2 * Implementation of the security services.
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
21 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
23 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
25 * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
27 * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
29 * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
31 * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
33 * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
34 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
35 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
36 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
37 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
38 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
39 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
40 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
42 #include <linux/kernel.h>
43 #include <linux/slab.h>
44 #include <linux/string.h>
45 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
46 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
47 #include <linux/errno.h>
49 #include <linux/sched.h>
50 #include <linux/audit.h>
51 #include <linux/mutex.h>
52 #include <linux/selinux.h>
53 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
54 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
65 #include "conditional.h"
73 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
75 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
76 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
78 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
80 static struct sidtab sidtab;
81 struct policydb policydb;
85 * The largest sequence number that has been used when
86 * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
87 * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
90 static u32 latest_granting;
92 /* Forward declaration. */
93 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
96 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
97 struct context *tcontext,
99 struct av_decision *avd);
101 struct selinux_mapping {
102 u16 value; /* policy value */
104 u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
107 static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
108 static u16 current_mapping_size;
110 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
111 struct security_class_mapping *map,
112 struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
115 struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
116 size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
119 bool print_unknown_handle = false;
121 /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
128 /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
129 out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
133 /* Store the raw class and permission values */
135 while (map[j].name) {
136 struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
137 struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
139 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
140 if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
141 p_out->num_perms = 0;
145 p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
148 "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
150 if (pol->reject_unknown)
152 p_out->num_perms = 0;
153 print_unknown_handle = true;
158 while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
159 /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
160 if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
164 p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
166 if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
168 "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
169 p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
170 if (pol->reject_unknown)
172 print_unknown_handle = true;
177 p_out->num_perms = k;
180 if (print_unknown_handle)
181 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
182 pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
184 *out_map_p = out_map;
193 * Get real, policy values from mapped values
196 static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
198 if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
199 return current_mapping[tclass].value;
204 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
207 if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
208 unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
211 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
212 if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
214 if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
217 avd->allowed = result;
219 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
220 if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
222 avd->auditallow = result;
224 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
225 if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
227 if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
231 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
232 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
233 * should audit that denial
235 for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
237 avd->auditdeny = result;
241 int security_mls_enabled(void)
243 return policydb.mls_enabled;
247 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
248 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
251 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
252 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
253 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
254 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
255 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
257 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
258 struct context *tcontext,
259 struct context *xcontext,
260 struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
264 struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
265 struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
266 struct constraint_expr *e;
267 int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
270 for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
271 switch (e->expr_type) {
287 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
291 val1 = scontext->user;
292 val2 = tcontext->user;
295 val1 = scontext->type;
296 val2 = tcontext->type;
299 val1 = scontext->role;
300 val2 = tcontext->role;
301 r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
302 r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
305 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
309 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
313 s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
315 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
323 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
324 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
327 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
328 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
331 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
332 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
335 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
336 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
339 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
340 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
343 l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
344 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
349 s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
352 s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
355 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
358 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
361 s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
375 s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
378 s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
386 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
389 if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
391 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
398 if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
400 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
402 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
411 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
414 s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
432 * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
433 * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
435 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
437 struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
438 char **permission_names = args;
440 BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
442 permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
447 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
448 struct context *tcontext,
453 struct common_datum *common_dat;
454 struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
455 struct audit_buffer *ab;
457 char *scontext_name = NULL;
458 char *tcontext_name = NULL;
459 char *permission_names[32];
462 bool need_comma = false;
467 tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
468 tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
469 common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
471 /* init permission_names */
473 hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
474 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
477 if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
478 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
481 /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
482 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
483 &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
486 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
487 &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
490 /* audit a message */
491 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
492 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
496 audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
497 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
498 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
500 for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
501 u32 mask = (1 << index);
503 if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
506 audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
507 need_comma ? "," : "",
508 permission_names[index]
509 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
514 /* release scontext/tcontext */
515 kfree(tcontext_name);
516 kfree(scontext_name);
522 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
523 * on boundary constraint.
525 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
526 struct context *tcontext,
528 struct av_decision *avd)
530 struct context lo_scontext;
531 struct context lo_tcontext;
532 struct av_decision lo_avd;
533 struct type_datum *source
534 = policydb.type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
535 struct type_datum *target
536 = policydb.type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
539 if (source->bounds) {
540 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
542 memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
543 lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
545 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
549 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
550 return; /* no masked permission */
551 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
554 if (target->bounds) {
555 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
557 memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
558 lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
560 context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
564 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
565 return; /* no masked permission */
566 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
569 if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
570 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
572 * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
576 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
580 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
581 return; /* no masked permission */
582 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
586 /* mask violated permissions */
587 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
589 /* audit masked permissions */
590 security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
591 tclass, masked, "bounds");
596 * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
597 * the permissions in a particular class.
599 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
600 struct context *tcontext,
602 struct av_decision *avd)
604 struct constraint_node *constraint;
605 struct role_allow *ra;
606 struct avtab_key avkey;
607 struct avtab_node *node;
608 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
609 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
610 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
615 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
617 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
618 if (printk_ratelimit())
619 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
623 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
626 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
627 * this permission check, then use it.
629 avkey.target_class = tclass;
630 avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
631 sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
633 tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
635 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
636 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
637 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
638 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
639 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
641 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
642 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
643 avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
644 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
645 avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
646 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
647 avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
650 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
651 cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
657 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
660 constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
662 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
663 !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
665 avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
667 constraint = constraint->next;
671 * If checking process transition permission and the
672 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
675 if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
676 (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
677 scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
678 for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
679 if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
680 tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
684 avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
688 * If the given source and target types have boundary
689 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
690 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
692 type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
696 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
697 struct context *ncontext,
698 struct context *tcontext,
701 char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
702 u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
704 if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen) < 0)
706 if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
708 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
710 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
711 "security_validate_transition: denied for"
712 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
713 o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
719 if (!selinux_enforcing)
724 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
727 struct context *ocontext;
728 struct context *ncontext;
729 struct context *tcontext;
730 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
731 struct constraint_node *constraint;
738 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
740 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
742 if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
743 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n",
748 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
750 ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
752 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
758 ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
760 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
766 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
768 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
774 constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
776 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
778 rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
782 constraint = constraint->next;
786 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
791 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
792 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
793 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
794 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
796 * @oldsid : current security identifier
797 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
799 int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
801 struct context *old_context, *new_context;
802 struct type_datum *type;
806 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
808 old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
810 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
815 new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
817 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
822 /* type/domain unchanged */
823 if (old_context->type == new_context->type) {
828 index = new_context->type;
830 type = policydb.type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
833 /* not bounded anymore */
839 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
840 if (type->bounds == old_context->type) {
844 index = type->bounds;
848 char *old_name = NULL;
849 char *new_name = NULL;
852 if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
853 &old_name, &length) &&
854 !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
855 &new_name, &length)) {
856 audit_log(current->audit_context,
857 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
858 "op=security_bounded_transition "
860 "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
867 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
872 static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
876 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
877 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
883 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
884 * @ssid: source security identifier
885 * @tsid: target security identifier
886 * @tclass: target security class
887 * @avd: access vector decisions
889 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
890 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
892 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
895 struct av_decision *avd)
898 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
900 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
905 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
907 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
912 /* permissive domain? */
913 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
914 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
916 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
918 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
923 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
924 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
925 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
929 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
930 map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
932 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
935 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
939 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
942 struct av_decision *avd)
944 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
946 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
951 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
953 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
958 /* permissive domain? */
959 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
960 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
962 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
964 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
969 if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
970 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
975 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
977 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
980 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
985 * Write the security context string representation of
986 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
987 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
988 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
989 * the length of the string.
991 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1000 *scontext_len = context->len;
1001 *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
1007 /* Compute the size of the context. */
1008 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
1009 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
1010 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
1011 *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
1016 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
1017 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1020 *scontext = scontextp;
1023 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
1025 sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
1026 policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1],
1027 policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
1028 policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
1029 scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
1030 1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
1031 1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
1033 mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
1040 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
1042 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
1044 if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
1046 return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
1049 static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
1050 u32 *scontext_len, int force)
1052 struct context *context;
1059 if (!ss_initialized) {
1060 if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
1063 *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
1066 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1071 strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
1072 *scontext = scontextp;
1075 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
1076 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
1080 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1082 context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
1084 context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
1086 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1091 rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
1093 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1100 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1101 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1102 * @scontext: security context
1103 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1105 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1106 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
1107 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1109 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1111 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
1114 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1116 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
1120 * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
1122 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
1123 struct sidtab *sidtabp,
1126 struct context *ctx,
1129 struct role_datum *role;
1130 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1131 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1132 char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
1137 /* Parse the security context. */
1140 scontextp = (char *) scontext;
1142 /* Extract the user. */
1144 while (*p && *p != ':')
1152 usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
1156 ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
1160 while (*p && *p != ':')
1168 role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
1171 ctx->role = role->value;
1175 while (*p && *p != ':')
1180 typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
1181 if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
1184 ctx->type = typdatum->value;
1186 rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
1190 if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len) {
1195 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1196 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx)) {
1203 context_destroy(ctx);
1207 static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1208 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
1211 char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
1212 struct context context;
1215 if (!ss_initialized) {
1218 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
1219 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
1224 *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
1229 /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
1230 scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
1233 memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
1234 scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
1237 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1238 str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
1245 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1246 rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab,
1247 scontext2, scontext_len,
1249 if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
1251 context.len = scontext_len;
1255 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
1256 context_destroy(&context);
1258 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1265 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1266 * @scontext: security context
1267 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1268 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1270 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1271 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1272 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1273 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1275 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
1277 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1278 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
1282 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1283 * falling back to specified default if needed.
1285 * @scontext: security context
1286 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1287 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1288 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1290 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1291 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1292 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1293 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1294 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1295 * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1296 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1297 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1299 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1300 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1302 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1303 sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
1306 int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1309 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1310 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
1313 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1314 struct context *scontext,
1315 struct context *tcontext,
1317 struct context *newcontext)
1319 char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
1320 u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
1322 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen) < 0)
1324 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
1326 if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
1328 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
1329 "security_compute_sid: invalid context %s"
1333 n, s, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
1338 if (!selinux_enforcing)
1343 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
1350 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
1351 struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
1352 struct avtab_key avkey;
1353 struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
1354 struct avtab_node *node;
1358 if (!ss_initialized) {
1359 switch (orig_tclass) {
1360 case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
1370 context_init(&newcontext);
1372 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1375 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1377 tclass = orig_tclass;
1379 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1381 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1386 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1388 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1394 /* Set the user identity. */
1395 switch (specified) {
1396 case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
1398 /* Use the process user identity. */
1399 newcontext.user = scontext->user;
1402 /* Use the related object owner. */
1403 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1407 /* Set the role and type to default values. */
1408 if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
1409 /* Use the current role and type of process. */
1410 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1411 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1413 /* Use the well-defined object role. */
1414 newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
1415 /* Use the type of the related object. */
1416 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1419 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1420 avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
1421 avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
1422 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1423 avkey.specified = specified;
1424 avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1426 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1428 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
1429 for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
1430 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
1431 avdatum = &node->datum;
1438 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1439 newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
1442 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1443 if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
1444 if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
1445 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1446 for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
1447 roletr = roletr->next) {
1448 if (roletr->role == scontext->role &&
1449 roletr->type == tcontext->type) {
1450 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1451 newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
1458 /* Set the MLS attributes.
1459 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1460 rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext);
1464 /* Check the validity of the context. */
1465 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
1466 rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
1473 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1474 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
1476 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1477 context_destroy(&newcontext);
1483 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1484 * @ssid: source security identifier
1485 * @tsid: target security identifier
1486 * @tclass: target security class
1487 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1489 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1490 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1491 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1492 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1493 * computed successfully.
1495 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
1500 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1504 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid,
1509 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1514 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1515 * @ssid: source security identifier
1516 * @tsid: target security identifier
1517 * @tclass: target security class
1518 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1520 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1521 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1522 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1523 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1524 * computed successfully.
1526 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
1531 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid,
1536 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1537 * @ssid: source security identifier
1538 * @tsid: target security identifier
1539 * @tclass: target security class
1540 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1542 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1543 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1544 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1545 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1546 * computed successfully.
1548 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
1553 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid,
1557 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1558 static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
1559 struct context *context,
1562 struct sidtab *s = arg;
1564 if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
1565 return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
1570 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
1574 if (selinux_enforcing) {
1580 if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
1582 "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
1590 struct convert_context_args {
1591 struct policydb *oldp;
1592 struct policydb *newp;
1596 * Convert the values in the security context
1597 * structure `c' from the values specified
1598 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1599 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1600 * context is valid under the new policy.
1602 static int convert_context(u32 key,
1606 struct convert_context_args *args;
1607 struct context oldc;
1608 struct ocontext *oc;
1609 struct mls_range *range;
1610 struct role_datum *role;
1611 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1612 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1617 if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
1624 s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
1629 rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
1630 c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
1634 "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1636 /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1638 memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
1640 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1641 /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1645 /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1647 "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1653 rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
1659 /* Convert the user. */
1660 usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
1661 args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
1664 c->user = usrdatum->value;
1666 /* Convert the role. */
1667 role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
1668 args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
1671 c->role = role->value;
1673 /* Convert the type. */
1674 typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
1675 args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
1678 c->type = typdatum->value;
1680 /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
1681 if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1682 rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
1685 } else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1687 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
1688 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
1689 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
1691 mls_context_destroy(c);
1692 } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1694 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
1695 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
1696 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
1697 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
1700 oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
1701 while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
1704 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
1705 " the initial SIDs list\n");
1708 range = &oc->context[0].range;
1709 rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
1714 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1715 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
1716 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
1721 context_destroy(&oldc);
1726 /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
1727 if (context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len))
1729 context_destroy(&oldc);
1734 "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
1740 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
1742 selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1743 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
1744 selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1745 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
1748 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
1749 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
1752 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
1753 * @data: binary policy data
1754 * @len: length of data in bytes
1756 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
1757 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
1758 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
1759 * loading the new policy.
1761 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
1763 struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
1764 struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
1765 struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
1766 struct convert_context_args args;
1770 struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
1772 if (!ss_initialized) {
1774 rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
1776 avtab_cache_destroy();
1781 rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
1783 ¤t_mapping_size);
1785 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1786 avtab_cache_destroy();
1790 rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
1792 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1793 avtab_cache_destroy();
1797 security_load_policycaps();
1799 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1800 selinux_complete_init();
1801 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1802 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1803 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
1804 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1805 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1810 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
1813 rc = policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp);
1817 newpolicydb.len = len;
1818 /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
1819 if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
1820 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
1821 else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
1822 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
1824 rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
1826 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
1827 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
1831 rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
1835 rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb);
1837 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
1841 /* Clone the SID table. */
1842 sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
1844 rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
1849 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
1850 * in the new SID table.
1852 args.oldp = &policydb;
1853 args.newp = &newpolicydb;
1854 rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
1856 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
1857 " representation of contexts in the new SID"
1862 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
1863 memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
1864 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
1866 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
1867 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
1868 memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
1869 sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
1870 security_load_policycaps();
1871 oldmap = current_mapping;
1872 current_mapping = map;
1873 current_mapping_size = map_size;
1874 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1875 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
1877 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
1878 policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
1879 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
1882 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1883 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1884 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
1885 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1886 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1892 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
1893 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
1898 size_t security_policydb_len(void)
1902 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1904 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1910 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
1911 * @protocol: protocol number
1912 * @port: port number
1913 * @out_sid: security identifier
1915 int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
1920 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1922 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
1924 if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
1925 c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
1926 c->u.port.high_port >= port)
1933 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1939 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
1941 *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
1945 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1950 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
1951 * @name: interface name
1952 * @if_sid: interface SID
1954 int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
1959 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1961 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
1963 if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
1969 if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
1970 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1975 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1981 *if_sid = c->sid[0];
1983 *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
1986 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1990 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
1994 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
1995 if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
2004 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
2005 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
2007 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
2008 * @out_sid: security identifier
2010 int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
2018 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2024 if (addrlen != sizeof(u32)) {
2029 addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
2031 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
2033 if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
2041 if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) {
2045 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
2047 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
2055 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2061 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2067 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2069 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2073 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2080 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2081 * @fromsid: starting SID
2082 * @username: username
2083 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2084 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2086 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2087 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2088 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2089 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
2090 * number of elements in the array.
2093 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
2098 struct context *fromcon, usercon;
2099 u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
2100 u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
2101 struct user_datum *user;
2102 struct role_datum *role;
2103 struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
2109 if (!ss_initialized)
2112 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2114 context_init(&usercon);
2116 fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
2122 user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
2127 usercon.user = user->value;
2129 mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
2135 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
2136 role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
2137 usercon.role = i + 1;
2138 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
2139 usercon.type = j + 1;
2141 if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
2144 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
2147 if (mynel < maxnel) {
2148 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2151 mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
2156 memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
2159 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2165 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2171 mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
2177 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
2178 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
2179 SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
2180 PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
2183 mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
2195 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2196 * @fstype: filesystem type
2197 * @path: path from root of mount
2198 * @sclass: file security class
2199 * @sid: SID for path
2201 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2202 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2203 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2205 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2212 struct genfs *genfs;
2214 int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
2216 while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
2219 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2221 sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
2223 for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
2224 cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
2229 if (!genfs || cmp) {
2230 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2235 for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
2236 len = strlen(c->u.name);
2237 if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
2238 (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
2243 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2249 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2258 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2263 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2264 * @fstype: filesystem type
2265 * @behavior: labeling behavior
2266 * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
2268 int security_fs_use(
2270 unsigned int *behavior,
2276 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2278 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
2280 if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
2286 *behavior = c->v.behavior;
2288 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2296 rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
2298 *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
2301 *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
2306 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2310 int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
2312 int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
2314 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2318 *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2324 *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
2328 *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
2332 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
2334 (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
2335 name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
2336 (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
2339 strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
2340 (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
2344 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2348 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
2356 int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
2359 int lenp, seqno = 0;
2360 struct cond_node *cur;
2362 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2364 lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2370 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
2371 if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
2372 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
2373 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
2374 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2375 policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
2377 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
2378 audit_get_loginuid(current),
2379 audit_get_sessionid(current));
2382 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
2384 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
2387 for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2388 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
2393 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2396 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2398 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2399 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2400 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2401 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2406 int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
2411 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2413 len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2419 rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
2421 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2425 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
2427 int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
2428 char **bnames = NULL;
2429 struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
2430 struct cond_node *cur;
2432 rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
2435 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
2436 booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
2438 booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
2440 for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2441 rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
2448 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
2457 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2458 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2460 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
2462 struct context *context1;
2463 struct context *context2;
2464 struct context newcon;
2469 if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
2474 context_init(&newcon);
2476 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2477 context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2479 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2485 context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
2487 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2493 newcon.user = context1->user;
2494 newcon.role = context1->role;
2495 newcon.type = context1->type;
2496 rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
2500 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2501 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
2502 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
2507 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
2511 if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
2512 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2513 "security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s);
2518 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2519 context_destroy(&newcon);
2525 * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
2526 * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
2527 * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
2528 * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
2531 * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
2532 * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
2533 * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
2534 * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
2536 * | function return | @sid
2537 * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
2538 * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
2539 * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
2540 * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
2541 * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
2544 int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
2549 struct context *nlbl_ctx;
2550 struct context *xfrm_ctx;
2552 /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
2553 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
2554 * single or absent peer SID/label */
2555 if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
2556 *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
2559 /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
2560 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
2562 if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
2563 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2567 /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
2568 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
2569 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
2570 if (!policydb.mls_enabled) {
2571 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2575 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2577 nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
2579 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2580 __func__, nlbl_sid);
2584 xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
2586 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2587 __func__, xfrm_sid);
2591 rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
2594 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2596 /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
2597 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
2598 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
2599 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
2601 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2603 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2607 static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2609 struct class_datum *datum = d;
2610 char *name = k, **classes = args;
2611 int value = datum->value - 1;
2613 classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2614 if (!classes[value])
2620 int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
2624 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2626 *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
2627 *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
2631 rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
2635 for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
2636 kfree((*classes)[i]);
2641 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2645 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2647 struct perm_datum *datum = d;
2648 char *name = k, **perms = args;
2649 int value = datum->value - 1;
2651 perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2658 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
2660 int rc = -ENOMEM, i;
2661 struct class_datum *match;
2663 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2665 match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
2667 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
2673 *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
2674 *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
2678 if (match->comdatum) {
2679 rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
2680 get_permissions_callback, *perms);
2685 rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
2691 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2695 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2696 for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
2702 int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
2704 return policydb.reject_unknown;
2707 int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
2709 return policydb.allow_unknown;
2713 * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
2714 * @req_cap: capability
2717 * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
2718 * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
2719 * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
2722 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
2726 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2727 rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
2728 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2733 struct selinux_audit_rule {
2735 struct context au_ctxt;
2738 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
2740 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
2743 context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
2748 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
2750 struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
2751 struct role_datum *roledatum;
2752 struct type_datum *typedatum;
2753 struct user_datum *userdatum;
2754 struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
2759 if (!ss_initialized)
2763 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2764 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2765 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2766 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2767 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2768 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2769 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
2770 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
2773 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2774 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2775 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2776 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2777 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
2778 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
2782 /* only the above fields are valid */
2786 tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
2790 context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
2792 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2794 tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
2797 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2798 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2799 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
2803 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
2805 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2806 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2807 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
2811 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
2813 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2814 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2815 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
2819 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
2821 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2822 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2823 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2824 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2825 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
2829 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2832 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
2841 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
2842 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
2846 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
2847 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
2849 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2850 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2851 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2852 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2853 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2854 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2855 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2856 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2857 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2858 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2866 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
2867 struct audit_context *actx)
2869 struct context *ctxt;
2870 struct mls_level *level;
2871 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
2875 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2876 "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
2880 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2882 if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
2883 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2884 "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
2889 ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2891 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2892 "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2898 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
2901 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2902 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2905 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
2907 case Audit_not_equal:
2908 match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
2912 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2913 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2916 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
2918 case Audit_not_equal:
2919 match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
2923 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2924 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2927 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
2929 case Audit_not_equal:
2930 match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
2934 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2935 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2936 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2937 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2938 level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
2939 field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
2940 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
2943 match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2946 case Audit_not_equal:
2947 match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2951 match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2953 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2957 match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2961 match = (mls_level_dom(level,
2962 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
2963 !mls_level_eq(level,
2964 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
2967 match = mls_level_dom(level,
2968 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
2974 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2978 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
2980 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
2981 u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
2985 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
2986 err = aurule_callback();
2990 static int __init aurule_init(void)
2994 err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
2995 SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
2997 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
3001 __initcall(aurule_init);
3003 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
3005 * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
3006 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3007 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3010 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
3011 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
3012 * already been initialized.
3015 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3020 sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
3021 if (sid_cache == NULL)
3023 secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
3024 if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
3030 secattr->cache->free = kfree;
3031 secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
3032 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
3036 * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
3037 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3038 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3041 * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
3042 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
3043 * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possibile the
3044 * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
3045 * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
3046 * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
3050 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3054 struct context *ctx;
3055 struct context ctx_new;
3057 if (!ss_initialized) {
3062 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3064 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) {
3065 *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
3067 } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) {
3068 *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
3070 } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
3071 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
3073 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
3075 context_init(&ctx_new);
3076 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
3077 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
3078 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
3079 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
3080 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
3081 if (ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
3082 secattr->attr.mls.cat) != 0)
3083 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
3084 memcpy(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat,
3085 &ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
3086 sizeof(ctx_new.range.level[0].cat));
3088 if (mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new) != 1)
3089 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
3091 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
3093 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
3095 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
3097 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3103 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return:
3104 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3106 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup:
3107 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3108 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
3112 * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3113 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3114 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3117 * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3118 * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3121 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
3124 struct context *ctx;
3126 if (!ss_initialized)
3129 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3130 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3133 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
3135 secattr->domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1],
3137 if (secattr->domain == NULL) {
3139 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
3141 secattr->attr.secid = sid;
3142 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
3143 mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
3144 rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
3146 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
3147 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3151 netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure:
3152 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3155 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
3158 * security_read_policy - read the policy.
3159 * @data: binary policy data
3160 * @len: length of data in bytes
3163 int security_read_policy(void **data, ssize_t *len)
3166 struct policy_file fp;
3168 if (!ss_initialized)
3171 *len = security_policydb_len();
3173 *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
3180 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3181 rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
3182 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3187 *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;