Shérab [Wed, 30 Nov 2011 04:03:05 +0000 (15:03 +1100)]
arch/x86/platform/iris/iris.c: register a platform device and a platform driver
This makes the iris driver use the platform API, so it is properly exposed
in /sys.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove commented-out code, add missing space to printk, clean up code layout] Signed-off-by: Shérab <Sebastien.Hinderer@ens-lyon.org> Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Peter Feuerer [Wed, 30 Nov 2011 04:03:04 +0000 (15:03 +1100)]
acerhdf: lowered default temp fanon/fanoff values
Due to new supported hardware, of which the actual temperature limits of
processor, harddisk and other components are unknown, it feels safer with
lower fanon / fanoff settings.
It won't change much for most people, already using acerhdf, as they use
their own fanon/fanoff variable settings when loading the module.
Furthermore seems like kernel and userspace tools have been improved to
work more efficient and netbooks don't get so hot anymore.
Signed-off-by: Peter Feuerer <peter@piie.net> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <petkovbb@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Alex Bligh [Wed, 30 Nov 2011 04:03:03 +0000 (15:03 +1100)]
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c: fix Oops on container destroy
Problem:
A repeatable Oops can be caused if a container with networking
unshared is destroyed when it has nf_conntrack entries yet to expire.
A copy of the oops follows below. A perl program generating the oops
repeatably is attached inline below.
Analysis:
The oops is called from cleanup_net when the namespace is
destroyed. conntrack iterates through outstanding events and calls
death_by_timeout on each of them, which in turn produces a call to
ctnetlink_conntrack_event. This calls nf_netlink_has_listeners, which
oopses because net->nfnl is NULL.
The perl program generates the container through fork() then
clone(NS_NEWNET). I does not explicitly set up netlink
explicitly set up netlink, but I presume it was set up else net->nfnl
would have been NULL earlier (i.e. when an earlier connection
timed out). This would thus suggest that net->nfnl is made NULL
during the destruction of the container, which I think is done by
nfnetlink_net_exit_batch.
I can see that the various subsystems are deinitialised in the opposite
order to which the relevant register_pernet_subsys calls are called,
and both nf_conntrack and nfnetlink_net_ops register their relevant
subsystems. If nfnetlink_net_ops registered later than nfconntrack,
then its exit routine would have been called first, which would cause
the oops described. I am not sure there is anything to prevent this
happening in a container environment.
Whilst there's perhaps a more complex problem revolving around ordering
of subsystem deinit, it seems to me that missing a netlink event on a
container that is dying is not a disaster. An early check for net->nfnl
being non-NULL in ctnetlink_conntrack_event appears to fix this. There
may remain a potential race condition if it becomes NULL immediately
after being checked (I am not sure any lock is held at this point or
how synchronisation for subsystem deinitialization works).
Patch:
The patch attached should apply on everything from 2.6.26 (if not before)
onwards; it appears to be a problem on all kernels. This was taken against
Ubuntu-3.0.0-11.17 which is very close to 3.0.4. I have torture-tested it
with the above perl script for 15 minutes or so; the perl script hung the
machine within 20 seconds without this patch.
Applicability:
If this is the right solution, it should be applied to all stable kernels
as well as head. Apart from the minor overhead of checking one variable
against NULL, it can never 'do the wrong thing', because if net->nfnl
is NULL, an oops will inevitably result. Therefore, checking is a reasonable
thing to do unless it can be proven than net->nfnl will never be NULL.
Check net->nfnl for NULL in ctnetlink_conntrack_event to avoid Oops on
container destroy
Signed-off-by: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Youquan Song [Wed, 30 Nov 2011 04:03:02 +0000 (15:03 +1100)]
thp: set compound tail page _count to zero
70b50f94f1644 ("mm: thp: tail page refcounting fix") keeps all
page_tail->_count zero at all times. But the current kernel does not set
page_tail->_count to zero if a 1GB page is utilized. So when an IOMMU 1GB
page is used at KVM, it wil result in a kernel oops because a tail page's
_count does not equal zero.
Signed-off-by: Youquan Song <youquan.song@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Youquan Song [Wed, 30 Nov 2011 04:03:02 +0000 (15:03 +1100)]
thp: add compound tail page _mapcount when mapped
With the 3.2-rc kernel, the IOMMU 2M page in KVM works. While I try to us
IOMMU 1GB page in KVM, I encounter a oops and 1GB page total fail to be
used. The root cause is that 1GB page allocation calls gup_huge_pud()
while 2M page calls gup_huge_pmd. If compound pages are used and the page
is tail page, gup_huge_pmd increase _mapcount to record tail page are
mapped while gup_huge_pud does not include this process. So when the
mapped page is relesed, it will result in kernel oops because the page
does not mark mapped.
This patch add tail process for compound page in 1GB huge page which keeps
the same process as 2M page.
Signed-off-by: Youquan Song <youquan.song@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Peter Zijlstra [Wed, 30 Nov 2011 04:03:02 +0000 (15:03 +1100)]
printk: avoid double lock acquire
Commit 4f2a8d3cf5e ("printk: Fix console_sem vs logbuf_lock unlock race")
introduced another silly bug where we would want to acquire an already
held lock. Avoid this.
Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
More players joined to memory cgroup developments and Johannes' great work
changed internal design of memory cgroup dramatically. And he will do
more works. Michal Hokko did many bug fixes and know memory cgroup very
well. Daisuke Nishimura helped us very much but he seems busy now.
Thanks to his works.
Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp> Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
David Rientjes [Wed, 30 Nov 2011 04:03:01 +0000 (15:03 +1100)]
cpusets: stall when updating mems_allowed for mempolicy or disjoint nodemask
c0ff7453bb5c ("cpuset,mm: fix no node to alloc memory when changing
cpuset's mems") adds get_mems_allowed() to prevent the set of allowed
nodes from changing for a thread. This causes any update to a set of
allowed nodes to stall until put_mems_allowed() is called.
This stall is unncessary, however, if at least one node remains unchanged
in the update to the set of allowed nodes. This was addressed by 89e8a244b97e ("cpusets: avoid looping when storing to mems_allowed if one
node remains set"), but it's still possible that an empty nodemask may be
read from a mempolicy because the old nodemask may be remapped to the new
nodemask during rebind. To prevent this, only avoid the stall if there is
no mempolicy for the thread being changed.
This is a temporary solution until all reads from mempolicy nodemasks can
be guaranteed to not be empty without the get_mems_allowed()
synchronization.
Also moves the check for nodemask intersection inside task_lock() so that
tsk->mems_allowed cannot change. This ensures that nothing can set this
tsk's mems_allowed out from under us and also protects tsk->mempolicy.
Reported-by: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <paul@paulmenage.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Andrea Arcangeli [Wed, 30 Nov 2011 04:03:00 +0000 (15:03 +1100)]
thp: reduce khugepaged freezing latency
Use wait_event_freezable_timeout() instead of
schedule_timeout_interruptible() to avoid missing freezer wakeups. A
try_to_freeze() would have been needed in the khugepaged_alloc_hugepage
tight loop too in case of the allocation failing repeatedly, and
wait_event_freezable_timeout will provide it too.
khugepaged would still freeze just fine by trying again the next minute
but it's better if it freezes immediately.
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@suse.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
A shrinker function can return -1, means that it cannot do anything
without a risk of deadlock. For example prune_super() does this if it
cannot grab a superblock refrence, even if nr_to_scan=0. Currently we
interpret this -1 as a ULONG_MAX size shrinker and evaluate `total_scan'
according to this. So the next time around this shrinker can cause really
big pressure. Let's skip such shrinkers instead.
Also make total_scan signed, otherwise the check (total_scan < 0) below
never works.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
projects / karo-tx-linux.git / log