ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP

commit 64b875f7ac8a5d60a4e191479299e931ee949b67 upstream.

When the flag PT_PTRACE_CAP was added the PTRACE_TRACEME path was
overlooked.  This can result in incorrect behavior when an application
like strace traces an exec of a setuid executable.

Further PT_PTRACE_CAP does not have enough information for making good
security decisions as it does not report which user namespace the
capability is in.  This has already allowed one mistake through
insufficient granulariy.

I found this issue when I was testing another corner case of exec and
discovered that I could not get strace to set PT_PTRACE_CAP even when
running strace as root with a full set of caps.

This change fixes the above issue with strace allowing stracing as
root a setuid executable without disabling setuid.  More fundamentaly
this change allows what is allowable at all times, by using the correct
information in it's decision.

Fixes: 4214e42f96d4 ("v2.4.9.11 -> v2.4.9.12")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index a9dec2f540dcfbd999701f461c43af6c4363850f..67e86571685a38b9dc9b659d50c3ee4252e8b447 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1425,7 +1425,7 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
        unsigned n_fs;
 
        if (p->ptrace) {
-               if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP)
+               if (ptracer_capable(p, current_user_ns()))
                        bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP;
                else
                        bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE;

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 6ce3eefe2769517a618838bca7ee3ba28dc3d66c..6ffb67e10c060afbb24ea34d0dbb38ac36043d3c 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode);
 extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
 extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
 
 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
 extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);

diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index 504c98a278d46606d27f09d109589e0a1e2263d8..e13bfdf7f314784e326b245e1f1ab5465da9e7dc 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
 #define PT_SEIZED      0x00010000      /* SEIZE used, enable new behavior */
 #define PT_PTRACED     0x00000001
 #define PT_DTRACE      0x00000002      /* delayed trace (used on m68k, i386) */
-#define PT_PTRACE_CAP  0x00000004      /* ptracer can follow suid-exec */
 
 #define PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT      3
 /* PT_TRACE_* event enable flags */

diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index e9c009dc3a4a35a256731f37b3b44d3f05b317e4..75d9a57e212e8b075355bb269036d9cb76aadeef 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1656,6 +1656,7 @@ struct task_struct {
        struct list_head cpu_timers[3];
 
 /* process credentials */
+       const struct cred __rcu *ptracer_cred; /* Tracer's credentials at attach */
        const struct cred __rcu *real_cred; /* objective and real subjective task
                                         * credentials (COW) */
        const struct cred __rcu *cred;  /* effective (overridable) subjective task

diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index c020c0047983b1a2ae10ed7bcf71b5c4cdf08424..4984e1f552ebfb97fa460b527b35c67ebd0f324d 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -485,3 +485,23 @@ bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
        return ns_capable(ns, cap) && privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(ns, inode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);
+
+/**
+ * ptracer_capable - Determine if the ptracer holds CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the namespace
+ * @tsk: The task that may be ptraced
+ * @ns: The user namespace to search for CAP_SYS_PTRACE in
+ *
+ * Return true if the task that is ptracing the current task had CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+ * in the specified user namespace.
+ */
+bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+       int ret = 0;  /* An absent tracer adds no restrictions */
+       const struct cred *cred;
+       rcu_read_lock();
+       cred = rcu_dereference(tsk->ptracer_cred);
+       if (cred)
+               ret = security_capable_noaudit(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+       rcu_read_unlock();
+       return (ret == 0);
+}

diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 282821557183f3d58f8433dddbf2e2609e2ed6ee..e82c15cadd6df68dfbe7c8866485db59c3f8689d 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent)
        BUG_ON(!list_empty(&child->ptrace_entry));
        list_add(&child->ptrace_entry, &new_parent->ptraced);
        child->parent = new_parent;
+       rcu_read_lock();
+       child->ptracer_cred = get_cred(__task_cred(new_parent));
+       rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
 /**
@@ -71,12 +74,16 @@ void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent)
  */
 void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child)
 {
+       const struct cred *old_cred;
        BUG_ON(!child->ptrace);
 
        clear_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE);
 
        child->parent = child->real_parent;
        list_del_init(&child->ptrace_entry);
+       old_cred = child->ptracer_cred;
+       child->ptracer_cred = NULL;
+       put_cred(old_cred);
 
        spin_lock(&child->sighand->siglock);
        child->ptrace = 0;
@@ -326,11 +333,6 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
 
        task_lock(task);
        retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
-       if (!retval) {
-               struct mm_struct *mm = task->mm;
-               if (mm && ns_capable(mm->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
-                       flags |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
-       }
        task_unlock(task);
        if (retval)
                goto unlock_creds;