From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 03:04:35 +0000 (+0000) Subject: net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data X-Git-Tag: v3.0.64~11 X-Git-Url: https://git.karo-electronics.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=0535d24446251c444a03d912a0022319a2de16f8;p=karo-tx-linux.git net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data [ Upstream commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf ] On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c index c8cc24e282c3..dbe5870a139e 100644 --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c @@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) /* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { + int i; + SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return); /* Free up the HMAC transform. */ @@ -270,6 +272,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue); sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr); + for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i) + memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE); + /* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash) sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk);