mpt2sas: prevent heap overflows and unchecked reads

[ upstream commit a1f74ae82d133ebb2aabb19d181944b4e83e9960 ]

At two points in handling device ioctls via /dev/mpt2ctl, user-supplied
length values are used to copy data from userspace into heap buffers
without bounds checking, allowing controllable heap corruption and
subsequently privilege escalation.

Additionally, user-supplied values are used to determine the size of a
copy_to_user() as well as the offset into the buffer to be read, with no
bounds checking, allowing users to read arbitrary kernel memory.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Acked-by: Eric Moore <eric.moore@lsi.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c b/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c
index d88e9756d8f5259ce156ee434ca7d3b2303816e0..9e689c874ccebfcdabfb01e7bfe340ecf394ac33 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c
@@ -637,6 +637,13 @@ _ctl_do_mpt_command(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc,
        data_out_sz = karg.data_out_size;
        data_in_sz = karg.data_in_size;
 
+       /* Check for overflow and wraparound */
+       if (karg.data_sge_offset * 4 > ioc->request_sz ||
+           karg.data_sge_offset > (UINT_MAX / 4)) {
+               ret = -EINVAL;
+               goto out;
+       }
+
        /* copy in request message frame from user */
        if (copy_from_user(mpi_request, mf, karg.data_sge_offset*4)) {
                printk(KERN_ERR "failure at %s:%d/%s()!\n", __FILE__, __LINE__,
@@ -1883,7 +1890,7 @@ _ctl_diag_read_buffer(void __user *arg, enum block_state state)
        Mpi2DiagBufferPostReply_t *mpi_reply;
        int rc, i;
        u8 buffer_type;
-       unsigned long timeleft;
+       unsigned long timeleft, request_size, copy_size;
        u16 smid;
        u16 ioc_status;
        u8 issue_reset = 0;
@@ -1919,6 +1926,8 @@ _ctl_diag_read_buffer(void __user *arg, enum block_state state)
                return -ENOMEM;
        }
 
+       request_size = ioc->diag_buffer_sz[buffer_type];
+
        if ((karg.starting_offset % 4) || (karg.bytes_to_read % 4)) {
                printk(MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: either the starting_offset "
                    "or bytes_to_read are not 4 byte aligned\n", ioc->name,
@@ -1926,13 +1935,23 @@ _ctl_diag_read_buffer(void __user *arg, enum block_state state)
                return -EINVAL;
        }
 
+       if (karg.starting_offset > request_size)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
        diag_data = (void *)(request_data + karg.starting_offset);
        dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MPT2SAS_DEBUG_FMT "%s: diag_buffer(%p), "
            "offset(%d), sz(%d)\n", ioc->name, __func__,
            diag_data, karg.starting_offset, karg.bytes_to_read));
 
+       /* Truncate data on requests that are too large */
+       if ((diag_data + karg.bytes_to_read < diag_data) ||
+           (diag_data + karg.bytes_to_read > request_data + request_size))
+               copy_size = request_size - karg.starting_offset;
+       else
+               copy_size = karg.bytes_to_read;
+
        if (copy_to_user((void __user *)uarg->diagnostic_data,
-           diag_data, karg.bytes_to_read)) {
+           diag_data, copy_size)) {
                printk(MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: Unable to write "
                    "mpt_diag_read_buffer_t data @ %p\n", ioc->name,
                    __func__, diag_data);