2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
18 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
21 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
22 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
25 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
28 #include <linux/errno.h>
29 #include <linux/sched.h>
30 #include <linux/security.h>
31 #include <linux/xattr.h>
32 #include <linux/capability.h>
33 #include <linux/unistd.h>
35 #include <linux/mman.h>
36 #include <linux/slab.h>
37 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
38 #include <linux/swap.h>
39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
41 #include <linux/file.h>
42 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
43 #include <linux/namei.h>
44 #include <linux/mount.h>
45 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
48 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
51 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
52 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
53 #include <net/netlabel.h>
54 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
55 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
56 #include <asm/atomic.h>
57 #include <linux/bitops.h>
58 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
59 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
60 #include <linux/netlink.h>
61 #include <linux/tcp.h>
62 #include <linux/udp.h>
63 #include <linux/dccp.h>
64 #include <linux/quota.h>
65 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
66 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <linux/parser.h>
68 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
70 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
71 #include <linux/personality.h>
72 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
73 #include <linux/audit.h>
74 #include <linux/string.h>
75 #include <linux/selinux.h>
76 #include <linux/mutex.h>
87 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
88 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
90 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
92 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
93 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
94 extern int selinux_compat_net;
95 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing;
103 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 unsigned long enforcing;
106 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
107 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118 unsigned long enabled;
119 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
120 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125 int selinux_enabled = 1;
128 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
129 static struct security_operations *original_ops;
131 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
133 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
134 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
159 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
161 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
163 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
165 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
170 task->security = tsec;
175 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
177 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
178 task->security = NULL;
182 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
184 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
185 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
187 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
191 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
192 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
194 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
195 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
196 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
197 inode->i_security = isec;
202 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
204 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
205 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
207 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
208 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
209 list_del_init(&isec->list);
210 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
212 inode->i_security = NULL;
213 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
216 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
218 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
219 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
221 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
225 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
226 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
227 file->f_security = fsec;
232 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
234 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
235 file->f_security = NULL;
239 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
241 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
243 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
247 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
249 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
250 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
252 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
253 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
254 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
255 sb->s_security = sbsec;
260 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
262 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
264 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
265 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
266 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
267 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
269 sb->s_security = NULL;
273 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
275 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
277 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
281 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sk->sk_security = ssec;
285 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
290 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
292 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
294 sk->sk_security = NULL;
298 /* The security server must be initialized before
299 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
300 extern int ss_initialized;
302 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
304 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
306 "uses transition SIDs",
308 "uses genfs_contexts",
309 "not configured for labeling",
310 "uses mountpoint labeling",
313 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
315 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
317 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
328 static match_table_t tokens = {
329 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
332 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
336 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
338 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
344 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
345 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
349 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
350 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
354 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
355 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
356 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
359 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
360 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
364 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
365 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
369 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
372 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
373 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
376 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
377 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
378 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
379 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
380 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
381 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
382 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
383 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
384 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
388 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
389 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
390 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
391 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
392 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
393 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
395 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
396 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
397 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
402 sbsec->initialized = 1;
404 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
405 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
406 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
408 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
409 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
410 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
412 /* Initialize the root inode. */
413 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
415 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
416 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
417 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
419 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
421 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
422 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
423 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
424 struct inode_security_struct, list);
425 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
426 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
427 inode = igrab(inode);
429 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
433 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
434 list_del_init(&isec->list);
437 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
443 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
444 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
445 * mount options, or whatever.
447 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
448 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
451 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
452 char *context = NULL;
456 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
458 if (!sbsec->initialized)
465 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
466 * settings this is going to need a mask
469 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
470 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
472 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
476 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
477 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
482 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
483 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
489 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
490 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
493 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
494 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
496 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
497 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
500 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
501 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
503 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
504 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
507 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
508 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
510 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
511 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
512 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
514 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
517 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
518 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
521 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
526 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
530 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
531 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
533 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
534 if (sbsec->initialized)
535 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
536 (old_sid != new_sid))
539 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
540 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
542 if (!sbsec->initialized)
543 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
549 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
550 * labeling information.
552 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
553 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
557 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
558 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
559 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
560 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
561 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
562 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
563 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
564 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
565 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
567 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
569 if (!ss_initialized) {
571 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
572 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
573 server is ready to handle calls. */
574 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
575 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
576 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
577 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
581 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
582 "before the security server is initialized\n");
587 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
588 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
589 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
590 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
592 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
593 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
594 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
595 * will be used for both mounts)
597 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
602 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
603 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
604 * than once with different security options.
606 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->initialized) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
683 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
687 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
691 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
692 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
693 * the superblock context if not already set.
696 if (!fscontext_sid) {
697 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
706 if (!rootcontext_sid)
707 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
713 if (rootcontext_sid) {
714 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
718 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
719 root_isec->initialized = 1;
722 if (defcontext_sid) {
723 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
725 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
726 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
730 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
731 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
737 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
740 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
742 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
746 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
747 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
751 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
752 struct super_block *newsb)
754 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
755 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
757 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
758 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
762 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
763 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
766 if (!ss_initialized) {
767 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
768 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
769 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
770 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
774 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
775 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
777 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
778 if (newsbsec->initialized)
781 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
783 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
785 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
786 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
787 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
790 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
794 if (!set_rootcontext) {
795 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
796 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
799 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
801 if (set_rootcontext) {
802 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
803 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
804 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
805 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
807 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
810 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
811 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
814 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
815 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
818 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
819 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
820 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
822 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
824 /* Standard string-based options. */
825 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
827 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
832 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
836 if (context || defcontext) {
838 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
841 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
851 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
854 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
861 case Opt_rootcontext:
864 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
867 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
875 if (context || defcontext) {
877 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
880 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
889 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
896 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
901 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
902 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
907 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
908 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
911 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
912 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
915 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
916 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
919 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
920 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
923 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
934 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
936 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
939 char *options = data;
940 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
942 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
947 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
949 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
954 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
957 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
961 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
963 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
965 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
967 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
969 return SECCLASS_FILE;
971 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
975 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
977 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
981 return SECCLASS_FILE;
984 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
986 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
989 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
991 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
994 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1000 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1001 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1003 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1010 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1011 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1013 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1015 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1016 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1018 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1020 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1022 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1028 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1029 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1030 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1031 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1032 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1034 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1036 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1037 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1038 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1040 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1041 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1042 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1043 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1044 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1045 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1046 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1048 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1051 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1053 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1055 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1058 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1061 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1062 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1067 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1069 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1074 end = buffer+buflen;
1079 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1080 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1084 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1089 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1090 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1094 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1102 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1103 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1105 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1106 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1108 struct dentry *dentry;
1109 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1110 char *context = NULL;
1114 if (isec->initialized)
1117 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1118 if (isec->initialized)
1121 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1122 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1123 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1124 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1125 server is ready to handle calls. */
1126 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1127 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1128 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1129 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1133 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1134 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1135 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1136 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1140 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1141 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1143 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1144 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1146 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1147 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1150 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1151 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1156 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1157 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1163 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1165 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1166 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1167 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1175 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1181 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1187 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1188 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1189 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1190 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1194 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1195 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1198 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1202 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1203 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1204 __func__, context, -rc,
1205 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1207 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1215 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1216 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1218 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1219 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1220 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1222 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1223 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1224 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1232 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1233 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1236 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1237 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1240 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1242 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1243 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1254 isec->initialized = 1;
1257 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1259 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1260 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1264 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1265 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1271 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1272 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1275 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1276 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1279 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1280 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1283 /* All other signals. */
1284 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1291 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1292 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1293 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1294 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1297 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1299 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1300 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1301 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1302 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1305 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1306 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1309 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1310 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1313 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1314 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1316 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1318 tsec = tsk->security;
1320 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1324 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1326 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1329 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1333 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1336 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1339 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1340 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1343 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1345 tsec = tsk->security;
1347 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1348 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1351 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1352 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1353 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1354 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1355 struct inode *inode,
1357 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1359 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1360 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1361 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1363 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1366 tsec = tsk->security;
1367 isec = inode->i_security;
1371 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1372 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1375 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1378 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1379 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1380 pathname if needed. */
1381 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1382 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1383 struct dentry *dentry,
1386 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1387 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1388 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1389 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1390 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1391 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1394 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1395 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1396 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1397 check a particular permission to the file.
1398 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1399 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1400 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1401 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1402 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1406 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1407 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1408 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1409 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1412 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1413 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1415 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1416 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1424 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1426 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1431 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1432 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1433 struct dentry *dentry,
1436 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1437 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1438 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1440 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1443 tsec = current->security;
1444 dsec = dir->i_security;
1445 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1447 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1448 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1450 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1451 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1456 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1457 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1459 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1465 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1469 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1470 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1471 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1474 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1475 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1476 struct task_struct *ctx)
1478 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1480 tsec = ctx->security;
1482 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1486 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1489 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1490 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1491 struct dentry *dentry,
1495 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1496 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1497 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1501 tsec = current->security;
1502 dsec = dir->i_security;
1503 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1505 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1506 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1509 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1510 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1525 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1530 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1534 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1535 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1536 struct inode *new_dir,
1537 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1539 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1540 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1541 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1543 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1546 tsec = current->security;
1547 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1548 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1549 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1550 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1552 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1554 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1555 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1556 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1559 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1560 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1563 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1564 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1565 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1570 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1571 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1572 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1573 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1574 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1577 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1578 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1579 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1580 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1582 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1590 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1591 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1592 struct super_block *sb,
1594 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1596 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1597 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1599 tsec = tsk->security;
1600 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1601 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1605 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1606 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1610 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1611 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1612 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1613 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1616 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1618 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1622 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1624 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1626 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1634 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1637 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1639 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1641 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1643 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1647 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1648 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1649 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1650 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1651 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1652 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1653 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1656 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1657 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1662 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1663 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1667 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1669 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1670 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1677 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1685 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1687 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent,
1688 struct task_struct *child,
1693 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child, mode);
1697 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1698 struct task_security_struct *tsec = parent->security;
1699 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1700 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1701 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1704 return task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1707 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1708 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1712 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1716 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1719 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1720 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1724 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1728 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1731 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1732 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1734 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1737 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1741 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1745 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1748 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1751 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1754 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1759 end = buffer+buflen;
1765 const char *name = table->procname;
1766 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1767 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1771 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1774 table = table->parent;
1780 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1782 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1784 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1789 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1793 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1797 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1801 tsec = current->security;
1803 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1804 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1806 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1807 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1810 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1811 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1813 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1814 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1822 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1823 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1829 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1842 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1848 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1852 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1858 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1860 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1863 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1867 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1872 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1873 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1874 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1876 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1877 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1878 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1879 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1881 case 0: /* Close log */
1882 case 1: /* Open log */
1883 case 2: /* Read from log */
1884 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1885 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1887 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1894 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1895 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1896 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1898 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1899 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1900 * the capability is granted.
1902 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1903 * processes that allocate mappings.
1905 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1907 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1908 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1910 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1912 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1913 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1914 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1921 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1925 * task_tracer_task - return the task that is tracing the given task
1926 * @task: task to consider
1928 * Returns NULL if noone is tracing @task, or the &struct task_struct
1929 * pointer to its tracer.
1931 * Must be called under rcu_read_lock().
1933 static struct task_struct *task_tracer_task(struct task_struct *task)
1935 if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
1936 return rcu_dereference(task->parent);
1940 /* binprm security operations */
1942 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1944 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1946 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1950 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1953 bprm->security = bsec;
1957 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1959 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1960 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1961 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1962 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1964 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1967 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1971 bsec = bprm->security;
1976 tsec = current->security;
1977 isec = inode->i_security;
1979 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1980 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1982 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1983 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1984 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1985 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1987 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1988 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1989 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1992 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1993 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1994 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1999 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2000 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2002 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2005 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2006 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2007 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2011 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2012 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2013 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2017 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2018 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2022 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2023 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2025 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2033 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2035 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2039 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2041 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2044 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2045 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2046 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2047 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2048 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2050 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2053 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2056 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2058 kfree(bprm->security);
2059 bprm->security = NULL;
2062 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2063 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2065 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2066 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2068 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2069 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2070 struct tty_struct *tty;
2071 struct fdtable *fdt;
2075 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2076 tty = get_current_tty();
2079 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2081 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2082 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2083 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2084 file may belong to another process and we are only
2085 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2086 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2087 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2088 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2094 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2095 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2099 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2101 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2103 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2105 unsigned long set, i;
2110 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2111 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2113 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2116 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2117 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2122 if (file_has_perm(current,
2124 file_to_av(file))) {
2126 fd = get_unused_fd();
2136 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2137 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2144 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2149 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2152 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2155 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2157 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2158 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2162 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2164 tsec = current->security;
2166 bsec = bprm->security;
2169 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2171 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2172 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2173 unchanged and kill. */
2174 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2175 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2176 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2183 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2184 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2185 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2186 struct task_struct *tracer;
2187 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2191 tracer = task_tracer_task(current);
2192 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2193 sec = tracer->security;
2199 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2200 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2212 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2214 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2216 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2217 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2218 struct itimerval itimer;
2219 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2222 tsec = current->security;
2223 bsec = bprm->security;
2226 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2229 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2232 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2233 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2235 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2236 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2237 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2238 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2239 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2240 will be checked against the new SID. */
2241 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2242 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2244 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2245 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2246 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2247 flush_signals(current);
2248 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2249 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2250 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2251 recalc_sigpending();
2252 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2255 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2256 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2258 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2259 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2260 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2261 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2262 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2263 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2264 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2265 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2266 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2268 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2269 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2271 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2272 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2273 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2274 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2276 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2278 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2281 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2285 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2286 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2287 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2290 /* superblock security operations */
2292 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2294 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2297 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2299 superblock_free_security(sb);
2302 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2307 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2310 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2312 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2313 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2314 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2315 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2318 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2325 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2329 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2332 int current_size = 0;
2340 while (current_size < len) {
2350 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2352 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2353 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2354 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2360 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2368 in_save = in_end = orig;
2372 open_quote = !open_quote;
2373 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2375 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2377 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2378 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2380 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2382 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2384 } while (*in_end++);
2386 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2387 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2392 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2394 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2397 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2401 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2402 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2403 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2406 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2408 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2410 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2411 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2412 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2415 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2418 unsigned long flags,
2423 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2427 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2428 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2429 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2431 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2435 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2439 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2443 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2444 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2447 /* inode security operations */
2449 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2451 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2454 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2456 inode_free_security(inode);
2459 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2460 char **name, void **value,
2463 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2464 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2465 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2468 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2470 tsec = current->security;
2471 dsec = dir->i_security;
2472 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2474 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2475 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2477 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2478 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2481 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2482 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2485 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2490 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2491 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2492 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2493 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2495 isec->initialized = 1;
2498 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2502 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2509 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2521 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2523 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2526 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2530 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2533 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2536 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2540 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2543 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2546 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2548 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2551 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2553 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2556 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2558 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2561 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2565 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2569 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2572 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2573 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2575 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2578 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2580 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2583 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2587 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2590 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2593 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2594 struct nameidata *nd)
2598 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2603 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2607 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2608 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2611 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2615 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2619 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2622 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2623 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2624 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2626 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2629 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2631 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2634 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2636 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2637 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2638 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2639 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2641 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2642 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2643 Restrict to administrator. */
2648 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2649 ordinary setattr permission. */
2650 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2653 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2654 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2656 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2657 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2658 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2659 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2660 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2664 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2665 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2667 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2668 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2671 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2674 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2675 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2677 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2678 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2682 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2683 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2684 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2686 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2691 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2692 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2696 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2701 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2703 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2704 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2708 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2709 const void *value, size_t size,
2712 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2713 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2717 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2718 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2722 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2724 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2725 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2726 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2734 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2736 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2739 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2741 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2744 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2746 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2747 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2749 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2750 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2755 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2757 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2759 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2763 char *context = NULL;
2764 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2765 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2767 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2771 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2772 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2773 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2774 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2775 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2776 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2777 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2779 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2781 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2782 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2783 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2787 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2790 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2803 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2804 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2806 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2810 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2813 if (!value || !size)
2816 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2824 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2826 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2827 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2828 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2832 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2834 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2837 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2839 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2842 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2844 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2848 /* file security operations */
2850 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2853 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2856 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2860 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2861 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2864 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2865 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2869 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2872 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2874 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2875 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2876 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2877 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2880 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2884 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2885 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2886 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2888 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2891 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2893 return file_alloc_security(file);
2896 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2898 file_free_security(file);
2901 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2906 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2908 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2913 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2916 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2918 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2919 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2921 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2922 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2923 * This has an additional check.
2925 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2932 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2933 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2935 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2936 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2939 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2940 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2942 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2947 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2948 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2949 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2952 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
2954 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2955 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2956 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2957 if (rc || addr_only)
2960 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2963 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2964 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2967 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2968 unsigned long reqprot,
2973 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2977 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2980 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2981 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2983 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2984 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2985 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2987 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2988 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2989 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2990 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2991 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2993 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2994 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2995 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2996 * modified content. This typically should only
2997 * occur for text relocations.
2999 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3007 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3010 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3012 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3015 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3022 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3027 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3028 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3037 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3038 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3043 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3048 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3052 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3059 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3061 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3062 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3064 tsec = current->security;
3065 fsec = file->f_security;
3066 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3071 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3072 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3076 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3077 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3079 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3080 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3082 tsec = tsk->security;
3083 fsec = file->f_security;
3086 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3088 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3090 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3091 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3094 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3096 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3099 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3101 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3102 struct inode *inode;
3103 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3104 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3105 fsec = file->f_security;
3106 isec = inode->i_security;
3108 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3109 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3110 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3111 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3112 * struct as its SID.
3114 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3115 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3117 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3118 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3119 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3120 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3121 * new inode label or new policy.
3122 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3124 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3127 /* task security operations */
3129 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3133 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3137 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3140 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3142 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3145 tsec1 = current->security;
3147 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3150 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3152 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3153 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3155 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3156 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3157 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3158 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3159 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3164 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3166 task_free_security(tsk);
3169 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3171 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3172 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3173 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3174 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3175 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3180 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3182 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3185 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3187 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3191 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3193 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3196 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3198 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3201 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3203 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3206 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3208 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3212 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3214 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3218 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3222 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3226 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3229 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3233 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3237 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3240 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3242 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3245 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3247 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3250 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3254 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3255 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3256 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3257 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3258 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3259 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3264 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3268 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3272 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3275 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3277 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3280 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3282 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3285 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3290 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3292 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3297 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3299 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3302 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3304 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3308 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3315 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3316 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3317 the state of the current process. */
3318 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3321 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3323 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3326 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3328 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3330 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3333 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3334 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3338 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3339 struct inode *inode)
3341 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3342 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3344 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3345 isec->initialized = 1;
3349 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3350 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3351 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3353 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3354 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3356 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3357 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3361 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3362 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3365 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3366 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3370 *proto = ih->protocol;
3372 switch (ih->protocol) {
3374 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3376 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3380 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3384 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3385 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3390 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3392 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3396 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3400 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3401 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3405 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3406 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3408 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3412 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3416 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3417 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3428 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3430 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3431 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3432 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3435 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3436 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3438 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3439 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3443 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3444 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3447 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3448 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3449 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3458 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3460 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3464 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3465 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3470 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3472 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3476 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3477 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3481 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3482 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3484 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3488 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3489 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3493 /* includes fragments */
3503 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3504 char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3508 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3510 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3513 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3514 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3517 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3519 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3522 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3523 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3532 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3533 " unable to parse packet\n");
3539 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3541 * @family: protocol family
3542 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3545 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3546 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3547 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3548 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3549 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3553 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3560 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3561 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3563 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3564 if (unlikely(err)) {
3566 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3567 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3574 /* socket security operations */
3575 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3578 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3579 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3580 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3583 tsec = task->security;
3584 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3586 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3589 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3590 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3591 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3597 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3598 int protocol, int kern)
3601 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3607 tsec = current->security;
3608 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3609 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3610 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3611 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3617 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3618 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3621 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3622 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3623 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3626 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3628 tsec = current->security;
3629 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3630 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3631 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3632 isec->initialized = 1;
3635 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3636 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3637 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3638 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3644 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3645 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3646 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3648 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3653 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3658 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3659 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3660 * check the first address now.
3662 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3663 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3665 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3666 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3667 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3668 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3669 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3670 unsigned short snum;
3671 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3672 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3674 tsec = current->security;
3675 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3677 if (family == PF_INET) {
3678 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3679 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3680 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3681 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3683 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3684 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3685 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3686 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3692 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3694 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3695 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3699 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3700 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3701 ad.u.net.family = family;
3702 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3704 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3710 switch (isec->sclass) {
3711 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3712 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3715 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3716 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3719 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3720 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3724 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3728 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3732 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3733 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3734 ad.u.net.family = family;
3736 if (family == PF_INET)
3737 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3739 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3741 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3742 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3750 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3752 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3755 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3760 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3762 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3763 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3764 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3765 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3766 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3767 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3768 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3769 unsigned short snum;
3772 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3773 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3774 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3776 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3778 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3779 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3781 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3784 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3788 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3789 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3791 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3792 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3793 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3794 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3803 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3805 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3808 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3811 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3812 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3814 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3818 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3820 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3821 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3822 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3823 newisec->initialized = 1;
3828 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3833 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3837 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3840 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3841 int size, int flags)
3843 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3846 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3848 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3851 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3853 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3856 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3860 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3864 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3867 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3870 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3873 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3875 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3878 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3879 struct socket *other,
3882 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3883 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3884 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3885 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3888 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3892 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3893 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3895 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3896 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3898 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3900 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3904 /* connecting socket */
3905 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3906 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3908 /* server child socket */
3909 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3910 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3911 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3916 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3917 struct socket *other)
3919 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3920 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3921 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3924 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3925 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3927 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3928 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3930 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3931 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3938 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3940 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3946 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3949 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3950 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3954 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3957 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3958 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
3961 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
3962 struct sk_buff *skb,
3963 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3968 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3970 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
3971 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
3973 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
3974 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
3977 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3978 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3979 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3980 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3982 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3983 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3984 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3985 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3987 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3988 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
3989 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
3990 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3993 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3994 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3999 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4002 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4006 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4009 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4015 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4016 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4017 if (unlikely(err)) {
4019 "SELinux: failure in"
4020 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4021 " network port label not found\n");
4024 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4027 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4028 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4029 u16 family, char *addrp)
4032 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4034 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4036 if (selinux_compat_net)
4037 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
4040 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4045 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4046 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4049 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4050 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
4052 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
4055 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
4061 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4064 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4065 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4066 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4067 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4070 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4073 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4074 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4077 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4078 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4079 ad.u.net.family = family;
4080 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4084 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4085 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4086 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4087 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4088 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4089 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4092 if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
4095 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4098 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4102 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4106 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4107 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4116 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4117 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4122 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4123 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4124 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4126 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4128 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4129 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4130 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4131 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4133 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4138 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4143 if (scontext_len > len) {
4148 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4152 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4160 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4162 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4166 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4167 else if (skb && skb->sk)
4168 family = skb->sk->sk_family;
4172 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4173 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4175 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4178 *secid = peer_secid;
4179 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4184 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4186 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4189 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4191 sk_free_security(sk);
4194 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4196 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4197 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4199 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4200 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4201 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4203 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4206 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4209 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4211 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4213 *secid = sksec->sid;
4217 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4219 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4220 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4222 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4223 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4224 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4225 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4227 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4230 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4231 struct request_sock *req)
4233 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4238 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
4241 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4242 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4243 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4247 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4251 req->secid = newsid;
4252 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4256 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4257 const struct request_sock *req)
4259 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4261 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4262 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4263 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4264 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4265 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4266 time it will have been created and available. */
4268 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4269 * thread with access to newsksec */
4270 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4273 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4274 struct sk_buff *skb)
4276 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4278 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4281 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4284 fl->secid = req->secid;
4287 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4291 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4292 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4293 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4295 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4299 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4301 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4303 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4304 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4305 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4306 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4307 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4308 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4318 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4323 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4325 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4330 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4334 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4337 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4338 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4339 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4342 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4343 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4344 ad.u.net.family = family;
4345 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4348 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4352 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4353 peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
4357 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4358 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4364 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4365 struct sk_buff *skb,
4366 const struct net_device *in,
4367 const struct net_device *out,
4368 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4370 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4373 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4374 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4375 struct sk_buff *skb,
4376 const struct net_device *in,
4377 const struct net_device *out,
4378 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4380 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4384 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4386 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4387 u16 family, char *addrp)
4390 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4392 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4393 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4395 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4396 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4399 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4400 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4401 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4402 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4404 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4405 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4406 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4407 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4409 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4410 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4411 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4412 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4415 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4416 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4421 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4424 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4427 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4430 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4437 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4438 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4439 if (unlikely(err)) {
4441 "SELinux: failure in"
4442 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4443 " network port label not found\n");
4446 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4449 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4451 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4456 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4457 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4461 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4463 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4464 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4468 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4469 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
4473 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4474 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
4480 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4486 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4492 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4493 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4494 ad.u.net.family = family;
4495 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4498 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4499 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4500 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4501 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4502 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4503 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
4504 family, addrp, proto);
4506 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4507 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4508 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4509 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4510 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4511 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4512 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4515 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4516 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4517 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4520 /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
4521 * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
4522 * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
4523 * directly from the packet */
4526 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4527 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4528 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4530 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4532 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4536 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4537 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4540 if (peerlbl_active) {
4544 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4546 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4547 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4550 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4552 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4553 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4560 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4561 struct sk_buff *skb,
4562 const struct net_device *in,
4563 const struct net_device *out,
4564 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4566 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4569 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4570 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4571 struct sk_buff *skb,
4572 const struct net_device *in,
4573 const struct net_device *out,
4574 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4576 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4580 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4582 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4586 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4590 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4591 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4596 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4599 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4601 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4605 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4606 ad.u.cap = capability;
4608 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4609 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4612 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4613 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4616 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4617 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4619 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4623 isec->sclass = sclass;
4624 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4625 perm->security = isec;
4630 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4632 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4633 perm->security = NULL;
4637 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4639 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4641 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4645 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4646 msg->security = msec;
4651 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4653 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4655 msg->security = NULL;
4659 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4662 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4663 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4664 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4666 tsec = current->security;
4667 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4669 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4670 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4672 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4675 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4677 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4680 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4682 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4685 /* message queue security operations */
4686 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4688 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4689 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4690 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4693 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4697 tsec = current->security;
4698 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4700 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4701 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4703 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4706 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4712 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4714 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4717 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4719 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4720 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4721 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4723 tsec = current->security;
4724 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4726 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4727 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4729 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4730 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4733 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4741 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4742 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4745 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4748 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4751 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4757 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4761 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4763 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4764 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4765 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4766 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4769 tsec = current->security;
4770 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4771 msec = msg->security;
4774 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4776 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4778 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4779 * message queue this message will be stored in
4781 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4789 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4790 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4792 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4793 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4796 /* Can this process send the message */
4797 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4798 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4800 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4801 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4802 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4807 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4808 struct task_struct *target,
4809 long type, int mode)
4811 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4812 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4813 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4814 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4817 tsec = target->security;
4818 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4819 msec = msg->security;
4821 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4822 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4824 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4825 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4827 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4828 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4832 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4833 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4835 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4836 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4837 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4840 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4844 tsec = current->security;
4845 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4847 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4848 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4850 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4853 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4859 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4861 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4864 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4866 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4867 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4868 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4870 tsec = current->security;
4871 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4873 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4874 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4876 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4877 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4880 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4881 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4889 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4890 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4893 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4896 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4903 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4909 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4913 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4914 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4919 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4923 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4926 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4928 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4931 /* Semaphore security operations */
4932 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4934 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4935 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4936 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4939 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4943 tsec = current->security;
4944 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4946 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4947 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4949 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4952 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4958 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4960 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4963 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4965 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4966 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4967 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4969 tsec = current->security;
4970 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4972 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4973 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4975 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4976 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4979 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4980 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4988 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4989 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4993 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5004 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5007 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5011 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5017 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5021 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5022 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5027 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5031 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5034 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5040 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5042 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5047 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5050 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5052 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5056 /* module stacking operations */
5057 static int selinux_register_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
5059 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
5060 printk(KERN_ERR "%s: There is already a secondary security "
5061 "module registered.\n", __func__);
5065 secondary_ops = ops;
5067 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
5074 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5077 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5080 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5081 char *name, char **value)
5083 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5089 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5096 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5098 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5100 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5101 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5102 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5103 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5104 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5105 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5106 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5107 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5114 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5120 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5121 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5123 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5124 struct task_struct *tracer;
5130 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5131 security attributes. */
5136 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5137 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5138 * above restriction is ever removed.
5140 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5141 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5142 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5143 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5144 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5145 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5146 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5147 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5148 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5149 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5155 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5156 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5157 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5161 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5162 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5163 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5165 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5172 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5173 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5174 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5175 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5176 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5177 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5179 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5180 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5181 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5182 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5183 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5184 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5187 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5188 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5189 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5190 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5191 struct av_decision avd;
5196 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5197 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5198 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5199 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5200 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5201 do_each_thread(g, t)
5202 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5203 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5206 while_each_thread(g, t);
5207 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5210 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5211 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5212 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5216 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5217 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5220 tracer = task_tracer_task(p);
5221 if (tracer != NULL) {
5222 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5223 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5225 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5227 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5231 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5232 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5246 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5248 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5251 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5253 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5256 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5263 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5264 unsigned long flags)
5266 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5267 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5269 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5273 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5274 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5276 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5282 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5284 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5290 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5291 struct task_struct *ctx,
5295 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5296 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5298 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5300 tsec = ctx->security;
5301 ksec = key->security;
5303 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5304 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5305 appear to be created. */
5309 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5310 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5313 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5315 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5316 char *context = NULL;
5320 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5329 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5332 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
5333 .capget = selinux_capget,
5334 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5335 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5336 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5337 .capable = selinux_capable,
5338 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5339 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5340 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5341 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5343 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5344 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5346 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5347 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5348 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5349 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5350 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5351 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5352 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5354 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5355 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5356 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5357 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5358 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5359 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5360 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5361 .sb_get_mnt_opts = selinux_get_mnt_opts,
5362 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5363 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5364 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5367 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5368 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5369 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5370 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5371 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5372 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5373 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5374 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5375 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5376 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5377 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5378 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5379 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5380 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5381 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5382 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5383 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5384 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5385 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5386 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5387 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5388 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5389 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5390 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5391 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5392 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5393 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5395 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5396 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5397 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5398 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5399 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5400 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5401 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5402 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5403 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5404 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5405 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5407 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5409 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5410 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5411 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5412 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5413 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5414 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5415 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5416 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5417 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5418 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5419 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5420 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5421 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5422 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5423 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5424 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5425 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5426 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5427 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5428 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5429 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5430 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5431 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5433 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5434 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5436 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5437 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5439 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5440 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5441 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5442 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5443 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5444 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5446 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5447 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5448 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5449 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5450 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5452 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5453 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5454 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5455 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5456 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5458 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
5460 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5462 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5463 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5465 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5466 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5467 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5469 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5470 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5472 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5473 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5474 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5475 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5476 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5477 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5478 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5479 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5480 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5481 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5482 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5483 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5484 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5485 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5486 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5487 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5488 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5489 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5490 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5491 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5492 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5493 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5494 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5495 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5496 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5498 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5499 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5500 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5501 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5502 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5503 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5504 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5505 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5506 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5507 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5508 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5512 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5513 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5514 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5515 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5519 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5520 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5521 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5522 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5526 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5528 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5530 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5531 selinux_enabled = 0;
5535 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5536 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5540 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5542 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5543 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5544 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5545 tsec = current->security;
5546 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5548 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5549 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5550 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5553 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
5555 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5556 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5557 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5559 if (selinux_enforcing)
5560 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5562 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5567 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5569 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5571 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5572 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5573 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5574 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5576 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5577 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5578 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5579 struct superblock_security_struct,
5581 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5583 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5584 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5585 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5587 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5589 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5590 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5591 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5594 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5595 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5598 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5599 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5600 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5602 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5604 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5606 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5607 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5609 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5610 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5613 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5614 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5616 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5617 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5621 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5623 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5625 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5626 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5628 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5629 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5632 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5633 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5635 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5636 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5642 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5647 if (!selinux_enabled)
5650 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5652 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++) {
5653 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
5655 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n",
5659 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5660 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++) {
5661 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
5663 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n",
5672 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5674 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5675 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5679 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5681 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++)
5682 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
5683 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5684 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++)
5685 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
5690 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5692 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5693 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5696 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5698 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5699 static int selinux_disabled;
5701 int selinux_disable(void)
5703 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5705 if (ss_initialized) {
5706 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5710 if (selinux_disabled) {
5711 /* Only do this once. */
5715 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5717 selinux_disabled = 1;
5718 selinux_enabled = 0;
5720 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5721 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5723 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5724 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5726 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */