502 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4507 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4509 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4511 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4512 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4516 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4518 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4519 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4521 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4522 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4523 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4525 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4528 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4531 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4533 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4535 *secid = sksec->sid;
4539 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4541 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4542 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4544 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4545 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4546 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4547 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4550 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4551 struct request_sock *req)
4553 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4555 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4559 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4562 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4565 req->secid = connsid;
4566 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4568 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4571 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4572 const struct request_sock *req)
4574 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4576 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4577 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4578 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4579 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4580 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4581 time it will have been created and available. */
4583 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4584 * thread with access to newsksec */
4585 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4588 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4590 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4591 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4593 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4594 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4597 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4600 static void selinux_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
4602 skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
4605 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4607 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4610 __tsec = current_security();
4613 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4616 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4618 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4621 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4623 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4626 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4629 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4632 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4634 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4636 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4639 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4645 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4650 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4652 u32 sid = current_sid();
4654 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4655 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4656 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4657 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4658 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4659 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4661 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4665 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4667 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4669 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4670 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4673 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4675 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4676 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4678 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4679 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4680 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4681 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4682 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4683 * protocols were being used */
4685 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4686 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4691 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4693 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4694 u32 sid = current_sid();
4697 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4698 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4701 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4702 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4710 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4714 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4715 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4717 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4721 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4723 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4725 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4727 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4728 " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
4729 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4730 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4740 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4745 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4747 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
4748 const struct net_device *indev,
4754 struct common_audit_data ad;
4755 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4760 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4763 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4764 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4765 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4766 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4769 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4772 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4774 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
4775 ad.u.net->family = family;
4776 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4779 if (peerlbl_active) {
4780 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
4781 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4783 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4789 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4790 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4794 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4795 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4796 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4798 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4804 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4805 struct sk_buff *skb,
4806 const struct net_device *in,
4807 const struct net_device *out,
4808 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4810 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in, PF_INET);
4813 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4814 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4815 struct sk_buff *skb,
4816 const struct net_device *in,
4817 const struct net_device *out,
4818 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4820 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in, PF_INET6);
4824 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4830 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4833 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4834 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4835 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4838 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4840 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
4841 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4842 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4843 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4844 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4845 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4846 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4847 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4848 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4849 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4850 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4851 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4852 * best we can do. */
4855 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4856 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4859 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4860 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4866 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4867 struct sk_buff *skb,
4868 const struct net_device *in,
4869 const struct net_device *out,
4870 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4872 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4875 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4879 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4880 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4881 struct common_audit_data ad;
4882 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4888 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4890 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4892 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4893 ad.u.net->family = family;
4894 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4897 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4898 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4899 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4900 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4902 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4903 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4908 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
4909 const struct net_device *outdev,
4914 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
4916 struct common_audit_data ad;
4917 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4922 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4923 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4924 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4925 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4926 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4927 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4929 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4930 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4931 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4937 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4938 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4939 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4940 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4941 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4942 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4943 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4944 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4945 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4946 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4948 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
4949 !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
4954 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4955 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4956 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4957 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4959 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4960 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4963 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4964 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4966 } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
4967 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
4968 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
4969 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
4970 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
4971 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
4972 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
4973 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
4974 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
4975 * for similar problems. */
4977 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4978 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
4980 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
4981 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
4982 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
4983 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
4984 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
4985 * pass the packet. */
4986 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4989 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4993 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4997 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5000 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5002 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5004 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5005 * associated socket. */
5006 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5007 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5008 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5011 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5013 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5014 ad.u.net->family = family;
5015 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5019 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5020 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5021 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5023 if (peerlbl_active) {
5027 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5029 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5030 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5031 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5033 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5035 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5036 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5037 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5043 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5044 struct sk_buff *skb,
5045 const struct net_device *in,
5046 const struct net_device *out,
5047 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
5049 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out, PF_INET);
5052 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5053 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5054 struct sk_buff *skb,
5055 const struct net_device *in,
5056 const struct net_device *out,
5057 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
5059 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out, PF_INET6);
5063 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5065 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5069 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
5073 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5076 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5077 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5080 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5083 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5087 sid = task_sid(task);
5088 isec->sclass = sclass;
5090 perm->security = isec;
5095 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5097 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5098 perm->security = NULL;
5102 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5104 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5106 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5110 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5111 msg->security = msec;
5116 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5118 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5120 msg->security = NULL;
5124 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5127 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5128 struct common_audit_data ad;
5129 u32 sid = current_sid();
5131 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5133 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5134 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5136 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5139 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5141 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5144 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5146 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5149 /* message queue security operations */
5150 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5152 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5153 struct common_audit_data ad;
5154 u32 sid = current_sid();
5157 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5161 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5163 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5164 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5166 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5169 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5175 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5177 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5180 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5182 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5183 struct common_audit_data ad;
5184 u32 sid = current_sid();
5186 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5188 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5189 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5191 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5192 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5195 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5203 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5204 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5207 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5210 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5213 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5219 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5223 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5225 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5226 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5227 struct common_audit_data ad;
5228 u32 sid = current_sid();
5231 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5232 msec = msg->security;
5235 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5237 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5239 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5240 * message queue this message will be stored in
5242 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5248 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5249 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5251 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5252 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5255 /* Can this process send the message */
5256 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5259 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5260 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5261 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5266 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5267 struct task_struct *target,
5268 long type, int mode)
5270 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5271 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5272 struct common_audit_data ad;
5273 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5276 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5277 msec = msg->security;
5279 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5280 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5282 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5283 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5285 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5286 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5290 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5291 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5293 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5294 struct common_audit_data ad;
5295 u32 sid = current_sid();
5298 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5302 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5304 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5305 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5307 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5310 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5316 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5318 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5321 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5323 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5324 struct common_audit_data ad;
5325 u32 sid = current_sid();
5327 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5329 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5330 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5332 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5333 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5336 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5337 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5345 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5346 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5349 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5352 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5359 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5365 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5369 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5370 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5374 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5377 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5379 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5382 /* Semaphore security operations */
5383 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5385 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5386 struct common_audit_data ad;
5387 u32 sid = current_sid();
5390 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5394 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5396 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5397 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5399 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5402 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5408 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5410 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5413 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5415 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5416 struct common_audit_data ad;
5417 u32 sid = current_sid();
5419 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5421 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5422 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5424 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5425 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5428 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5429 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5437 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5438 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5442 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5453 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5456 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5460 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5466 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5470 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5471 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5476 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5480 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5483 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5489 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5491 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5496 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5499 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5501 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5505 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5508 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5511 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5512 char *name, char **value)
5514 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5520 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5526 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5528 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5530 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5532 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5533 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5534 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5535 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5536 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5537 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5538 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5539 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5547 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5557 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5558 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5560 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5561 struct task_struct *tracer;
5568 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5569 security attributes. */
5574 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5575 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5576 * above restriction is ever removed.
5578 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5579 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5580 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5581 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5582 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5583 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5584 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5585 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5586 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5587 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5593 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5594 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5595 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5599 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5600 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5601 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5602 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5605 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5606 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5607 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5608 audit_size = size - 1;
5611 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5612 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5613 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5618 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5625 new = prepare_creds();
5629 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5630 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5631 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5632 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5633 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5634 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5635 tsec = new->security;
5636 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5637 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5638 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5639 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5640 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5641 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5644 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5645 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5646 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5647 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5652 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5654 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5655 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5660 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5661 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5662 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5666 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5667 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5670 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5672 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5676 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5677 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5696 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5698 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5701 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5703 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5706 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5708 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
5711 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5717 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5719 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5721 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5725 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5727 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5729 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5732 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5735 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5744 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5745 unsigned long flags)
5747 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5748 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5750 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5754 tsec = cred->security;
5755 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5756 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5758 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5764 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5766 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5772 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5773 const struct cred *cred,
5777 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5780 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5781 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5782 appear to be created. */
5786 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5788 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5789 ksec = key->security;
5791 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5794 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5796 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5797 char *context = NULL;
5801 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5810 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5813 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5814 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5815 .capget = selinux_capget,
5816 .capset = selinux_capset,
5817 .capable = selinux_capable,
5818 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5819 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5820 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5821 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5823 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5825 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5826 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5827 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5828 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5830 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5831 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5832 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5833 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5834 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5835 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5836 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5837 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5838 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5839 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5840 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5841 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5843 .dentry_init_security = selinux_dentry_init_security,
5845 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5846 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5847 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5848 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5849 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5850 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5851 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5852 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5853 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5854 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5855 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5856 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5857 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5858 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5859 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5860 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5861 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5862 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5863 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5864 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5865 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5866 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5867 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5868 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5869 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5871 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5872 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5873 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5874 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5875 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5876 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5877 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5878 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5879 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5880 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5881 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5882 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5884 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5886 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5887 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5888 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5889 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5890 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5891 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5892 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5893 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5894 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5895 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5896 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5897 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5898 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5899 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5900 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5901 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5902 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5903 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5904 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5905 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5906 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5907 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5909 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5910 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5912 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5913 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5915 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5916 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5917 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5918 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5919 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5920 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5922 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5923 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5924 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5925 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5926 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5928 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5929 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5930 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5931 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5932 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5934 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5936 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5937 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5939 .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel,
5940 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5941 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5942 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5943 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5944 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5945 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5947 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5948 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5950 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5951 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5952 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5953 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5954 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5955 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5956 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5957 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5958 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5959 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5960 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5961 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5962 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5963 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5964 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5965 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5966 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5967 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5968 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5969 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5970 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5971 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5972 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5973 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5974 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5975 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5976 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5977 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5978 .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
5979 .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
5980 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5981 .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
5982 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5983 .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
5984 .skb_owned_by = selinux_skb_owned_by,
5986 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5987 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5988 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5989 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5990 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5991 .xfrm_state_alloc = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5992 .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
5993 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5994 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5995 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5996 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5997 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
6001 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
6002 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
6003 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
6004 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
6008 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
6009 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
6010 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
6011 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
6015 static __init int selinux_init(void)
6017 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
6018 selinux_enabled = 0;
6022 if (!selinux_enabled) {
6023 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6027 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6029 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6030 cred_init_security();
6032 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6034 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6035 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6036 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6039 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
6040 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
6042 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6043 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6045 if (selinux_enforcing)
6046 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6048 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6053 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6055 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6058 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6060 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6062 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6063 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6064 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6067 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6068 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6069 security_initcall(selinux_init);
6071 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6073 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6075 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6076 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6078 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6079 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6082 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
6083 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6085 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6086 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6089 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
6090 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6092 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6093 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6095 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6097 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6098 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6100 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6101 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6104 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
6105 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6107 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6108 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6113 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6117 if (!selinux_enabled)
6120 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6122 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6124 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
6129 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6131 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6132 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6134 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6136 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6140 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6142 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6143 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6146 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6148 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6149 static int selinux_disabled;
6151 int selinux_disable(void)
6153 if (ss_initialized) {
6154 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6158 if (selinux_disabled) {
6159 /* Only do this once. */
6163 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6165 selinux_disabled = 1;
6166 selinux_enabled = 0;
6168 reset_security_ops();
6170 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6173 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6174 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6176 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */