2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
56 #include <net/netlabel.h>
57 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
58 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
59 #include <linux/atomic.h>
60 #include <linux/bitops.h>
61 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
62 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
63 #include <linux/netlink.h>
64 #include <linux/tcp.h>
65 #include <linux/udp.h>
66 #include <linux/dccp.h>
67 #include <linux/quota.h>
68 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
69 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <linux/parser.h>
71 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
73 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
74 #include <linux/personality.h>
75 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #include <linux/selinux.h>
78 #include <linux/mutex.h>
79 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
80 #include <linux/syslog.h>
81 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
82 #include <linux/export.h>
83 #include <linux/msg.h>
84 #include <linux/shm.h>
96 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
98 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing;
106 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
108 unsigned long enforcing;
109 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
110 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
119 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
121 unsigned long enabled;
122 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
123 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
128 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
134 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
137 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
138 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
139 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
140 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
143 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
145 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
149 * initialise the security for the init task
151 static void cred_init_security(void)
153 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
154 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
156 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
158 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
160 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
161 cred->security = tsec;
165 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
167 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
169 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
171 tsec = cred->security;
176 * get the objective security ID of a task
178 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
183 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
189 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
191 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
198 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
200 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
203 u32 sid = current_sid();
205 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
209 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
210 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
212 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
213 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
214 isec->task_sid = sid;
215 inode->i_security = isec;
220 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
223 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
225 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
226 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
227 list_del_init(&isec->list);
228 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
230 inode->i_security = NULL;
231 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
234 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
236 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
237 u32 sid = current_sid();
239 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
244 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
245 file->f_security = fsec;
250 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
252 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
253 file->f_security = NULL;
257 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
259 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
261 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
265 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
266 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
267 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
269 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
270 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
271 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
272 sb->s_security = sbsec;
277 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
279 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
280 sb->s_security = NULL;
284 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
286 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
288 "uses transition SIDs",
290 "uses genfs_contexts",
291 "not configured for labeling",
292 "uses mountpoint labeling",
295 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
297 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
299 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
308 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
311 static const match_table_t tokens = {
312 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
313 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
320 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
322 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
323 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
324 const struct cred *cred)
326 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
329 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
330 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
334 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
335 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
339 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
340 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
341 const struct cred *cred)
343 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
345 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
350 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
351 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
355 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
358 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
359 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
362 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
363 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
364 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
365 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
366 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
367 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
368 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
369 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
370 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
374 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
375 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
376 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
377 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
378 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
379 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
382 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
383 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
388 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
390 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
391 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
394 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
395 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
396 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
398 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
399 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
400 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
401 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
402 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
404 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
405 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
406 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
408 /* Initialize the root inode. */
409 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
411 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
412 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
413 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
415 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
417 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
418 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
419 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
420 struct inode_security_struct, list);
421 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
422 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
423 inode = igrab(inode);
425 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
429 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
430 list_del_init(&isec->list);
433 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
439 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
440 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
441 * mount options, or whatever.
443 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
444 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
447 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
448 char *context = NULL;
452 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
454 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
460 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
461 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
462 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
464 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
467 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
468 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
469 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
471 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
472 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
477 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
478 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
484 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
485 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
488 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
489 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
491 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
492 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
495 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
496 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
498 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
499 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
502 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
503 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
505 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
506 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
507 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
509 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
512 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
513 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
515 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
532 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
534 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
535 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
536 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
537 (old_sid != new_sid))
540 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
541 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
543 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
544 if (mnt_flags & flag)
550 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
551 * labeling information.
553 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
554 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
558 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
559 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
560 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
561 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
562 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
563 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
564 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
565 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
566 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
568 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
570 if (!ss_initialized) {
572 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
573 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
574 server is ready to handle calls. */
578 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
579 "before the security server is initialized\n");
584 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
585 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
586 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
587 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
589 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
590 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
591 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
592 * will be used for both mounts)
594 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
599 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
600 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
601 * than once with different security options.
603 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
606 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
670 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
707 if (!rootcontext_sid)
708 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
714 if (rootcontext_sid) {
715 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
720 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
721 root_isec->initialized = 1;
724 if (defcontext_sid) {
725 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
727 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
728 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
732 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
733 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
739 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
742 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
744 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
748 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
749 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
753 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
754 struct super_block *newsb)
756 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
757 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
759 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
761 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
764 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
765 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
770 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
771 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
773 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
774 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
777 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
779 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
781 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
782 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
783 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
786 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
790 if (!set_rootcontext) {
791 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
792 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
795 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
797 if (set_rootcontext) {
798 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
799 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
800 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
803 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
806 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
807 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
810 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
811 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
814 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
815 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
816 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
818 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
820 /* Standard string-based options. */
821 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
823 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
828 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
832 if (context || defcontext) {
834 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
837 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
847 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
850 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
857 case Opt_rootcontext:
860 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
863 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
871 if (context || defcontext) {
873 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
876 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
882 case Opt_labelsupport:
886 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
893 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
897 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
898 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
899 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
904 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
905 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
908 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
909 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
912 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
916 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
917 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
920 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
931 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
933 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
936 char *options = data;
937 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
939 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
944 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
946 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
951 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
954 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
958 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
959 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
964 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
968 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
972 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
974 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
977 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
979 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
980 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
983 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
987 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
993 /* we need a comma before each option */
998 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1004 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1006 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1009 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1011 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1017 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1019 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1024 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1026 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1028 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1030 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1034 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1036 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1038 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1040 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1044 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1047 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1049 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1052 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1054 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1057 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1063 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1064 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1066 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1073 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1074 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1076 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1078 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1079 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1081 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1085 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1108 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1111 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1114 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1116 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1121 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1124 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1125 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1130 char *buffer, *path;
1132 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1136 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1140 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1141 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1142 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1143 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1147 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1149 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1153 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1161 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1162 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1164 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1165 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1167 struct dentry *dentry;
1168 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1169 char *context = NULL;
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1176 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1177 if (isec->initialized)
1180 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1181 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1182 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1183 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1184 server is ready to handle calls. */
1185 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1186 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1187 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1188 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1192 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1193 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1194 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1195 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1199 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1200 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1202 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1203 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1205 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1206 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1210 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1211 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1212 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1213 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1214 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1215 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1216 * be used again by userspace.
1221 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1222 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1228 context[len] = '\0';
1229 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1231 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1234 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1235 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1242 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1248 context[len] = '\0';
1249 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1255 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1256 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1257 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1258 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1263 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1266 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1270 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1271 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1273 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1274 if (printk_ratelimit())
1275 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1276 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1277 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1279 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1280 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1281 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1284 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1292 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1293 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1296 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1297 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1299 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1300 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1301 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1302 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1308 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1311 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1314 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1316 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1317 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1328 isec->initialized = 1;
1331 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1333 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1334 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1338 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1339 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1345 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1346 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1349 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1350 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1353 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1354 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1357 /* All other signals. */
1358 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1366 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1367 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1369 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1370 const struct cred *target,
1373 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1375 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1379 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1380 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1381 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1382 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1384 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1385 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1388 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1392 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1393 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1395 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1399 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1400 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1401 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1402 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1404 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1409 sid = current_sid();
1410 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1411 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1414 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1415 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1418 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1419 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1422 struct common_audit_data ad;
1423 struct av_decision avd;
1425 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1426 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1429 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1432 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1434 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1437 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1441 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1446 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1447 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1448 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1455 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1456 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1459 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1461 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1462 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1465 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1466 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1467 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1468 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1469 struct inode *inode,
1471 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1474 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1477 validate_creds(cred);
1479 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1482 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1483 isec = inode->i_security;
1485 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1488 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1489 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1490 pathname if needed. */
1491 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1492 struct dentry *dentry,
1495 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1496 struct common_audit_data ad;
1498 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1499 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1500 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1503 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1504 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1505 pathname if needed. */
1506 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1510 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1511 struct common_audit_data ad;
1513 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1515 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1518 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1519 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1520 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1521 check a particular permission to the file.
1522 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1523 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1524 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1525 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1526 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1530 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1531 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1532 struct common_audit_data ad;
1533 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1536 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1537 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1539 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1540 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1548 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1551 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1557 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1558 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1559 struct dentry *dentry,
1562 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1563 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1564 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1566 struct common_audit_data ad;
1569 dsec = dir->i_security;
1570 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1573 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1575 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1576 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1578 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1579 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1584 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1585 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1586 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1591 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1595 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1596 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1597 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1600 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1601 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1602 struct task_struct *ctx)
1604 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1606 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1610 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1613 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1614 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1615 struct dentry *dentry,
1619 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1620 struct common_audit_data ad;
1621 u32 sid = current_sid();
1625 dsec = dir->i_security;
1626 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1628 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1629 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1632 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1633 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1648 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1653 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1657 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1658 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1659 struct inode *new_dir,
1660 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1662 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1663 struct common_audit_data ad;
1664 u32 sid = current_sid();
1666 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1669 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1670 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1671 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1672 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1674 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1676 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1677 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1678 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1681 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1682 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1685 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1686 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1687 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1692 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1693 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1694 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1695 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1696 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1699 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1700 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1701 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1702 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1704 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1712 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1713 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1714 struct super_block *sb,
1716 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1718 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1719 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1721 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1722 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1725 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1726 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1730 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1731 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1732 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1733 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1736 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1738 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1742 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1744 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1746 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1753 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1754 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1758 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1760 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1761 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1768 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1777 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1780 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1782 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1784 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1790 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1792 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1797 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1801 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1802 u32 sid = current_sid();
1803 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1804 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1807 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1810 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1814 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1818 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1821 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1822 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1826 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1830 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1833 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1834 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1835 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1836 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1840 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1841 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1845 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1849 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1850 * which was removed).
1852 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1853 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1854 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1855 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1858 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
1863 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
1867 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
1870 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1872 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1884 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1889 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1892 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1898 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1900 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1902 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1905 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1910 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1911 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1912 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1914 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1915 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1916 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1917 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1918 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1920 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1921 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1922 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1923 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1924 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1926 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1933 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1934 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1935 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1937 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1938 * processes that allocate mappings.
1940 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1942 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1944 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1945 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1949 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1952 /* binprm security operations */
1954 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1956 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1957 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1958 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1959 struct common_audit_data ad;
1960 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1963 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1967 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1968 * the script interpreter */
1969 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
1972 old_tsec = current_security();
1973 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
1974 isec = inode->i_security;
1976 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1977 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1978 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
1980 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1981 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
1982 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1983 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1985 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
1986 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
1987 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1988 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1991 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
1992 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
1994 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
1997 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1998 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1999 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2005 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2006 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2008 if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
2009 (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
2010 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2012 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2013 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2014 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2018 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2019 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2020 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2024 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2025 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2029 /* Check for shared state */
2030 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2031 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2032 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2038 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2039 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2041 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2042 struct task_struct *tracer;
2043 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2047 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2048 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2049 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2055 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2057 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2063 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2064 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2070 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2072 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2080 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2081 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2082 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2083 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2085 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2088 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2091 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2092 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2093 struct files_struct *files)
2095 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2096 struct tty_struct *tty;
2097 struct fdtable *fdt;
2101 tty = get_current_tty();
2103 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2104 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2105 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2107 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2108 Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
2109 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2110 file may belong to another process and we are only
2111 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2112 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2113 struct tty_file_private, list);
2114 file = file_priv->file;
2115 if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2118 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2121 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2125 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2126 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2128 unsigned long set, i;
2132 i = j * BITS_PER_LONG;
2133 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2134 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2136 set = fdt->open_fds[j];
2139 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2140 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2145 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2147 file_to_av(file))) {
2149 fd = get_unused_fd();
2159 devnull = dentry_open(
2162 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2169 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2174 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2177 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2181 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2183 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2185 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2186 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2189 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2190 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2193 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2194 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2196 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2197 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2199 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2200 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2201 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2203 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2204 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2205 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2206 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2207 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2209 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2210 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2212 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2214 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2215 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2216 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2217 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2219 task_unlock(current);
2220 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2225 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2228 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2230 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2231 struct itimerval itimer;
2241 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2242 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2243 * flush and unblock signals.
2245 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2246 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2248 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2250 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2251 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2252 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2253 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2254 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2255 __flush_signals(current);
2256 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2257 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2259 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2262 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2263 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2264 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2265 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2266 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2269 /* superblock security operations */
2271 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2273 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2276 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2278 superblock_free_security(sb);
2281 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2286 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2289 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2291 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2292 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2293 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2294 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2295 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2298 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2305 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2309 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2312 int current_size = 0;
2320 while (current_size < len) {
2330 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2332 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2333 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2334 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2340 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2348 in_save = in_end = orig;
2352 open_quote = !open_quote;
2353 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2355 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2357 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2358 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2360 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2362 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2364 } while (*in_end++);
2366 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2367 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2372 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2375 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2376 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2377 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2379 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2385 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2388 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2389 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2392 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2394 goto out_free_secdata;
2396 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2398 goto out_free_secdata;
2400 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2401 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2403 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2407 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2409 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2410 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2412 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2413 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2414 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2420 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2421 goto out_bad_option;
2424 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2425 goto out_bad_option;
2427 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2428 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2429 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2431 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2432 goto out_bad_option;
2435 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2436 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2437 goto out_bad_option;
2446 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2448 free_secdata(secdata);
2451 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2452 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2457 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2459 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2460 struct common_audit_data ad;
2463 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2467 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2468 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2471 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2472 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2473 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2476 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2478 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2479 struct common_audit_data ad;
2481 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2482 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2483 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2486 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2489 unsigned long flags,
2492 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2494 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2495 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2496 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2498 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2501 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2503 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2505 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2506 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2509 /* inode security operations */
2511 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2513 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2516 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2518 inode_free_security(inode);
2521 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2522 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2523 void **value, size_t *len)
2525 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2526 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2527 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2528 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2530 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2532 dsec = dir->i_security;
2533 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2536 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2538 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2539 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2540 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2541 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2542 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2543 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2546 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2547 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2550 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2555 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2556 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2557 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2558 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2560 isec->initialized = 1;
2563 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2567 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2574 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2586 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2588 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2591 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2593 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2596 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2598 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2601 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2603 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2606 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2608 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2611 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2613 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2616 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2618 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2621 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2622 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2624 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2627 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2629 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2631 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2634 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2636 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2638 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2641 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2642 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2645 struct common_audit_data ad;
2646 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2649 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2652 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2653 audited, denied, &ad, flags);
2659 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2661 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2664 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2665 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2667 struct av_decision avd;
2669 u32 audited, denied;
2671 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2672 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2674 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2678 validate_creds(cred);
2680 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2683 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2685 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2686 isec = inode->i_security;
2688 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2689 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2690 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2692 if (likely(!audited))
2695 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
2701 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2703 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2704 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2705 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2707 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2708 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2709 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2715 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2716 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2717 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2719 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2722 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2725 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2727 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2730 path.dentry = dentry;
2733 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2736 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2738 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2740 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2741 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2742 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2743 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2745 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2746 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2747 Restrict to administrator. */
2752 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2753 ordinary setattr permission. */
2754 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2757 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2758 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2760 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2761 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2762 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2763 struct common_audit_data ad;
2764 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2767 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2768 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2770 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2771 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2774 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2777 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2778 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2780 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2781 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2785 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2786 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2787 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2788 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2792 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2793 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2796 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
2797 audit_size = size - 1;
2804 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
2805 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2806 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
2811 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2816 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2817 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2821 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2826 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2828 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2829 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2833 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2834 const void *value, size_t size,
2837 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2838 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2842 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2843 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2847 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2849 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2850 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2851 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2859 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2861 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2863 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2866 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2868 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2870 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2873 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2875 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2876 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2878 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2879 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2884 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2886 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2888 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2892 char *context = NULL;
2893 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2895 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2899 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2900 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2901 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2902 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2903 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2904 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2905 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2907 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2908 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2910 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2913 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2926 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2927 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2929 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2933 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2936 if (!value || !size)
2939 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2944 isec->initialized = 1;
2948 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2950 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2951 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2952 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2956 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2958 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2962 /* file security operations */
2964 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2966 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2967 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2969 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2970 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2973 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2974 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2977 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2979 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2980 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2981 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2982 u32 sid = current_sid();
2985 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2988 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2989 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2990 /* No change since file_open check. */
2993 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2996 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2998 return file_alloc_security(file);
3001 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3003 file_free_security(file);
3006 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3009 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3019 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3021 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3022 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3025 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3027 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3028 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3031 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3035 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3040 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3041 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3044 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3045 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3048 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3053 static int default_noexec;
3055 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3057 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3060 if (default_noexec &&
3061 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3063 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3064 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3065 * This has an additional check.
3067 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3073 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3074 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3076 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3077 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3080 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3081 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3083 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3090 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3093 u32 sid = current_sid();
3096 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3097 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3098 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3099 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3101 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3102 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3103 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3108 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3109 return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3112 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3113 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3115 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3118 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3119 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3122 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3123 unsigned long reqprot,
3126 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3128 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3131 if (default_noexec &&
3132 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3134 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3135 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3136 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3137 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3138 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3139 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3140 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3141 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3143 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3144 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3145 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3146 * modified content. This typically should only
3147 * occur for text relocations.
3149 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3155 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3158 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3160 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3162 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3165 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3168 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3173 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3178 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3179 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3188 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3189 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3190 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3195 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3200 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3204 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3211 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3213 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3215 fsec = file->f_security;
3216 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3221 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3222 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3225 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3227 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3229 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3230 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3232 fsec = file->f_security;
3235 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3237 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3239 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3240 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3243 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3245 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3247 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3250 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3252 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3253 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3255 fsec = file->f_security;
3256 isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
3258 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3259 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3260 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3261 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3262 * struct as its SID.
3264 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3265 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3267 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3268 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3269 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3270 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3271 * new inode label or new policy.
3272 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3274 return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
3277 /* task security operations */
3279 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3281 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3285 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3287 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3289 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3291 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3295 cred->security = tsec;
3300 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3302 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3304 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3307 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3308 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3310 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3311 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3316 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3318 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3321 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3322 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3324 old_tsec = old->security;
3326 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3330 new->security = tsec;
3335 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3337 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3339 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3340 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3346 * set the security data for a kernel service
3347 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3349 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3351 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3352 u32 sid = current_sid();
3355 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3356 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3357 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3361 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3362 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3363 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3369 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3370 * objective context of the specified inode
3372 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3374 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3375 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3376 u32 sid = current_sid();
3379 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3380 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3381 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3385 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3389 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3392 struct common_audit_data ad;
3394 sid = task_sid(current);
3396 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3397 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3399 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3400 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3403 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3405 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3408 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3410 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3413 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3415 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3418 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3420 *secid = task_sid(p);
3423 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3427 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3431 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3434 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3438 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3442 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3445 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3447 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3450 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3451 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3453 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3455 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3456 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3457 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3458 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3459 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3460 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3465 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3469 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3473 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3476 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3478 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3481 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3483 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3486 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3493 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3495 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3497 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3498 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3500 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3504 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3506 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3509 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3510 struct inode *inode)
3512 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3513 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3516 isec->initialized = 1;
3519 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3520 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3521 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3523 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3524 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3526 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3527 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3531 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3532 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3535 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3536 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3540 *proto = ih->protocol;
3542 switch (ih->protocol) {
3544 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3546 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3550 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3554 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3555 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3560 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3562 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3566 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3570 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3571 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3575 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3576 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3578 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3582 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3586 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3587 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3598 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3600 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3601 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3602 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3605 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3606 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3609 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3610 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3614 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3615 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3618 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3619 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3620 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3629 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3631 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3635 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3636 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3641 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3643 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3647 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3648 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3652 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3653 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3655 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3659 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3660 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3664 /* includes fragments */
3674 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3675 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3680 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3682 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3685 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3686 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3689 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3691 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3694 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3695 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3705 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3706 " unable to parse packet\n");
3716 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3718 * @family: protocol family
3719 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3722 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3723 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3724 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3725 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3726 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3730 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3737 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3738 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3740 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3741 if (unlikely(err)) {
3743 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3744 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3751 /* socket security operations */
3753 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3754 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3756 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3757 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3761 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3765 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3767 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3768 struct common_audit_data ad;
3769 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3770 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3772 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3779 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3782 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3783 int protocol, int kern)
3785 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3793 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3794 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3798 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3801 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3802 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3804 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3805 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3806 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3809 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3812 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3814 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3819 isec->initialized = 1;
3822 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3823 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3824 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3825 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3831 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3832 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3833 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3835 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3837 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3841 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3846 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3847 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3848 * check the first address now.
3850 family = sk->sk_family;
3851 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3853 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3854 struct common_audit_data ad;
3855 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3856 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3857 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3858 unsigned short snum;
3861 if (family == PF_INET) {
3862 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3863 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3864 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3866 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3867 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3868 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3874 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3876 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3877 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3881 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3883 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3884 ad.u.net->family = family;
3885 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3887 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3893 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3894 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3895 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3898 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3899 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3902 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3903 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3907 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3911 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3915 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3917 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3918 ad.u.net->family = family;
3920 if (family == PF_INET)
3921 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3923 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
3925 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3926 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3934 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3936 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3937 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3940 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3945 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3947 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3948 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3949 struct common_audit_data ad;
3950 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3951 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3952 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3953 unsigned short snum;
3956 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3957 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3958 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3960 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3962 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3963 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3965 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3968 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3972 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3973 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3975 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3977 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
3978 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
3979 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3984 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3990 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3992 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3995 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3998 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3999 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4001 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4005 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4007 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4008 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4009 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4010 newisec->initialized = 1;
4015 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4018 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4021 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4022 int size, int flags)
4024 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4027 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4029 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4032 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4034 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4037 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4041 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4045 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4048 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4051 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4054 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4056 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4059 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4063 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4064 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4065 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4066 struct common_audit_data ad;
4067 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4070 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4072 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4074 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4075 sksec_other->sclass,
4076 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4080 /* server child socket */
4081 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4082 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4087 /* connecting socket */
4088 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4093 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4094 struct socket *other)
4096 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4097 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4098 struct common_audit_data ad;
4099 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4101 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4103 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4105 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4109 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4111 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4117 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4120 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4121 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4125 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4128 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4129 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4132 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4136 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4137 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4138 struct common_audit_data ad;
4139 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4142 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4144 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4145 ad.u.net->family = family;
4146 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4150 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4151 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4157 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4160 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4165 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4168 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4169 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4170 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4171 struct common_audit_data ad;
4172 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4177 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4180 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4181 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4184 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4185 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4186 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4187 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4188 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4189 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4191 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4192 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4193 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4196 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4198 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4199 ad.u.net->family = family;
4200 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4204 if (peerlbl_active) {
4207 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4210 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4213 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4216 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4219 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4222 if (secmark_active) {
4223 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4232 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4233 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4238 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4239 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4241 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4242 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4243 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4244 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4245 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4247 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4251 if (scontext_len > len) {
4256 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4260 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4266 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4268 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4271 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4273 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4276 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4280 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4281 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4283 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4286 *secid = peer_secid;
4287 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4292 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4294 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4296 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4300 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4301 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4302 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4303 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4308 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4310 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4312 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4313 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4317 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4319 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4320 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4322 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4323 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4324 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4326 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4329 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4332 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4334 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4336 *secid = sksec->sid;
4340 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4342 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4343 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4345 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4346 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4347 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4348 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4351 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4352 struct request_sock *req)
4354 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4356 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4360 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4361 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4364 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4367 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4368 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4369 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4371 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4374 req->secid = newsid;
4375 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4378 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4381 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4382 const struct request_sock *req)
4384 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4386 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4387 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4388 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4389 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4390 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4391 time it will have been created and available. */
4393 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4394 * thread with access to newsksec */
4395 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4398 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4400 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4401 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4403 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4404 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4407 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4410 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4412 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4415 __tsec = current_security();
4418 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4421 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4423 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4426 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4428 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4431 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4434 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4437 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4439 u32 sid = current_sid();
4441 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4442 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4443 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4444 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4445 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4446 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4448 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4452 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4454 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4456 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4457 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4458 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4459 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4460 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4461 * protocols were being used */
4463 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4464 * the sockcreate SID here */
4466 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4467 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4470 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4472 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4473 u32 sid = current_sid();
4476 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4477 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4480 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4481 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4490 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4494 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4495 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4497 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4501 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4503 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4505 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4506 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4507 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4508 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4509 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4510 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4520 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4525 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4527 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4533 struct common_audit_data ad;
4534 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4539 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4542 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4543 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4544 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4545 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4548 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4551 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4553 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4554 ad.u.net->family = family;
4555 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4558 if (peerlbl_active) {
4559 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4562 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4568 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4569 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4573 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4574 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4575 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4577 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4583 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4584 struct sk_buff *skb,
4585 const struct net_device *in,
4586 const struct net_device *out,
4587 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4589 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4592 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4593 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4594 struct sk_buff *skb,
4595 const struct net_device *in,
4596 const struct net_device *out,
4597 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4599 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4603 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4608 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4611 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4612 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4613 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4615 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4618 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4619 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4625 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4626 struct sk_buff *skb,
4627 const struct net_device *in,
4628 const struct net_device *out,
4629 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4631 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4634 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4638 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4639 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4640 struct common_audit_data ad;
4641 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4647 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4649 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4651 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4652 ad.u.net->family = family;
4653 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4656 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4657 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4658 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4659 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4661 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4662 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4667 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4673 struct common_audit_data ad;
4674 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4679 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4680 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4681 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4682 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4683 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4684 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4686 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4687 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4688 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4689 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4690 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4691 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4692 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4695 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4696 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4697 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4700 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4701 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4702 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4703 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4707 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4708 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4711 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4712 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4715 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4716 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4717 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4720 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4722 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4723 ad.u.net->family = family;
4724 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4728 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4729 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4730 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4732 if (peerlbl_active) {
4736 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4738 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4739 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4740 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4742 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4744 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4745 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4746 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4752 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4753 struct sk_buff *skb,
4754 const struct net_device *in,
4755 const struct net_device *out,
4756 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4758 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4761 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4762 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4763 struct sk_buff *skb,
4764 const struct net_device *in,
4765 const struct net_device *out,
4766 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4768 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4772 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4774 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4778 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4782 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4785 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4786 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4789 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4792 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4796 sid = task_sid(task);
4797 isec->sclass = sclass;
4799 perm->security = isec;
4804 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4806 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4807 perm->security = NULL;
4811 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4813 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4815 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4819 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4820 msg->security = msec;
4825 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4827 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4829 msg->security = NULL;
4833 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4836 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4837 struct common_audit_data ad;
4838 u32 sid = current_sid();
4840 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4842 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4843 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4845 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4848 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4850 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4853 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4855 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4858 /* message queue security operations */
4859 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4861 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4862 struct common_audit_data ad;
4863 u32 sid = current_sid();
4866 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4870 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4872 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4873 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4875 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4878 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4884 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4886 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4889 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4891 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4892 struct common_audit_data ad;
4893 u32 sid = current_sid();
4895 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4897 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4898 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4900 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4901 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4904 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4912 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4913 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4916 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4919 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4922 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4928 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4932 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4934 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4935 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4936 struct common_audit_data ad;
4937 u32 sid = current_sid();
4940 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4941 msec = msg->security;
4944 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4946 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4948 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4949 * message queue this message will be stored in
4951 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4957 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4958 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4960 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4961 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4964 /* Can this process send the message */
4965 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4968 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4969 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4970 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4975 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4976 struct task_struct *target,
4977 long type, int mode)
4979 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4980 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4981 struct common_audit_data ad;
4982 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4985 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4986 msec = msg->security;
4988 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4989 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4991 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4992 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4994 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4995 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4999 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5000 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5002 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5003 struct common_audit_data ad;
5004 u32 sid = current_sid();
5007 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5011 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5013 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5014 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5016 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5019 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5025 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5027 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5030 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5032 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5033 struct common_audit_data ad;
5034 u32 sid = current_sid();
5036 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5038 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5039 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5041 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5042 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5045 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5046 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5054 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5055 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5058 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5061 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5068 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5074 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5078 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5079 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5083 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5086 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5088 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5091 /* Semaphore security operations */
5092 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5094 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5095 struct common_audit_data ad;
5096 u32 sid = current_sid();
5099 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5103 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5105 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5106 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5108 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5111 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5117 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5119 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5122 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5124 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5125 struct common_audit_data ad;
5126 u32 sid = current_sid();
5128 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5130 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5131 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5133 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5134 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5137 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5138 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5146 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5147 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5151 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5162 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5165 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5169 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5175 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5179 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5180 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5185 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5189 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5192 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5198 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5200 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5205 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5208 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5210 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5214 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5217 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5220 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5221 char *name, char **value)
5223 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5229 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5235 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5237 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5239 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5241 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5242 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5243 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5244 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5245 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5246 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5247 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5248 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5256 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5266 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5267 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5269 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5270 struct task_struct *tracer;
5277 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5278 security attributes. */
5283 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5284 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5285 * above restriction is ever removed.
5287 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5288 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5289 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5290 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5291 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5292 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5293 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5294 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5295 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5296 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5302 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5303 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5304 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5308 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5309 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5310 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5311 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5314 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5315 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5316 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5317 audit_size = size - 1;
5320 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5321 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5322 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5327 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5334 new = prepare_creds();
5338 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5339 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5340 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5341 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5342 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5343 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5344 tsec = new->security;
5345 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5346 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5347 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5348 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5349 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5350 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5353 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5354 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5355 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5356 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5361 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5363 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5364 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5369 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5370 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5371 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5375 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5376 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5379 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5381 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5385 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5386 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5405 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5407 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5410 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5412 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5415 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5421 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5423 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5425 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5429 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5431 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5433 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5436 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5439 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5448 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5449 unsigned long flags)
5451 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5452 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5454 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5458 tsec = cred->security;
5459 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5460 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5462 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5468 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5470 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5476 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5477 const struct cred *cred,
5481 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5484 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5485 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5486 appear to be created. */
5490 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5492 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5493 ksec = key->security;
5495 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5498 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5500 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5501 char *context = NULL;
5505 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5514 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5517 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5518 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5519 .capget = selinux_capget,
5520 .capset = selinux_capset,
5521 .capable = selinux_capable,
5522 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5523 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5524 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5525 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5527 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5529 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5530 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5531 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5532 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5534 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5535 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5536 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5537 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5538 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5539 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5540 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5541 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5542 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5543 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5544 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5545 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5548 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5549 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5550 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5551 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5552 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5553 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5554 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5555 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5556 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5557 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5558 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5559 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5560 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5561 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5562 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5563 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5564 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5565 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5566 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5567 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5568 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5569 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5570 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5571 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5572 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5574 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5575 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5576 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5577 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5578 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5579 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5580 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5581 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5582 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5583 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5584 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5585 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5587 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5589 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5590 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5591 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5592 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5593 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5594 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5595 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5596 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5597 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5598 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5599 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5600 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5601 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5602 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5603 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5604 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5605 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5606 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5607 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5608 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5609 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5610 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5612 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5613 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5615 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5616 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5618 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5619 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5620 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5621 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5622 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5623 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5625 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5626 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5627 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5628 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5629 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5631 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5632 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5633 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5634 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5635 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5637 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5639 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5640 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5642 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5643 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5644 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5645 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5646 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5647 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5649 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5650 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5652 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5653 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5654 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5655 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5656 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5657 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5658 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5659 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5660 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5661 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5662 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5663 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5664 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5665 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5666 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5667 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5668 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5669 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5670 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5671 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5672 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5673 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5674 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5675 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5676 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5677 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5678 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5679 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5680 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5681 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5682 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5684 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5685 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5686 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5687 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5688 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5689 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5690 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5691 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5692 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5693 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5694 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5698 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5699 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5700 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5701 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5705 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5706 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5707 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5708 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5712 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5714 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5715 selinux_enabled = 0;
5719 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5720 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5724 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5726 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5727 cred_init_security();
5729 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5731 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5732 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5733 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5736 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5737 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5739 if (selinux_enforcing)
5740 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5742 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5747 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5749 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5752 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5754 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5756 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5757 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5758 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5761 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5762 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5763 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5765 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5767 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5769 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5770 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5772 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5773 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5776 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5777 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5779 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5780 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5783 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5784 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5786 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5787 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5791 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5793 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5795 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5796 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5798 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5799 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5802 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5803 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5805 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5806 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5812 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5816 if (!selinux_enabled)
5819 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5821 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5823 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5825 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5826 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5828 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5835 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5837 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5838 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5840 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5842 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5843 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5844 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5849 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5851 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5852 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5855 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5857 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5858 static int selinux_disabled;
5860 int selinux_disable(void)
5862 if (ss_initialized) {
5863 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5867 if (selinux_disabled) {
5868 /* Only do this once. */
5872 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5874 selinux_disabled = 1;
5875 selinux_enabled = 0;
5877 reset_security_ops();
5879 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5882 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5883 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5885 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */