netfilter: ip_tables: fix infoleak to userspace

commit 78b79876761b86653df89c48a7010b5cbd41a84a upstream.

Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace.  Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked.  When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the
second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1).  To trigger the bug
one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
index 3ce53cf13d5a71d5068e96e593f0e65a3d5033f8..ca09c70c0e9eb601625537d11c90b40204a81b6e 100644 (file)
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -1290,6 +1290,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
        /* overflow check */
        if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
                return -ENOMEM;
+       tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
        newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
        if (!newinfo)
@@ -1820,6 +1821,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
                return -ENOMEM;
        if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
                return -ENOMEM;
+       tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
        newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
        if (!newinfo)
@@ -2044,6 +2046,7 @@ do_ipt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
                        ret = -EFAULT;
                        break;
                }
+               rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0;
 
                if (cmd == IPT_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET)
                        target = 1;