From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 23:03:42 +0000 (+0200) Subject: bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access X-Git-Tag: v4.9-rc1~127^2~256 X-Git-Url: https://git.karo-electronics.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=2d2be8cab26ed918e94d2deae89580003242a123;p=karo-tx-linux.git bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 48c2705db22c..90493a66dddd 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1637,21 +1637,42 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) return 0; } -static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct verifier_env *env, - struct reg_state *dst_reg) +static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct verifier_state *state, + const struct reg_state *dst_reg) { - struct verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state; struct reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; int i; - /* r2 = r3; - * r2 += 8 - * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto somewhere - * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg, - * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) - * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) - * find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) - * so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) is safe to access + + /* LLVM can generate two kind of checks: + * + * Type 1: + * + * r2 = r3; + * r2 += 8; + * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto + * + * + * Where: + * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg + * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) + * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) + * + * Type 2: + * + * r2 = r3; + * r2 += 8; + * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto + * + * + * Where: + * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg + * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) + * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) + * + * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) + * so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) is safe to access. */ + for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id) regs[i].range = dst_reg->off; @@ -1668,8 +1689,8 @@ static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct verifier_env *env, static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) { - struct reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg; - struct verifier_state *other_branch; + struct verifier_state *other_branch, *this_branch = &env->cur_state; + struct reg_state *regs = this_branch->regs, *dst_reg; u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); int err; @@ -1750,13 +1771,17 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct verifier_env *env, } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT && dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { - find_good_pkt_pointers(env, dst_reg); + find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg); + } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE && + dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && + regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) { + find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, ®s[insn->src_reg]); } else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg); return -EACCES; } if (log_level) - print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state); + print_verifier_state(this_branch); return 0; } diff --git a/samples/bpf/test_verifier.c b/samples/bpf/test_verifier.c index 78c6f131d94f..1f6cc9b6a23b 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/test_verifier.c +++ b/samples/bpf/test_verifier.c @@ -1528,6 +1528,108 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { .result = REJECT, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, }, + { + "direct packet access: test5 (pkt_end >= reg, good access)", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8), + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result = ACCEPT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, + }, + { + "direct packet access: test6 (pkt_end >= reg, bad access)", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8), + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 3), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .errstr = "invalid access to packet", + .result = REJECT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, + }, + { + "direct packet access: test7 (pkt_end >= reg, both accesses)", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8), + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 3), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .errstr = "invalid access to packet", + .result = REJECT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, + }, + { + "direct packet access: test8 (double test, variant 1)", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8), + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 4), + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 1), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result = ACCEPT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, + }, + { + "direct packet access: test9 (double test, variant 2)", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8), + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 1), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result = ACCEPT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, + }, { "helper access to packet: test1, valid packet_ptr range", .insns = {