proc: protect mm start_code/end_code in /proc/pid/stat

commit 5883f57ca0008ffc93e09cbb9847a1928e50c6f3 upstream.

While mm->start_stack was protected from cross-uid viewing (commit
f83ce3e6b02d5 ("proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged
processes")), the start_code and end_code values were not.  This would
allow the text location of a PIE binary to leak, defeating ASLR.

Note that the value "1" is used instead of "0" for a protected value since
"ps", "killall", and likely other readers of /proc/pid/stat, take
start_code of "0" to mean a kernel thread and will misbehave.  Thanks to
Brad Spengler for pointing this out.

Addresses CVE-2011-0726

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 3d88fe1b9843e1af4adc876ea47aa156cf3845b8..9e5f43084912ca7e49da42561b9f5d5cc3dac23b 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
                vsize,
                mm ? get_mm_rss(mm) : 0,
                rsslim,
-               mm ? mm->start_code : 0,
-               mm ? mm->end_code : 0,
+               mm ? (permitted ? mm->start_code : 1) : 0,
+               mm ? (permitted ? mm->end_code : 1) : 0,
                (permitted && mm) ? mm->start_stack : 0,
                esp,
                eip,