KVM: s390: vsie: support aes dea wrapping keys

As soon as message-security-assist extension 3 is enabled for guest 2,
we have to allow key wrapping for guest 3.

Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
index cd4bbfa72881dd9ec8198acc82869301a7779fe4..6b26b0be63c14fb9f06fa4c5720d7d2bf49534af 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ struct vsie_page {
        struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_o;       /* 0x0200 */
        /* the shadow gmap in use by the vsie_page */
        struct gmap *gmap;                      /* 0x0208 */
-       __u8 reserved[0x0800 - 0x0210];         /* 0x0210 */
+       __u8 reserved[0x0700 - 0x0210];         /* 0x0210 */
+       struct kvm_s390_crypto_cb crycb;        /* 0x0700 */
        __u8 fac[S390_ARCH_FAC_LIST_SIZE_BYTE]; /* 0x0800 */
 } __packed;
 
@@ -111,6 +112,58 @@ static int prepare_cpuflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
        return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Create a shadow copy of the crycb block and setup key wrapping, if
+ * requested for guest 3 and enabled for guest 2.
+ *
+ * We only accept format-1 (no AP in g2), but convert it into format-2
+ * There is nothing to do for format-0.
+ *
+ * Returns: - 0 if shadowed or nothing to do
+ *          - > 0 if control has to be given to guest 2
+ */
+static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+       struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+       struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_o = vsie_page->scb_o;
+       u32 crycb_addr = scb_o->crycbd & 0x7ffffff8U;
+       unsigned long *b1, *b2;
+       u8 ecb3_flags;
+
+       scb_s->crycbd = 0;
+       if (!(scb_o->crycbd & vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT1))
+               return 0;
+       /* format-1 is supported with message-security-assist extension 3 */
+       if (!test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76))
+               return 0;
+       /* we may only allow it if enabled for guest 2 */
+       ecb3_flags = scb_o->ecb3 & vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 &
+                    (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA);
+       if (!ecb3_flags)
+               return 0;
+
+       if ((crycb_addr & PAGE_MASK) != ((crycb_addr + 128) & PAGE_MASK))
+               return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003CU);
+       else if (!crycb_addr)
+               return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0039U);
+
+       /* copy only the wrapping keys */
+       if (read_guest_real(vcpu, crycb_addr + 72, &vsie_page->crycb, 56))
+               return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0035U);
+
+       scb_s->ecb3 |= ecb3_flags;
+       scb_s->crycbd = ((__u32)(__u64) &vsie_page->crycb) | CRYCB_FORMAT1 |
+                       CRYCB_FORMAT2;
+
+       /* xor both blocks in one run */
+       b1 = (unsigned long *) vsie_page->crycb.dea_wrapping_key_mask;
+       b2 = (unsigned long *)
+                           vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->dea_wrapping_key_mask;
+       /* as 56%8 == 0, bitmap_xor won't overwrite any data */
+       bitmap_xor(b1, b1, b2, BITS_PER_BYTE * 56);
+       return 0;
+}
+
 /* shadow (round up/down) the ibc to avoid validity icpt */
 static void prepare_ibc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
 {
@@ -248,6 +301,7 @@ static int shadow_scb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
                scb_s->ecb |= scb_o->ecb & 0x02U;
 
        prepare_ibc(vcpu, vsie_page);
+       rc = shadow_crycb(vcpu, vsie_page);
 out:
        if (rc)
                unshadow_scb(vcpu, vsie_page);