f2fs crypto: remove checking key context during lookup

No matter what the key is valid or not, readdir shows the dir entries correctly.
So, lookup should not failed.
But, we expect further accesses should be denied from open, rename, link, and so
on.

Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
index bbd83e427834b72390f271b33ff8e822bad8b8a1..4ad7242f4829ca58683baea85eb70dda88761f33 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
@@ -260,16 +260,6 @@ static struct dentry *f2fs_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
        if (IS_ERR(inode))
                return ERR_CAST(inode);
 
-       if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(dir) && f2fs_may_encrypt(inode) &&
-               !f2fs_is_child_context_consistent_with_parent(dir, inode)) {
-               iput(inode);
-               f2fs_msg(inode->i_sb, KERN_WARNING,
-                               "Inconsistent encryption contexts: %lu/%lu\n",
-                               (unsigned long)dir->i_ino,
-                               (unsigned long)inode->i_ino);
-               return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-       }
-
        if (f2fs_has_inline_dots(inode)) {
                err = __recover_dot_dentries(inode, dir->i_ino);
                if (err)