2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
79 #include <linux/syslog.h>
90 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
92 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
93 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
95 /* SECMARK reference count */
96 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
98 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
99 int selinux_enforcing;
101 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
103 unsigned long enforcing;
104 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
105 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
108 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
111 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
112 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
114 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
116 unsigned long enabled;
117 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
118 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
121 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
123 int selinux_enabled = 1;
126 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
129 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
132 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
133 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
134 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
135 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
138 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
140 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
144 * initialise the security for the init task
146 static void cred_init_security(void)
148 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
149 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
151 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
153 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
155 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
156 cred->security = tsec;
160 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
162 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
164 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
166 tsec = cred->security;
171 * get the objective security ID of a task
173 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
178 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
184 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
186 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
188 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
193 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
195 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
197 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
198 u32 sid = current_sid();
200 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
204 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
205 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
207 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
208 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
209 isec->task_sid = sid;
210 inode->i_security = isec;
215 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
217 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
218 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
220 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
221 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
222 list_del_init(&isec->list);
223 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
225 inode->i_security = NULL;
226 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
229 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
231 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
232 u32 sid = current_sid();
234 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
239 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
240 file->f_security = fsec;
245 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
248 file->f_security = NULL;
252 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
254 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
256 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
260 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
261 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
262 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
264 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
265 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
266 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
267 sb->s_security = sbsec;
272 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
274 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
275 sb->s_security = NULL;
279 /* The security server must be initialized before
280 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
281 extern int ss_initialized;
283 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
285 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
287 "uses transition SIDs",
289 "uses genfs_contexts",
290 "not configured for labeling",
291 "uses mountpoint labeling",
294 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
296 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
298 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
307 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
310 static const match_table_t tokens = {
311 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
312 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
313 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
319 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
321 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
322 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
323 const struct cred *cred)
325 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
328 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
329 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
333 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
334 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
338 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 const struct cred *cred)
342 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
344 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
345 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
349 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
350 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
354 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
356 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
357 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
358 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
361 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
362 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
363 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
364 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
365 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
366 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
367 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
368 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
369 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
373 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
374 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
375 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
376 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
377 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
378 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
380 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
381 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
382 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
387 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
389 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
390 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
391 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
393 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
394 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
395 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
397 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
398 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
399 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
400 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
401 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
403 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
404 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
405 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
407 /* Initialize the root inode. */
408 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
410 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
411 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
412 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
414 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
416 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
417 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
418 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
419 struct inode_security_struct, list);
420 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
421 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
422 inode = igrab(inode);
424 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
428 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
429 list_del_init(&isec->list);
432 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
438 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
439 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
440 * mount options, or whatever.
442 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
443 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
446 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
447 char *context = NULL;
451 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
453 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
459 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
460 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
461 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
463 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
466 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
467 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
468 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
470 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
471 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
476 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
477 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
483 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
484 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
487 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
488 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
490 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
491 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
494 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
495 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
497 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
498 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
501 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
502 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
504 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
505 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
506 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
508 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
511 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
512 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
514 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
515 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
516 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
519 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
524 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
528 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
529 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
531 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
533 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
534 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
535 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
536 (old_sid != new_sid))
539 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
540 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
542 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
543 if (mnt_flags & flag)
549 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
550 * labeling information.
552 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
553 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
555 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
557 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
558 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
559 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
560 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
561 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
562 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
563 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
564 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
565 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
567 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
569 if (!ss_initialized) {
571 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
572 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
573 server is ready to handle calls. */
577 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
578 "before the security server is initialized\n");
583 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
584 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
585 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
586 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
588 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
589 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
590 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
591 * will be used for both mounts)
593 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
598 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
599 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
600 * than once with different security options.
602 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
605 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
607 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
608 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
610 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
611 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
612 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
619 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
621 goto out_double_mount;
623 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
628 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
630 goto out_double_mount;
632 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
634 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
635 rootcontext_sid = sid;
637 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
639 goto out_double_mount;
641 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
645 defcontext_sid = sid;
647 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
649 goto out_double_mount;
651 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
660 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
661 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
662 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
663 goto out_double_mount;
668 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
669 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
671 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
672 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
674 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
675 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
679 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
681 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
685 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
689 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
690 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
691 * the superblock context if not already set.
694 if (!fscontext_sid) {
695 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
699 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
701 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
706 if (!rootcontext_sid)
707 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
713 if (rootcontext_sid) {
714 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
719 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
720 root_isec->initialized = 1;
723 if (defcontext_sid) {
724 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
726 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
727 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
731 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
732 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
738 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
741 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
743 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
747 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
748 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
752 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
753 struct super_block *newsb)
755 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
756 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
758 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
763 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
764 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
769 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
770 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
772 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
773 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
776 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
778 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
780 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
781 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
782 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
785 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
789 if (!set_rootcontext) {
790 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
791 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
794 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
796 if (set_rootcontext) {
797 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
798 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
799 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
800 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
802 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
805 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
806 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
809 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
810 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
813 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
814 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
815 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
817 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
819 /* Standard string-based options. */
820 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
822 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
827 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
831 if (context || defcontext) {
833 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
836 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
846 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
849 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
856 case Opt_rootcontext:
859 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
862 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
870 if (context || defcontext) {
872 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
875 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
881 case Opt_labelsupport:
885 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
892 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
896 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
897 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
898 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
903 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
904 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
907 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
908 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
911 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
912 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
915 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
916 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
919 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
930 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
932 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
935 char *options = data;
936 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
938 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
943 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
945 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
950 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
953 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
957 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
958 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
963 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
966 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
967 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
971 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
973 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
976 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
978 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
979 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
982 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
986 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
991 /* we need a comma before each option */
996 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1002 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1004 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1007 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1009 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1015 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1017 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1022 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1024 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1026 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1028 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1030 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1034 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1036 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1038 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1042 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1045 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1047 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1050 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1052 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1055 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1061 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1062 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1064 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1071 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1072 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1074 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1076 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1077 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1079 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1081 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1089 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1090 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1102 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1112 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1114 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1116 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1122 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1123 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1128 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1130 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1135 end = buffer+buflen;
1140 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1141 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1145 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1150 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1151 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1155 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1163 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1164 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1166 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1167 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1169 struct dentry *dentry;
1170 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1171 char *context = NULL;
1175 if (isec->initialized)
1178 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1179 if (isec->initialized)
1182 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1183 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1184 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1185 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1186 server is ready to handle calls. */
1187 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1188 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1189 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1190 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1194 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1195 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1196 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1197 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1201 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1202 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1204 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1205 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1207 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1208 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1212 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1213 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1214 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1215 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1216 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1217 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1218 * be used again by userspace.
1223 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1224 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1230 context[len] = '\0';
1231 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1233 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1236 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1237 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1244 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1250 context[len] = '\0';
1251 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1257 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1258 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1259 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1260 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1264 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1265 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1268 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1272 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1273 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1275 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1276 if (printk_ratelimit())
1277 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1278 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1279 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1281 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1282 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1283 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1286 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1294 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1295 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1297 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1298 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1299 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1301 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1302 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1303 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1311 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1315 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1316 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1318 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1319 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1321 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1322 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1333 isec->initialized = 1;
1336 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1338 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1339 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1343 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1344 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1350 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1351 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1354 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1355 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1358 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1359 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1362 /* All other signals. */
1363 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1371 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1372 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1374 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1375 const struct cred *target,
1378 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1380 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1384 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1385 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1386 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1387 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1389 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1390 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1393 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1397 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1398 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1400 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1404 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1405 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1406 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1407 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1409 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1414 sid = current_sid();
1415 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1416 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1419 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1420 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1423 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1424 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1425 const struct cred *cred,
1428 struct common_audit_data ad;
1429 struct av_decision avd;
1431 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1432 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1435 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1439 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1441 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1444 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1448 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1452 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1453 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1454 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1458 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1459 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1464 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1465 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1468 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1469 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1470 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1471 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1472 struct inode *inode,
1474 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1476 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1477 struct common_audit_data ad;
1480 validate_creds(cred);
1482 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1485 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1486 isec = inode->i_security;
1490 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1491 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1494 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1497 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1498 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1499 pathname if needed. */
1500 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1501 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1502 struct dentry *dentry,
1505 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1506 struct common_audit_data ad;
1508 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1509 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1510 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1511 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1514 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1515 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1516 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1517 check a particular permission to the file.
1518 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1519 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1520 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1521 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1522 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1526 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1527 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1528 struct common_audit_data ad;
1529 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1532 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1533 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1535 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1536 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1544 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1547 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1553 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1554 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1555 struct dentry *dentry,
1558 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1559 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1560 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1562 struct common_audit_data ad;
1565 dsec = dir->i_security;
1566 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1569 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1571 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1572 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1574 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1575 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1580 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1581 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1586 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1590 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1591 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1592 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1595 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1596 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1597 struct task_struct *ctx)
1599 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1601 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1605 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1608 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1609 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1610 struct dentry *dentry,
1614 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1615 struct common_audit_data ad;
1616 u32 sid = current_sid();
1620 dsec = dir->i_security;
1621 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1623 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1624 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1627 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1628 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1643 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1648 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1652 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1653 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1654 struct inode *new_dir,
1655 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1657 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1658 struct common_audit_data ad;
1659 u32 sid = current_sid();
1661 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1664 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1665 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1666 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1667 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1669 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1671 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1672 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1673 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1676 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1677 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1680 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1681 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1682 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1687 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1688 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1689 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1690 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1691 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1694 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1695 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1696 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1697 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1699 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1707 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1708 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1709 struct super_block *sb,
1711 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1713 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1714 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1716 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1717 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1720 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1721 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1725 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1726 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1727 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1728 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1731 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1733 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1737 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1739 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1741 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1748 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1749 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1753 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1755 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1756 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1763 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1772 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1775 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1777 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1779 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1785 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1787 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1792 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1796 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1797 u32 sid = current_sid();
1798 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1799 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1802 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1805 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1809 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1813 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1816 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1817 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1821 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1825 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1828 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1829 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1830 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1831 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1835 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1836 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1840 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1844 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1845 * which was removed).
1847 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1848 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1849 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1850 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1853 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1858 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1862 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1865 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1868 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1871 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1876 end = buffer+buflen;
1882 const char *name = table->procname;
1883 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1884 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1888 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1891 table = table->parent;
1897 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1899 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1901 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1906 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1913 sid = current_sid();
1915 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1916 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1918 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1919 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1922 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1923 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1925 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1926 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1934 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1935 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1941 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1943 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1955 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1960 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1963 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1969 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1971 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1973 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1976 static int selinux_syslog(int type, bool from_file)
1980 rc = cap_syslog(type, from_file);
1985 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1986 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1987 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1989 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1990 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1991 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1992 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1993 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1995 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1996 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1997 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1998 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1999 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2001 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2008 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2009 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2010 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2012 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2013 * processes that allocate mappings.
2015 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2017 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2019 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2020 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2024 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2027 /* binprm security operations */
2029 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2031 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2032 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2033 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2034 struct common_audit_data ad;
2035 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2038 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2042 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2043 * the script interpreter */
2044 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2047 old_tsec = current_security();
2048 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2049 isec = inode->i_security;
2051 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2052 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2053 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2055 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2056 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2057 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2058 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2060 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2061 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2062 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2063 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2065 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2066 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2067 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2072 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2073 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2075 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2076 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2078 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2079 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2080 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2084 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2085 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2086 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2090 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2091 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2095 /* Check for shared state */
2096 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2097 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2098 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2104 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2105 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2107 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2108 struct task_struct *tracer;
2109 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2113 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2114 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2115 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2121 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2123 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2129 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2130 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2136 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2138 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2146 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2147 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2148 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2149 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2151 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2154 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2157 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2158 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2160 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2161 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2162 struct files_struct *files)
2164 struct common_audit_data ad;
2165 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2166 struct tty_struct *tty;
2167 struct fdtable *fdt;
2171 tty = get_current_tty();
2173 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2174 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2175 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2176 struct inode *inode;
2178 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2179 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2180 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2181 file may belong to another process and we are only
2182 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2183 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2184 struct tty_file_private, list);
2185 file = file_priv->file;
2186 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2187 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2188 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2192 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2195 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2199 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2201 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2203 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2205 unsigned long set, i;
2210 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2211 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2213 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2216 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2217 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2222 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2224 file_to_av(file))) {
2226 fd = get_unused_fd();
2236 devnull = dentry_open(
2238 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2240 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2247 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2252 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2255 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2259 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2261 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2263 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2264 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2267 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2268 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2271 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2272 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2274 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2275 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2277 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2278 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2279 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2281 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2282 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2283 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2284 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2285 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2287 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2288 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2290 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2292 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2293 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2294 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2295 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2297 task_unlock(current);
2298 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2303 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2306 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2308 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2309 struct itimerval itimer;
2319 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2320 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2321 * flush and unblock signals.
2323 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2324 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2326 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2328 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2329 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2330 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2331 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2332 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2333 __flush_signals(current);
2334 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2335 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2337 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2340 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2341 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2342 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2343 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2344 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2347 /* superblock security operations */
2349 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2351 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2354 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2356 superblock_free_security(sb);
2359 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2364 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2367 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2369 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2370 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2371 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2372 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2373 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2376 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2383 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2387 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2390 int current_size = 0;
2398 while (current_size < len) {
2408 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2410 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2411 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2412 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2418 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2426 in_save = in_end = orig;
2430 open_quote = !open_quote;
2431 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2433 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2435 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2436 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2438 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2440 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2442 } while (*in_end++);
2444 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2445 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2450 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2452 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2453 struct common_audit_data ad;
2456 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2460 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2461 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2464 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2465 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2466 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2469 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2471 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2472 struct common_audit_data ad;
2474 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2475 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2476 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2479 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2482 unsigned long flags,
2485 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2487 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2488 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2489 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2491 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2495 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2497 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2499 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2500 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2503 /* inode security operations */
2505 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2507 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2510 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2512 inode_free_security(inode);
2515 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2516 char **name, void **value,
2519 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2520 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2521 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2522 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2524 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2526 dsec = dir->i_security;
2527 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2530 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2532 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2533 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2534 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2537 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2538 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2541 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2546 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2547 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2548 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2549 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2551 isec->initialized = 1;
2554 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2558 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2565 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2577 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2579 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2582 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2584 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2587 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2589 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2592 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2594 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2597 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2599 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2602 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2604 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2607 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2609 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2612 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2613 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2615 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2618 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2620 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2622 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2625 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2627 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2629 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2632 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2634 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2635 struct common_audit_data ad;
2639 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2640 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2642 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2646 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2647 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
2650 ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
2652 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2654 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad);
2657 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2659 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2660 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2662 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2663 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2664 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2670 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2671 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2672 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2674 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2677 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2679 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2681 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2684 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2686 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2688 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2689 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2690 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2691 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2693 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2694 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2695 Restrict to administrator. */
2700 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2701 ordinary setattr permission. */
2702 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2705 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2706 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2708 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2709 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2710 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2711 struct common_audit_data ad;
2712 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2715 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2716 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2718 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2719 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2722 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2725 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2726 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2728 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2729 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2733 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2734 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2735 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2737 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2742 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2743 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2747 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2752 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2754 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2755 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2759 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2760 const void *value, size_t size,
2763 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2764 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2768 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2769 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2773 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2775 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2776 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2777 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2785 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2787 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2789 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2792 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2794 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2796 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2799 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2801 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2802 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2804 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2805 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2810 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2812 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2814 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2818 char *context = NULL;
2819 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2821 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2825 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2826 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2827 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2828 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2829 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2830 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2831 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2833 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2834 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2836 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2839 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2852 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2853 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2855 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2859 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2862 if (!value || !size)
2865 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2870 isec->initialized = 1;
2874 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2876 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2877 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2878 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2882 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2884 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2888 /* file security operations */
2890 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2892 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2893 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2895 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2896 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2899 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2900 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2903 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2905 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2906 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2907 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2908 u32 sid = current_sid();
2911 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2914 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2915 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2916 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2919 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2922 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2924 return file_alloc_security(file);
2927 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2929 file_free_security(file);
2932 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2935 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2938 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2940 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2945 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2948 static int default_noexec;
2950 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2952 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2955 if (default_noexec &&
2956 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2958 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2959 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2960 * This has an additional check.
2962 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2968 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2969 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2971 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2972 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2975 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2976 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2978 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2985 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2986 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2987 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2990 u32 sid = current_sid();
2993 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
2994 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
2995 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
2996 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
2998 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
2999 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3000 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3005 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3006 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3007 if (rc || addr_only)
3010 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3013 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3014 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3017 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3018 unsigned long reqprot,
3021 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3023 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3026 if (default_noexec &&
3027 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3029 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3030 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3031 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3032 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3033 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3034 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3035 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3036 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3038 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3039 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3040 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3041 * modified content. This typically should only
3042 * occur for text relocations.
3044 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3050 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3053 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3055 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3057 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3060 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3063 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3068 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3073 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3074 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3083 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3084 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3089 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3094 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3098 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3105 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3107 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3109 fsec = file->f_security;
3110 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3115 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3116 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3119 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3121 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3123 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3124 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3126 fsec = file->f_security;
3129 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3131 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3133 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3134 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3137 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3139 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3141 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3144 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3146 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3147 struct inode *inode;
3148 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3150 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3151 fsec = file->f_security;
3152 isec = inode->i_security;
3154 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3155 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3156 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3157 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3158 * struct as its SID.
3160 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3161 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3163 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3164 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3165 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3166 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3167 * new inode label or new policy.
3168 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3170 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3173 /* task security operations */
3175 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3177 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3181 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3183 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3185 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3187 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3191 cred->security = tsec;
3196 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3198 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3200 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3202 BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3203 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3208 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3210 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3213 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3216 old_tsec = old->security;
3218 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3222 new->security = tsec;
3227 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3229 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3231 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3232 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3238 * set the security data for a kernel service
3239 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3241 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3243 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3244 u32 sid = current_sid();
3247 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3248 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3249 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3253 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3254 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3255 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3261 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3262 * objective context of the specified inode
3264 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3266 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3267 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3268 u32 sid = current_sid();
3271 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3272 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3273 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3277 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3281 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3284 struct common_audit_data ad;
3286 sid = task_sid(current);
3288 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3289 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3291 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3292 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3295 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3297 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3300 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3302 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3305 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3307 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3310 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3312 *secid = task_sid(p);
3315 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3319 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3323 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3326 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3330 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3334 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3337 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3339 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3342 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3343 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3345 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3347 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3348 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3349 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3350 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3351 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3352 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3357 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3361 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3365 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3368 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3370 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3373 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3375 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3378 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3385 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3387 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3389 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3390 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3392 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3396 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3398 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3401 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3402 struct inode *inode)
3404 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3405 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3408 isec->initialized = 1;
3411 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3412 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3413 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3415 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3416 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3418 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3419 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3423 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3424 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3427 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3428 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3432 *proto = ih->protocol;
3434 switch (ih->protocol) {
3436 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3438 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3442 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3446 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3447 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3452 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3454 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3458 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3462 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3463 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3467 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3468 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3470 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3474 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3478 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3479 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3490 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3492 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3493 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3494 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3497 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3498 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3500 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3501 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3505 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3506 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3509 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3510 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3511 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3520 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3522 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3526 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3527 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3532 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3534 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3538 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3539 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3543 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3544 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3546 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3550 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3551 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3555 /* includes fragments */
3565 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3566 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3571 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3573 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3576 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3577 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3580 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3582 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3585 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3586 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3596 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3597 " unable to parse packet\n");
3607 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3609 * @family: protocol family
3610 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3613 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3614 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3615 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3616 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3617 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3621 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3628 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3629 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3631 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3632 if (unlikely(err)) {
3634 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3635 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3642 /* socket security operations */
3644 static u32 socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec)
3646 return tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3649 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3651 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3652 struct common_audit_data ad;
3653 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3655 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3658 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3661 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3664 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3665 int protocol, int kern)
3667 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3674 newsid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
3675 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3676 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3679 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3680 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3682 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3683 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3684 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3688 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3690 isec->sid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
3692 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3693 isec->initialized = 1;
3696 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3697 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3698 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3699 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3705 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3706 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3707 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3709 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3711 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3715 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3720 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3721 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3722 * check the first address now.
3724 family = sk->sk_family;
3725 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3727 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3728 struct common_audit_data ad;
3729 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3730 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3731 unsigned short snum;
3734 if (family == PF_INET) {
3735 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3736 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3737 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3739 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3740 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3741 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3747 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3749 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3750 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3754 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3755 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3756 ad.u.net.family = family;
3757 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3759 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3765 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3766 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3767 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3770 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3771 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3774 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3775 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3779 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3783 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3787 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3788 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3789 ad.u.net.family = family;
3791 if (family == PF_INET)
3792 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3794 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3796 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3797 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3805 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3807 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3808 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3811 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3816 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3818 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3819 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3820 struct common_audit_data ad;
3821 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3822 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3823 unsigned short snum;
3826 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3827 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3828 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3830 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3832 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3833 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3835 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3838 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3842 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3843 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3845 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3846 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3847 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3848 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3853 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3859 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3861 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3864 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3867 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3868 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3870 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3874 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3876 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3877 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3878 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3879 newisec->initialized = 1;
3884 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3887 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3890 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3891 int size, int flags)
3893 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3896 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3898 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3901 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3903 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3906 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3910 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3914 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3917 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3920 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3923 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3925 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3928 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3929 struct socket *other,
3932 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk->sk_security;
3933 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk->sk_security;
3934 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
3935 struct common_audit_data ad;
3938 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3939 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3941 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
3942 sksec_other->sclass,
3943 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3947 /* server child socket */
3948 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
3949 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
3954 /* connecting socket */
3955 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
3960 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3961 struct socket *other)
3963 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3964 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
3965 struct common_audit_data ad;
3967 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3968 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3970 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
3974 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3976 struct common_audit_data *ad)
3982 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3985 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3986 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3990 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3993 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3994 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
3997 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4001 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4003 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4004 struct common_audit_data ad;
4007 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4008 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4009 ad.u.net.family = family;
4010 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4014 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4015 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4021 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4022 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4025 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4026 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4028 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4030 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4033 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4039 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4042 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4043 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4044 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4045 struct common_audit_data ad;
4050 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4053 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4054 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4057 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4058 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4059 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4060 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4061 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4062 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4064 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4065 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4066 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4069 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4070 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4071 ad.u.net.family = family;
4072 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4076 if (peerlbl_active) {
4079 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4082 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4085 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4088 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4091 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4094 if (secmark_active) {
4095 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4104 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4105 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4110 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4111 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4113 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4114 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4115 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4116 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4117 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4119 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4123 if (scontext_len > len) {
4128 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4132 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4138 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4140 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4143 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4145 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4148 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4152 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4153 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4155 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4158 *secid = peer_secid;
4159 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4164 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4166 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4168 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4172 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4173 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4174 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4175 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4180 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4182 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4184 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4185 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4189 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4191 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4192 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4194 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4195 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4196 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4198 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4201 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4204 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4206 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4208 *secid = sksec->sid;
4212 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4214 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4215 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4217 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4218 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4219 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4220 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4223 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4224 struct request_sock *req)
4226 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4228 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4232 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4233 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4236 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4239 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4240 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4241 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4243 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4246 req->secid = newsid;
4247 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4250 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4253 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4254 const struct request_sock *req)
4256 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4258 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4259 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4260 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4261 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4262 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4263 time it will have been created and available. */
4265 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4266 * thread with access to newsksec */
4267 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4270 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4272 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4273 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4275 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4276 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4279 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4282 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4284 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4287 __tsec = current_security();
4290 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4293 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4295 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4298 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4300 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4303 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4306 fl->secid = req->secid;
4309 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4311 u32 sid = current_sid();
4313 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4314 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4315 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4316 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4317 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4318 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4320 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4324 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4326 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4328 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4329 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4330 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4331 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4332 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4333 * protocols were being used */
4335 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4336 * the sockcreate SID here */
4338 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4339 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4342 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4344 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4345 u32 sid = current_sid();
4348 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4349 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4352 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4353 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4362 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4366 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4367 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4369 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4373 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4375 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4377 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4378 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4379 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4380 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4381 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4382 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4392 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4397 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4399 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4405 struct common_audit_data ad;
4410 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4413 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4414 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4415 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4416 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4419 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4422 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4423 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4424 ad.u.net.family = family;
4425 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4428 if (peerlbl_active) {
4429 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4432 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4438 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4439 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4443 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4444 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4445 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4447 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4453 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4454 struct sk_buff *skb,
4455 const struct net_device *in,
4456 const struct net_device *out,
4457 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4459 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4462 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4463 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4464 struct sk_buff *skb,
4465 const struct net_device *in,
4466 const struct net_device *out,
4467 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4469 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4473 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4478 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4481 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4482 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4483 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4485 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4488 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4489 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4495 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4496 struct sk_buff *skb,
4497 const struct net_device *in,
4498 const struct net_device *out,
4499 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4501 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4504 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4508 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4509 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4510 struct common_audit_data ad;
4516 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4518 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4519 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4520 ad.u.net.family = family;
4521 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4524 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4525 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4526 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4529 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4530 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4536 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4542 struct common_audit_data ad;
4547 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4548 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4549 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4550 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4551 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4552 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4554 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4555 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4556 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4557 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4558 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4559 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4560 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4563 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4564 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4565 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4568 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4569 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4570 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4571 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4576 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4577 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4579 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4582 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4583 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4585 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4590 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4591 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4594 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4596 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4597 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4598 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4601 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4602 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4603 ad.u.net.family = family;
4604 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4608 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4609 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4612 if (peerlbl_active) {
4616 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4618 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4619 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4622 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4624 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4625 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4632 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4633 struct sk_buff *skb,
4634 const struct net_device *in,
4635 const struct net_device *out,
4636 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4638 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4641 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4642 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4643 struct sk_buff *skb,
4644 const struct net_device *in,
4645 const struct net_device *out,
4646 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4648 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4652 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4654 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4658 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4662 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4665 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4668 struct common_audit_data ad;
4670 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4674 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4675 ad.u.cap = capability;
4677 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4678 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4681 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4682 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4685 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4688 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4692 sid = task_sid(task);
4693 isec->sclass = sclass;
4695 perm->security = isec;
4700 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4702 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4703 perm->security = NULL;
4707 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4709 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4711 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4715 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4716 msg->security = msec;
4721 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4723 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4725 msg->security = NULL;
4729 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4732 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4733 struct common_audit_data ad;
4734 u32 sid = current_sid();
4736 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4738 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4739 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4741 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4744 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4746 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4749 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4751 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4754 /* message queue security operations */
4755 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4757 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4758 struct common_audit_data ad;
4759 u32 sid = current_sid();
4762 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4766 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4768 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4769 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4771 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4774 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4780 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4782 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4785 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4787 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4788 struct common_audit_data ad;
4789 u32 sid = current_sid();
4791 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4793 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4794 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4796 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4797 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4800 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4808 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4809 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4812 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4815 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4818 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4824 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4828 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4830 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4831 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4832 struct common_audit_data ad;
4833 u32 sid = current_sid();
4836 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4837 msec = msg->security;
4840 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4842 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4844 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4845 * message queue this message will be stored in
4847 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4853 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4854 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4856 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4857 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4860 /* Can this process send the message */
4861 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4864 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4865 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4866 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4871 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4872 struct task_struct *target,
4873 long type, int mode)
4875 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4876 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4877 struct common_audit_data ad;
4878 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4881 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4882 msec = msg->security;
4884 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4885 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4887 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4888 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4890 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4891 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4895 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4896 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4898 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4899 struct common_audit_data ad;
4900 u32 sid = current_sid();
4903 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4907 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4909 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4910 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4912 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4915 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4921 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4923 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4926 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4928 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4929 struct common_audit_data ad;
4930 u32 sid = current_sid();
4932 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4934 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4935 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4937 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4938 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4941 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4942 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4950 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4951 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4954 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4957 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4964 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4970 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4974 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4975 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4979 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4982 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4984 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4987 /* Semaphore security operations */
4988 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4990 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4991 struct common_audit_data ad;
4992 u32 sid = current_sid();
4995 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4999 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5001 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5002 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5004 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5007 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5013 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5015 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5018 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5020 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5021 struct common_audit_data ad;
5022 u32 sid = current_sid();
5024 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5026 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5027 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5029 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5030 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5033 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5034 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5042 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5043 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5047 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5058 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5061 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5065 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5071 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5075 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5076 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5081 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5085 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5088 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5094 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5096 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5101 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5104 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5106 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5110 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5113 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5116 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5117 char *name, char **value)
5119 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5125 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5131 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5133 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5135 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5137 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5138 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5139 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5140 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5141 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5142 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5143 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5144 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5152 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5162 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5163 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5166 struct task_struct *tracer;
5173 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5174 security attributes. */
5179 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5180 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5181 * above restriction is ever removed.
5183 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5184 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5185 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5186 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5187 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5188 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5189 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5190 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5191 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5192 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5198 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5199 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5200 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5204 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5205 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5206 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5208 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5215 new = prepare_creds();
5219 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5220 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5221 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5222 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5223 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5224 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5225 tsec = new->security;
5226 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5227 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5228 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5229 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5230 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5231 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5234 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5235 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5236 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5237 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5242 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5244 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5245 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5250 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5251 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5252 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5256 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5257 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5260 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5262 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5266 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5267 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5286 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5288 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5291 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5293 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5296 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5302 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5304 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5306 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5310 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5312 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5314 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5317 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5320 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5329 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5330 unsigned long flags)
5332 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5333 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5335 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5339 tsec = cred->security;
5340 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5341 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5343 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5349 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5351 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5357 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5358 const struct cred *cred,
5362 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5365 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5366 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5367 appear to be created. */
5371 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5373 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5374 ksec = key->security;
5376 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5379 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5381 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5382 char *context = NULL;
5386 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5395 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5398 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5399 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5400 .capget = selinux_capget,
5401 .capset = selinux_capset,
5402 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5403 .capable = selinux_capable,
5404 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5405 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5406 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5407 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5409 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5410 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5412 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5413 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5414 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5415 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5417 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5418 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5419 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5420 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5421 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5422 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5423 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5424 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5425 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5426 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5427 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5430 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5431 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5432 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5433 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5434 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5435 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5436 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5437 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5438 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5439 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5440 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5441 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5442 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5443 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5444 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5445 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5446 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5447 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5448 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5449 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5450 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5451 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5452 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5453 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5454 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5456 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5457 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5458 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5459 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5460 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5461 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5462 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5463 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5464 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5465 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5466 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5468 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5470 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5471 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5472 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5473 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5474 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5475 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5476 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5477 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5478 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5479 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5480 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5481 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5482 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5483 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5484 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5485 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5486 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5487 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5488 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5489 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5490 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5491 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5493 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5494 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5496 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5497 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5499 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5500 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5501 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5502 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5503 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5504 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5506 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5507 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5508 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5509 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5510 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5512 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5513 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5514 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5515 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5516 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5518 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5520 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5521 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5523 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5524 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5525 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5526 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5527 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5528 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5530 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5531 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5533 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5534 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5535 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5536 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5537 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5538 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5539 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5540 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5541 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5542 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5543 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5544 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5545 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5546 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5547 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5548 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5549 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5550 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5551 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5552 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5553 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5554 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5555 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5556 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5557 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5558 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5559 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5560 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5561 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5562 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5563 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5565 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5566 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5567 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5568 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5569 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5570 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5571 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5572 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5573 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5574 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5575 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5579 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5580 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5581 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5582 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5586 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5587 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5588 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5589 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5593 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5595 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5596 selinux_enabled = 0;
5600 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5601 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5605 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5607 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5608 cred_init_security();
5610 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5612 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5613 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5614 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5617 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5618 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5620 if (selinux_enforcing)
5621 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5623 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5628 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5630 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5633 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5635 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5637 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5638 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5639 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5642 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5643 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5644 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5646 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5648 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5650 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5651 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5653 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5654 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5657 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5658 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5660 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5661 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5664 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5665 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5667 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5668 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5672 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5674 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5676 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5677 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5679 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5680 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5683 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5684 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5686 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5687 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5693 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5697 if (!selinux_enabled)
5700 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5702 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5704 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5706 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5707 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5709 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5716 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5718 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5719 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5721 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5723 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5724 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5725 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5730 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5732 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5733 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5736 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5738 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5739 static int selinux_disabled;
5741 int selinux_disable(void)
5743 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5745 if (ss_initialized) {
5746 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5750 if (selinux_disabled) {
5751 /* Only do this once. */
5755 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5757 selinux_disabled = 1;
5758 selinux_enabled = 0;
5760 reset_security_ops();
5762 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5765 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5766 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5768 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */