2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
97 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
99 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
101 /* SECMARK reference count */
102 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
104 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
105 int selinux_enforcing;
107 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
109 unsigned long enforcing;
110 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
111 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
114 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
117 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
118 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
120 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
122 unsigned long enabled;
123 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
124 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
127 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
129 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
135 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
138 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
139 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
140 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
141 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
144 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
146 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
150 * initialise the security for the init task
152 static void cred_init_security(void)
154 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
155 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
157 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
159 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
161 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
162 cred->security = tsec;
166 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
168 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
170 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
172 tsec = cred->security;
177 * get the objective security ID of a task
179 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
184 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
190 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
192 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
194 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
199 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
201 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
203 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
204 u32 sid = current_sid();
206 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
210 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
211 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
213 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
214 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
215 isec->task_sid = sid;
216 inode->i_security = isec;
221 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
223 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
224 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
226 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
227 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
228 list_del_init(&isec->list);
229 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
231 inode->i_security = NULL;
232 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
235 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
237 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
238 u32 sid = current_sid();
240 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
245 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
246 file->f_security = fsec;
251 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
253 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
254 file->f_security = NULL;
258 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
260 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
262 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
266 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
267 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
268 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
270 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
271 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
272 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
273 sb->s_security = sbsec;
278 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
280 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
281 sb->s_security = NULL;
285 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
287 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
289 "uses transition SIDs",
291 "uses genfs_contexts",
292 "not configured for labeling",
293 "uses mountpoint labeling",
296 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
298 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
300 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
309 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
312 static const match_table_t tokens = {
313 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
317 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
321 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
323 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
324 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
325 const struct cred *cred)
327 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
330 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
331 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
335 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
336 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
340 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
341 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
342 const struct cred *cred)
344 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
346 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
347 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
351 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
352 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
356 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
358 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
359 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
360 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
363 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
364 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
365 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
366 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
367 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
368 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
369 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
370 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
371 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
375 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
376 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
377 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
378 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
379 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
380 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
382 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
383 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
384 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
389 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
391 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
392 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
393 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
395 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
396 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
397 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
399 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
400 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
401 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
402 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
403 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
405 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
406 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
407 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
409 /* Initialize the root inode. */
410 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
412 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
413 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
414 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
416 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
418 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
419 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
420 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
421 struct inode_security_struct, list);
422 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
423 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
424 inode = igrab(inode);
426 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
430 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
431 list_del_init(&isec->list);
434 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
440 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
441 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
442 * mount options, or whatever.
444 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
445 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
448 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
449 char *context = NULL;
453 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
455 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
461 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
462 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
463 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
465 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
468 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
469 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
470 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
472 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
473 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
478 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
479 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
485 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
486 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
489 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
490 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
492 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
493 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
496 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
497 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
499 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
500 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
503 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
504 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
506 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
507 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
508 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
510 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
513 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
514 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
516 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
517 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
518 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
521 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
526 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
530 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
531 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
533 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
535 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
536 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
537 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
538 (old_sid != new_sid))
541 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
542 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
544 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
545 if (mnt_flags & flag)
551 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
552 * labeling information.
554 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
555 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
557 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
559 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
560 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
561 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
562 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
563 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
564 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
565 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
566 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
567 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
569 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
571 if (!ss_initialized) {
573 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
574 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
575 server is ready to handle calls. */
579 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
580 "before the security server is initialized\n");
585 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
586 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
587 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
588 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
590 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
591 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
592 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
593 * will be used for both mounts)
595 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
600 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
601 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
602 * than once with different security options.
604 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
607 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
609 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
610 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
612 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
613 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
614 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
621 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
623 goto out_double_mount;
625 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
630 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
632 goto out_double_mount;
634 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
636 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
637 rootcontext_sid = sid;
639 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
641 goto out_double_mount;
643 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
647 defcontext_sid = sid;
649 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
651 goto out_double_mount;
653 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
662 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
663 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
664 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
665 goto out_double_mount;
670 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
671 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
673 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
674 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
676 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
677 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
681 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
683 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
687 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
691 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
692 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
693 * the superblock context if not already set.
696 if (!fscontext_sid) {
697 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
701 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
703 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
708 if (!rootcontext_sid)
709 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
712 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
715 if (rootcontext_sid) {
716 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
721 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
722 root_isec->initialized = 1;
725 if (defcontext_sid) {
726 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
728 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
729 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
733 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
734 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
740 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
743 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
745 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
749 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
750 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
754 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
755 const struct super_block *newsb)
757 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
758 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
759 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
760 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
762 if (oldflags != newflags)
764 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
766 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
768 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
770 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
771 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = oldsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
772 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = newsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
773 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
778 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
779 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
780 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
784 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
785 struct super_block *newsb)
787 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
788 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
790 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
791 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
792 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
795 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
796 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
801 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
802 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
804 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
805 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
806 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
808 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
810 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
812 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
813 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
814 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
817 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
821 if (!set_rootcontext) {
822 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
823 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
826 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
828 if (set_rootcontext) {
829 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
830 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
831 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
832 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
834 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
837 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
838 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
842 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
843 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
846 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
847 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
848 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
850 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
852 /* Standard string-based options. */
853 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
855 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
860 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
864 if (context || defcontext) {
866 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
869 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
879 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
882 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
889 case Opt_rootcontext:
892 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
895 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
903 if (context || defcontext) {
905 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
908 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
914 case Opt_labelsupport:
918 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
925 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
929 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
930 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
931 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
936 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
937 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
940 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
941 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
944 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
945 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
948 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
949 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
952 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
963 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
965 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
968 char *options = data;
969 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
971 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
976 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
978 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
983 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
986 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
990 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
991 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
996 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
999 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1000 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1004 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1006 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1009 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1011 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1012 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1014 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1015 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1017 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1019 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1025 /* we need a comma before each option */
1027 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1030 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1036 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1038 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1041 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1043 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1049 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1051 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1056 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1058 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1060 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1062 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1064 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1066 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1068 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1070 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1072 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1076 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1079 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1081 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1084 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1086 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1089 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1095 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1096 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1098 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1105 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1106 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1110 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1111 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1113 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1115 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1117 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1123 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1124 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1125 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1126 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1127 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1129 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1131 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1132 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1133 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1135 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1136 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1137 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1138 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1139 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1140 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1141 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1143 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1146 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1148 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1150 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1153 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1156 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1157 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1162 char *buffer, *path;
1164 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1168 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1172 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1173 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1174 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1175 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1179 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1181 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1185 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1193 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1194 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1196 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1197 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1199 struct dentry *dentry;
1200 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1201 char *context = NULL;
1205 if (isec->initialized)
1208 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1209 if (isec->initialized)
1212 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1213 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1214 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1215 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1216 server is ready to handle calls. */
1217 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1218 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1219 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1220 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1224 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1225 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1226 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1227 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1231 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1232 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1234 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1235 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1237 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1238 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1242 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1243 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1244 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1245 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1246 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1247 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1248 * be used again by userspace.
1253 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1254 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1260 context[len] = '\0';
1261 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1263 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1266 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1267 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1274 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1280 context[len] = '\0';
1281 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1287 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1288 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1289 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1290 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1294 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1295 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1298 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1302 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1303 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1305 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1306 if (printk_ratelimit())
1307 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1308 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1309 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1311 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1312 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1313 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1316 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1324 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1325 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1327 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1328 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1329 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1331 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1332 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1333 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1334 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1339 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1340 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1343 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1344 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1346 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1348 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1349 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1360 isec->initialized = 1;
1363 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1365 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1366 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1370 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1371 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1377 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1378 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1381 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1382 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1385 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1386 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1389 /* All other signals. */
1390 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1398 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1399 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1401 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1402 const struct cred *target,
1405 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1407 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1411 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1412 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1413 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1414 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1416 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1417 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1420 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1424 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1425 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1427 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1431 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1432 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1433 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1434 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1436 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1441 sid = current_sid();
1442 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1443 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1446 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1447 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1450 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1451 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1454 struct common_audit_data ad;
1455 struct av_decision avd;
1457 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1458 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1461 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1464 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1466 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1469 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1473 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1478 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1479 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1480 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1487 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1488 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1491 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1493 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1494 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1497 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1498 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1499 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1500 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1501 struct inode *inode,
1503 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1506 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1509 validate_creds(cred);
1511 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1514 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1515 isec = inode->i_security;
1517 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1520 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1521 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1522 pathname if needed. */
1523 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1524 struct dentry *dentry,
1527 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1528 struct common_audit_data ad;
1530 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1531 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1532 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1535 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1536 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1537 pathname if needed. */
1538 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1542 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1543 struct common_audit_data ad;
1545 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1547 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1550 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1551 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1555 struct common_audit_data ad;
1557 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1558 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1559 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad, 0);
1562 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1563 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1564 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1565 check a particular permission to the file.
1566 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1567 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1568 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1569 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1570 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1574 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1575 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1576 struct common_audit_data ad;
1577 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1580 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1581 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1583 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1584 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1592 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1595 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1601 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1602 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1603 struct dentry *dentry,
1606 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1607 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1608 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1610 struct common_audit_data ad;
1613 dsec = dir->i_security;
1614 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1617 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1619 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1620 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1622 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1623 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1628 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1629 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1630 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1635 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1639 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1640 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1641 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1644 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1645 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1646 struct task_struct *ctx)
1648 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1650 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1654 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1657 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1658 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1659 struct dentry *dentry,
1663 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1664 struct common_audit_data ad;
1665 u32 sid = current_sid();
1669 dsec = dir->i_security;
1670 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1672 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1673 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1676 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1677 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1692 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1697 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1701 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1702 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1703 struct inode *new_dir,
1704 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1706 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1707 struct common_audit_data ad;
1708 u32 sid = current_sid();
1710 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1713 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1714 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1715 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1716 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1718 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1720 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1721 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1722 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1725 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1726 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1729 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1730 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1731 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1736 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1737 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1738 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1739 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1740 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1743 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1744 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1745 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1746 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1748 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1756 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1757 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1758 struct super_block *sb,
1760 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1762 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1763 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1765 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1766 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1769 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1770 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1774 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1775 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1776 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1777 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1780 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1782 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1786 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1788 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1790 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1797 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1798 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1802 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1804 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1805 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1812 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1821 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1824 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1826 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1828 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1834 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1836 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1841 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1845 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1846 u32 sid = current_sid();
1847 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1848 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1851 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1854 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1858 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1862 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1865 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1866 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1870 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1874 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1877 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1878 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1879 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1880 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1884 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1885 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1889 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1893 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1894 * which was removed).
1896 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1897 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1898 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1899 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1902 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
1907 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
1911 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
1914 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1916 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1928 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1933 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1936 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1942 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1944 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1946 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1949 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1954 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1955 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1956 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1958 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1959 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1960 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1961 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1962 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1964 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1965 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1966 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1967 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1968 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1970 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1977 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1978 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1979 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1981 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1982 * processes that allocate mappings.
1984 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1986 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1988 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1989 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1993 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1996 /* binprm security operations */
1998 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2000 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2001 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2002 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2003 struct common_audit_data ad;
2004 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2007 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2011 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2012 * the script interpreter */
2013 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2016 old_tsec = current_security();
2017 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2018 isec = inode->i_security;
2020 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2021 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2022 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2024 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2025 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2026 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2027 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2029 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2030 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2031 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2032 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2035 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
2036 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
2038 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
2041 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2042 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2043 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2049 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2050 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2052 if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
2053 (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
2054 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2056 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2057 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2058 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2062 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2063 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2064 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2068 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2069 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2073 /* Check for shared state */
2074 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2075 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2076 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2082 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2083 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2085 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2086 struct task_struct *tracer;
2087 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2091 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2092 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2093 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2099 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2101 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2107 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2108 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2114 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2116 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2124 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2125 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2126 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2127 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2129 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2132 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2135 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2137 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2140 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2141 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2142 struct files_struct *files)
2144 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2145 struct tty_struct *tty;
2149 tty = get_current_tty();
2151 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2152 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2153 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2155 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2156 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2157 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2158 open file may belong to another process and we are
2159 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2160 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2161 struct tty_file_private, list);
2162 file = file_priv->file;
2163 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2166 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2169 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2173 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2174 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2175 if (!n) /* none found? */
2178 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2179 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2181 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2183 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2184 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2190 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2192 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2194 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2195 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2198 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2199 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2202 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2203 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2205 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2206 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2208 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2209 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2210 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2212 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2213 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2214 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2215 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2216 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2218 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2219 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2221 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2223 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2224 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2225 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2226 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2228 task_unlock(current);
2229 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2234 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2237 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2239 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2240 struct itimerval itimer;
2250 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2251 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2252 * flush and unblock signals.
2254 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2255 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2257 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2259 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2260 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2261 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2262 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2263 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2264 __flush_signals(current);
2265 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2266 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2268 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2271 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2272 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2273 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2274 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2275 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2278 /* superblock security operations */
2280 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2282 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2285 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2287 superblock_free_security(sb);
2290 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2295 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2298 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2300 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2301 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2302 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2303 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2304 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2307 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2314 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2318 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2321 int current_size = 0;
2329 while (current_size < len) {
2339 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2341 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2342 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2343 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2349 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2357 in_save = in_end = orig;
2361 open_quote = !open_quote;
2362 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2364 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2366 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2367 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2369 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2371 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2373 } while (*in_end++);
2375 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2376 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2381 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2384 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2385 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2386 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2388 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2394 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2397 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2398 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2401 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2403 goto out_free_secdata;
2405 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2407 goto out_free_secdata;
2409 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2410 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2412 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2416 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2418 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2419 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2421 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2422 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2423 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2429 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2430 goto out_bad_option;
2433 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2434 goto out_bad_option;
2436 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2437 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2438 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2440 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2441 goto out_bad_option;
2444 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2445 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2446 goto out_bad_option;
2455 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2457 free_secdata(secdata);
2460 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2461 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2466 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2468 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2469 struct common_audit_data ad;
2472 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2476 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2477 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2480 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2481 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2482 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2485 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2487 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2488 struct common_audit_data ad;
2490 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2491 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2492 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2495 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2498 unsigned long flags,
2501 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2503 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2504 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2505 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2507 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2510 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2512 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2514 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2515 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2518 /* inode security operations */
2520 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2522 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2525 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2527 inode_free_security(inode);
2530 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2531 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2532 void **value, size_t *len)
2534 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2535 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2536 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2537 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2539 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2541 dsec = dir->i_security;
2542 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2545 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2547 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2548 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2549 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2550 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2551 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2552 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2555 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2556 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2559 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2564 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2565 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2566 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2567 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2569 isec->initialized = 1;
2572 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2576 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2583 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2595 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2597 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2600 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2602 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2605 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2607 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2610 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2612 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2615 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2617 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2620 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2622 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2625 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2627 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2630 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2631 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2633 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2636 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2638 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2640 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2643 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2645 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2647 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2650 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2651 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2654 struct common_audit_data ad;
2655 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2658 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2661 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2662 audited, denied, &ad, flags);
2668 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2670 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2673 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2674 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2676 struct av_decision avd;
2678 u32 audited, denied;
2680 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2681 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2683 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2687 validate_creds(cred);
2689 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2692 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2694 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2695 isec = inode->i_security;
2697 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2698 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2699 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2701 if (likely(!audited))
2704 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
2710 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2712 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2713 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2714 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2716 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2717 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2718 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2724 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2725 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2726 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2728 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2731 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2734 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2736 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2739 path.dentry = dentry;
2742 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2745 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2747 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2749 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2750 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2751 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2752 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2754 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2755 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2756 Restrict to administrator. */
2761 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2762 ordinary setattr permission. */
2763 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2766 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2767 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2769 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2770 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2771 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2772 struct common_audit_data ad;
2773 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2776 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2777 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2779 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2780 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2783 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2786 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2787 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2789 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2790 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2794 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2795 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2796 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2797 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2801 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2802 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2805 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
2806 audit_size = size - 1;
2813 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
2814 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2815 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
2820 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2825 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2826 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2830 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2835 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2837 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2838 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2842 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2843 const void *value, size_t size,
2846 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2847 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2851 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2852 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2856 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2858 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2859 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2860 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2868 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2870 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2872 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2875 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2877 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2879 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2882 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2884 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2885 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2887 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2888 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2893 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2895 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2897 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2901 char *context = NULL;
2902 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2904 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2908 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2909 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2910 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2911 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2912 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2913 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2914 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2916 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2917 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2919 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2922 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2935 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2936 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2938 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2942 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2945 if (!value || !size)
2948 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2953 isec->initialized = 1;
2957 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2959 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2960 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2961 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2965 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2967 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2971 /* file security operations */
2973 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2975 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2976 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2978 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2979 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2982 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2983 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2986 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2988 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2989 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2990 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2991 u32 sid = current_sid();
2994 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2997 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2998 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2999 /* No change since file_open check. */
3002 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3005 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3007 return file_alloc_security(file);
3010 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3012 file_free_security(file);
3015 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3018 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3028 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3030 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3031 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3034 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3036 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3037 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3040 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3044 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3049 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3050 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3053 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3054 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3057 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3062 static int default_noexec;
3064 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3066 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3069 if (default_noexec &&
3070 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3072 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3073 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3074 * This has an additional check.
3076 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3082 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3083 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3085 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3086 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3089 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3090 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3092 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3099 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3102 u32 sid = current_sid();
3105 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3106 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3107 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3108 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3110 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3111 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3112 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3117 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3118 return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3121 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3122 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3124 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3127 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3128 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3131 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3132 unsigned long reqprot,
3135 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3137 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3140 if (default_noexec &&
3141 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3143 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3144 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3145 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3146 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3147 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3148 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3149 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3150 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3152 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3153 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3154 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3155 * modified content. This typically should only
3156 * occur for text relocations.
3158 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3164 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3167 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3169 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3171 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3174 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3177 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3182 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3183 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3192 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3193 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3194 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3199 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3204 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3211 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3213 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3215 fsec = file->f_security;
3216 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3221 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3222 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3225 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3227 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3229 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3230 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3232 fsec = file->f_security;
3235 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3237 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3239 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3240 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3243 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3245 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3247 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3250 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3252 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3253 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3255 fsec = file->f_security;
3256 isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3258 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3259 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3260 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3261 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3262 * struct as its SID.
3264 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3265 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3267 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3268 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3269 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3270 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3271 * new inode label or new policy.
3272 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3274 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3277 /* task security operations */
3279 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3281 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3285 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3287 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3289 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3291 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3295 cred->security = tsec;
3300 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3302 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3304 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3307 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3308 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3310 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3311 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3316 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3318 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3321 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3322 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3324 old_tsec = old->security;
3326 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3330 new->security = tsec;
3335 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3337 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3339 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3340 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3346 * set the security data for a kernel service
3347 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3349 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3351 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3352 u32 sid = current_sid();
3355 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3356 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3357 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3361 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3362 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3363 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3369 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3370 * objective context of the specified inode
3372 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3374 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3375 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3376 u32 sid = current_sid();
3379 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3380 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3381 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3385 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3389 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3392 struct common_audit_data ad;
3394 sid = task_sid(current);
3396 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3397 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3399 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3400 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3403 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3405 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3408 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3410 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3413 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3415 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3418 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3420 *secid = task_sid(p);
3423 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3427 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3431 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3434 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3438 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3442 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3445 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3447 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3450 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3451 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3453 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3455 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3456 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3457 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3458 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3459 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3460 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3465 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3469 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3473 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3476 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3478 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3481 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3483 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3486 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3493 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3495 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3497 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3498 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3500 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3504 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3506 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3509 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3510 struct inode *inode)
3512 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3513 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3516 isec->initialized = 1;
3519 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3520 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3521 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3523 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3524 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3526 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3527 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3531 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3532 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3535 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3536 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3540 *proto = ih->protocol;
3542 switch (ih->protocol) {
3544 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3546 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3550 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3554 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3555 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3560 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3562 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3566 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3570 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3571 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3575 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3576 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3578 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3582 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3586 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3587 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3598 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3600 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3601 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3602 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3605 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3606 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3609 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3610 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3614 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3615 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3618 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3619 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3620 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3629 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3631 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3635 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3636 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3641 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3643 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3647 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3648 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3652 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3653 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3655 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3659 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3660 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3664 /* includes fragments */
3674 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3675 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3680 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3682 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3685 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3686 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3689 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3691 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3694 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3695 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3705 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3706 " unable to parse packet\n");
3716 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3718 * @family: protocol family
3719 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3722 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3723 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3724 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3725 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3726 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3730 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3737 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3738 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3740 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3741 if (unlikely(err)) {
3743 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3744 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3751 /* socket security operations */
3753 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3754 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3756 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3757 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3761 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3765 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3767 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3768 struct common_audit_data ad;
3769 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3770 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3772 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3779 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3782 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3783 int protocol, int kern)
3785 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3793 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3794 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3798 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3801 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3802 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3804 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3805 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3806 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3809 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3812 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3814 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3819 isec->initialized = 1;
3822 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3823 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3824 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3825 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3831 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3832 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3833 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3835 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3837 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3841 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3846 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3847 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3848 * check the first address now.
3850 family = sk->sk_family;
3851 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3853 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3854 struct common_audit_data ad;
3855 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3856 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3857 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3858 unsigned short snum;
3861 if (family == PF_INET) {
3862 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3863 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3864 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3866 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3867 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3868 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3874 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3876 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3877 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3881 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3883 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3884 ad.u.net->family = family;
3885 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3887 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3893 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3894 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3895 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3898 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3899 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3902 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3903 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3907 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3911 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3915 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3917 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3918 ad.u.net->family = family;
3920 if (family == PF_INET)
3921 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3923 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
3925 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3926 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3934 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3936 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3937 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3940 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3945 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3947 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3948 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3949 struct common_audit_data ad;
3950 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3951 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3952 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3953 unsigned short snum;
3956 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3957 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3958 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3960 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3962 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3963 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3965 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3968 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3972 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3973 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3975 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3977 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
3978 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
3979 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3984 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3990 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3992 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3995 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3998 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3999 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4001 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4005 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4007 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4008 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4009 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4010 newisec->initialized = 1;
4015 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4018 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4021 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4022 int size, int flags)
4024 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4027 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4029 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4032 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4034 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4037 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4041 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4045 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4048 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4051 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4054 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4056 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4059 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4063 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4064 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4065 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4066 struct common_audit_data ad;
4067 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4070 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4072 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4074 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4075 sksec_other->sclass,
4076 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4080 /* server child socket */
4081 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4082 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4087 /* connecting socket */
4088 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4093 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4094 struct socket *other)
4096 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4097 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4098 struct common_audit_data ad;
4099 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4101 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4103 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4105 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4109 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4111 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4117 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4120 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4121 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4125 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4128 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4129 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4132 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4136 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4137 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4138 struct common_audit_data ad;
4139 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4142 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4144 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4145 ad.u.net->family = family;
4146 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4150 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4151 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4157 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4160 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4165 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4168 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4169 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4170 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4171 struct common_audit_data ad;
4172 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4177 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4180 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4181 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4184 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4185 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4186 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4187 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4188 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4189 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4191 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4192 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4193 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4196 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4198 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4199 ad.u.net->family = family;
4200 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4204 if (peerlbl_active) {
4207 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4210 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4213 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4216 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4219 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4222 if (secmark_active) {
4223 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4232 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4233 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4238 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4239 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4241 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4242 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4243 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4244 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4245 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4247 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4251 if (scontext_len > len) {
4256 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4260 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4266 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4268 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4271 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4273 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4276 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4280 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4281 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4283 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4286 *secid = peer_secid;
4287 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4292 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4294 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4296 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4300 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4301 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4302 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4303 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4308 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4310 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4312 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4313 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4317 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4319 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4320 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4322 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4323 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4324 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4326 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4329 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4332 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4334 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4336 *secid = sksec->sid;
4340 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4342 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4343 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4345 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4346 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4347 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4348 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4351 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4352 struct request_sock *req)
4354 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4356 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4360 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4361 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4364 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4367 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4368 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4369 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4371 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4374 req->secid = newsid;
4375 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4378 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4381 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4382 const struct request_sock *req)
4384 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4386 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4387 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4388 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4389 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4390 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4391 time it will have been created and available. */
4393 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4394 * thread with access to newsksec */
4395 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4398 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4400 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4401 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4403 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4404 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4407 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4410 static void selinux_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
4412 skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
4415 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4417 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4420 __tsec = current_security();
4423 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4426 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4428 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4431 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4433 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4436 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4439 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4442 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4444 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4446 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4449 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4455 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4460 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4462 u32 sid = current_sid();
4464 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4465 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4466 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4467 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4468 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4469 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4471 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4475 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4477 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4479 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4480 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4483 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4485 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4486 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4488 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4489 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4490 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4491 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4492 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4493 * protocols were being used */
4495 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4496 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4501 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4503 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4504 u32 sid = current_sid();
4507 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4508 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4511 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4512 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4520 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4524 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4525 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4527 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4531 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4533 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4535 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4536 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4537 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4538 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4539 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4540 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4550 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4555 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4557 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4563 struct common_audit_data ad;
4564 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4569 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4572 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4573 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4574 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4575 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4578 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4581 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4583 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4584 ad.u.net->family = family;
4585 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4588 if (peerlbl_active) {
4589 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4592 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4598 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4599 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4603 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4604 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4605 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4607 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4613 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4614 struct sk_buff *skb,
4615 const struct net_device *in,
4616 const struct net_device *out,
4617 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4619 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4622 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4623 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4624 struct sk_buff *skb,
4625 const struct net_device *in,
4626 const struct net_device *out,
4627 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4629 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4633 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4638 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4641 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4642 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4643 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4645 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4648 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4649 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4655 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4656 struct sk_buff *skb,
4657 const struct net_device *in,
4658 const struct net_device *out,
4659 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4661 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4664 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4668 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4669 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4670 struct common_audit_data ad;
4671 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4677 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4679 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4681 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4682 ad.u.net->family = family;
4683 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4686 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4687 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4688 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4689 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4691 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4692 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4697 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4703 struct common_audit_data ad;
4704 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4709 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4710 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4711 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4712 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4713 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4714 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4716 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4717 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4718 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4719 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4720 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4721 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4722 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4725 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4726 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4727 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4730 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4731 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4732 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4733 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4737 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4738 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4741 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4742 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4745 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4746 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4747 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4750 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4752 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4753 ad.u.net->family = family;
4754 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4758 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4759 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4760 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4762 if (peerlbl_active) {
4766 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4768 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4769 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4770 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4772 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4774 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4775 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4776 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4782 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4783 struct sk_buff *skb,
4784 const struct net_device *in,
4785 const struct net_device *out,
4786 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4788 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4791 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4792 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4793 struct sk_buff *skb,
4794 const struct net_device *in,
4795 const struct net_device *out,
4796 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4798 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4802 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4804 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4808 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4812 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4815 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4816 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4819 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4822 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4826 sid = task_sid(task);
4827 isec->sclass = sclass;
4829 perm->security = isec;
4834 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4836 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4837 perm->security = NULL;
4841 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4843 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4845 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4849 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4850 msg->security = msec;
4855 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4857 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4859 msg->security = NULL;
4863 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4866 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4867 struct common_audit_data ad;
4868 u32 sid = current_sid();
4870 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4872 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4873 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4875 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4878 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4880 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4883 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4885 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4888 /* message queue security operations */
4889 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4891 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4892 struct common_audit_data ad;
4893 u32 sid = current_sid();
4896 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4900 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4902 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4903 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4905 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4908 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4914 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4916 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4919 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4921 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4922 struct common_audit_data ad;
4923 u32 sid = current_sid();
4925 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4927 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4928 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4930 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4931 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4934 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4942 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4943 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4946 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4949 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4952 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4958 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4962 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4964 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4965 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4966 struct common_audit_data ad;
4967 u32 sid = current_sid();
4970 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4971 msec = msg->security;
4974 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4976 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4978 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4979 * message queue this message will be stored in
4981 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4987 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4988 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4990 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4991 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4994 /* Can this process send the message */
4995 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4998 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4999 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5000 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5005 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5006 struct task_struct *target,
5007 long type, int mode)
5009 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5010 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5011 struct common_audit_data ad;
5012 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5015 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5016 msec = msg->security;
5018 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5019 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5021 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5022 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5024 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5025 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5029 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5030 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5032 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5033 struct common_audit_data ad;
5034 u32 sid = current_sid();
5037 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5041 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5043 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5044 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5046 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5049 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5055 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5057 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5060 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5062 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5063 struct common_audit_data ad;
5064 u32 sid = current_sid();
5066 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5068 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5069 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5071 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5072 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5075 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5076 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5084 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5085 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5088 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5091 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5098 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5104 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5108 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5109 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5113 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5116 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5118 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5121 /* Semaphore security operations */
5122 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5124 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5125 struct common_audit_data ad;
5126 u32 sid = current_sid();
5129 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5133 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5135 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5136 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5138 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5141 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5147 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5149 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5152 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5154 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5155 struct common_audit_data ad;
5156 u32 sid = current_sid();
5158 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5160 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5161 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5163 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5164 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5167 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5168 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5176 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5177 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5181 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5192 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5195 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5199 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5205 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5209 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5210 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5215 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5219 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5222 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5228 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5230 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5235 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5238 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5240 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5244 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5247 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5250 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5251 char *name, char **value)
5253 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5259 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5265 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5267 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5269 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5271 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5272 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5273 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5274 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5275 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5276 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5277 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5278 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5286 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5296 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5297 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5299 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5300 struct task_struct *tracer;
5307 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5308 security attributes. */
5313 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5314 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5315 * above restriction is ever removed.
5317 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5318 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5319 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5320 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5321 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5322 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5323 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5324 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5325 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5326 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5332 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5333 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5334 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5338 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5339 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5340 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5341 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5344 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5345 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5346 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5347 audit_size = size - 1;
5350 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5351 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5352 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5357 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5364 new = prepare_creds();
5368 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5369 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5370 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5371 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5372 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5373 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5374 tsec = new->security;
5375 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5376 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5377 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5378 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5379 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5380 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5383 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5384 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5385 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5386 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5391 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5393 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5394 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5399 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5400 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5401 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5405 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5406 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5409 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5411 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5415 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5416 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5435 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5437 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5440 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5442 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5445 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5451 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5453 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5455 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5459 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5461 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5463 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5466 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5469 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5478 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5479 unsigned long flags)
5481 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5482 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5484 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5488 tsec = cred->security;
5489 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5490 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5492 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5498 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5500 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5506 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5507 const struct cred *cred,
5511 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5514 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5515 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5516 appear to be created. */
5520 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5522 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5523 ksec = key->security;
5525 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5528 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5530 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5531 char *context = NULL;
5535 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5544 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5547 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5548 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5549 .capget = selinux_capget,
5550 .capset = selinux_capset,
5551 .capable = selinux_capable,
5552 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5553 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5554 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5555 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5557 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5559 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5560 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5561 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5562 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5564 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5565 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5566 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5567 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5568 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5569 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5570 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5571 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5572 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5573 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5574 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5575 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5578 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5579 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5580 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5581 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5582 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5583 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5584 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5585 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5586 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5587 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5588 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5589 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5590 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5591 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5592 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5593 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5594 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5595 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5596 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5597 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5598 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5599 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5600 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5601 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5602 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5604 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5605 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5606 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5607 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5608 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5609 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5610 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5611 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5612 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5613 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5614 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5615 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5617 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5619 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5620 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5621 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5622 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5623 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5624 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5625 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5626 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5627 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5628 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5629 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5630 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5631 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5632 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5633 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5634 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5635 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5636 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5637 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5638 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5639 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5640 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5642 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5643 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5645 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5646 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5648 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5649 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5650 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5651 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5652 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5653 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5655 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5656 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5657 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5658 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5659 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5661 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5662 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5663 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5664 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5665 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5667 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5669 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5670 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5672 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5673 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5674 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5675 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5676 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5677 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5679 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5680 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5682 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5683 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5684 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5685 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5686 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5687 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5688 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5689 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5690 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5691 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5692 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5693 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5694 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5695 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5696 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5697 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5698 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5699 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5700 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5701 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5702 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5703 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5704 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5705 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5706 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5707 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5708 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5709 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5710 .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
5711 .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
5712 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5713 .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
5714 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5715 .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
5716 .skb_owned_by = selinux_skb_owned_by,
5718 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5719 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5720 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5721 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5722 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5723 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5724 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5725 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5726 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5727 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5728 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5732 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5733 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5734 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5735 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5739 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5740 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5741 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5742 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5746 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5748 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5749 selinux_enabled = 0;
5753 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5754 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5758 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5760 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5761 cred_init_security();
5763 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5765 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5766 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5767 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5770 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5771 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5773 if (selinux_enforcing)
5774 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5776 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5781 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5783 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5786 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5788 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5790 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5791 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5792 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5795 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5796 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5797 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5799 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5801 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5803 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5804 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5806 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5807 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5810 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5811 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5813 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5814 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5817 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5818 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5820 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5821 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5825 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5827 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5829 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5830 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5832 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5833 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5836 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5837 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5839 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5840 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5846 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5850 if (!selinux_enabled)
5853 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5855 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5857 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5859 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5860 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5862 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5869 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5871 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5872 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5874 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5876 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5877 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5878 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5883 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5885 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5886 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5889 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5891 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5892 static int selinux_disabled;
5894 int selinux_disable(void)
5896 if (ss_initialized) {
5897 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5901 if (selinux_disabled) {
5902 /* Only do this once. */
5906 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5908 selinux_disabled = 1;
5909 selinux_enabled = 0;
5911 reset_security_ops();
5913 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5916 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5917 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5919 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */