From: David Howells Date: Fri, 8 May 2009 12:55:22 +0000 (+0100) Subject: CRED: Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against ptrace X-Git-Url: https://git.karo-electronics.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=5e751e992f3fb08ba35e1ca8095ec8fbf9eda523;p=linux-beck.git CRED: Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against ptrace Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against foreign intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made by ptrace(). The attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: James Morris --- diff --git a/fs/compat.c b/fs/compat.c index 681ed81e6be0..bb2a9b2e8173 100644 --- a/fs/compat.c +++ b/fs/compat.c @@ -1488,7 +1488,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, if (!bprm) goto out_files; - retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_guard_mutex); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; current->in_execve = 1; @@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, /* execve succeeded */ current->fs->in_exec = 0; current->in_execve = 0; - mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_guard_mutex); acct_update_integrals(current); free_bprm(bprm); if (displaced) @@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ out_unmark: out_unlock: current->in_execve = 0; - mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_guard_mutex); out_free: free_bprm(bprm); diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 639177b0eeac..998e856c3079 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) commit_creds(bprm->cred); bprm->cred = NULL; - /* cred_exec_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent + /* cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked */ @@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds); /* * determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program - * - the caller must hold current->cred_exec_mutex to protect against + * - the caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex to protect against * PTRACE_ATTACH */ int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) @@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, if (!bprm) goto out_files; - retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_guard_mutex); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; current->in_execve = 1; @@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, /* execve succeeded */ current->fs->in_exec = 0; current->in_execve = 0; - mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_guard_mutex); acct_update_integrals(current); free_bprm(bprm); if (displaced) @@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ out_unmark: out_unlock: current->in_execve = 0; - mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_guard_mutex); out_free: free_bprm(bprm); diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h index d87247d2641f..7f54ba942429 100644 --- a/include/linux/init_task.h +++ b/include/linux/init_task.h @@ -145,8 +145,8 @@ extern struct cred init_cred; .group_leader = &tsk, \ .real_cred = &init_cred, \ .cred = &init_cred, \ - .cred_exec_mutex = \ - __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tsk.cred_exec_mutex), \ + .cred_guard_mutex = \ + __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tsk.cred_guard_mutex), \ .comm = "swapper", \ .thread = INIT_THREAD, \ .fs = &init_fs, \ diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h index 3fa82b353c98..5932ace22400 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -1247,7 +1247,9 @@ struct task_struct { * credentials (COW) */ const struct cred *cred; /* effective (overridable) subjective task * credentials (COW) */ - struct mutex cred_exec_mutex; /* execve vs ptrace cred calculation mutex */ + struct mutex cred_guard_mutex; /* guard against foreign influences on + * credential calculations + * (notably. ptrace) */ char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; /* executable name excluding path - access with [gs]et_task_comm (which lock diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index 3a039189d707..1bb4d7e5d616 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds); /* * Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve() - * - The caller must hold current->cred_exec_mutex + * - The caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex */ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void) { @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags) struct cred *new; int ret; - mutex_init(&p->cred_exec_mutex); + mutex_init(&p->cred_guard_mutex); if ( #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 0692ab5a0d67..27ac80298bfa 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -185,10 +185,11 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task) if (same_thread_group(task, current)) goto out; - /* Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference; - * SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently under ptrace. + /* Protect the target's credential calculations against our + * interference; SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently + * under ptrace. */ - retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->cred_exec_mutex); + retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->cred_guard_mutex); if (retval < 0) goto out; @@ -232,7 +233,7 @@ repeat: bad: write_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklist_lock, flags); task_unlock(task); - mutex_unlock(&task->cred_exec_mutex); + mutex_unlock(&task->cred_guard_mutex); out: return retval; }