This patch fixes the following symptoms:
1. Unmount UBIFS cleanly.
2. Start mounting UBIFS R/W and have a power cut immediately
3. Start mounting UBIFS R/O, this succeeds
4. Try to re-mount UBIFS R/W - this fails immediately or later on,
because UBIFS will write the master node to the flash area
which has been written before.
The analysis of the problem:
1. UBIFS is unmounted cleanly, both copies of the master node are clean.
2. UBIFS is being mounter R/W, starts changing master node copy 1, and
a power cut happens. The copy N1 becomes corrupted.
3. UBIFS is being mounted R/O. It notices the copy N1 is corrupted and
reads copy N2. Copy N2 is clean.
4. Because of R/O mode, UBIFS cannot recover copy 1.
5. The mount code (ubifs_mount()) sees that the master node is clean,
so it decides that no recovery is needed.
6. We are re-mounting R/W. UBIFS believes no recovery is needed and
starts updating the master node, but copy N1 is still corrupted
and was not recovered!
Fix this problem by marking the master node as dirty every time we
recover it and we are in R/O mode. This forces further recovery and
the UBIFS cleans-up the corruptions and recovers the copy N1 when
re-mounting R/W later.
I may have an explanation for the LSI 1068 HBA hangs provoked by ATA
pass-through commands, in particular by smartctl.
First, my version of the symptoms. On an LSI SAS1068E B3 HBA running
01.29.00.00 firmware, with SATA disks, and with smartd running, I'm seeing
occasional task, bus, and host resets, some of which lead to hard faults of
the HBA requiring a reboot. Abusively looping the smartctl command,
# while true; do smartctl -a /dev/sdb > /dev/null; done
dramatically increases the frequency of these failures to nearly one per
minute. A high IO load through the HBA while looping smartctl seems to
improve the chance of a full scsi host reset or a non-recoverable hang.
I reduced what smartctl was doing down to a simple test case which
causes the hang with a single IO when pointed at the sd interface. See
the code at the bottom of this e-mail. It uses an SG_IO ioctl to issue
a single pass-through ATA identify device command. If the buffer
userspace gives for the read data has certain alignments, the task is
issued to the HBA but the HBA fails to respond. If run against the sg
interface, neither the test code nor smartctl causes a hang.
sd and sg handle the SG_IO ioctl slightly differently. Unless you
specifically set a flag to do direct IO, sg passes a buffer of its own,
which is page-aligned, to the block layer and later copies the result
into the userspace buffer regardless of its alignment. sd, on the other
hand, always does direct IO unless the userspace buffer fails an
alignment test at block/blk-map.c line 57, in which case a page-aligned
buffer is created and used for the transfer.
The alignment test currently checks for word-alignment, the default
setup by scsi_lib.c; therefore, userspace buffers of almost any
alignment are given directly to the HBA as DMA targets. The LSI 1068
hardware doesn't seem to like at least a couple of the alignments which
cross a page boundary (see the test code below). Curiously, many
page-boundary-crossing alignments do work just fine.
So, either the hardware has an bug handling certain alignments or the
hardware has a stricter alignment requirement than the driver is
advertising. If stricter alignment is required, then in no case should
misaligned buffers from userspace be allowed through without being
bounced or at least causing an error to be returned.
It seems the mptsas driver could use blk_queue_dma_alignment() to advertise
a stricter alignment requirement. If it does, sd does the right thing and
bounces misaligned buffers (see block/blk-map.c line 57). The following
patch to 2.6.34-rc5 makes my symptoms go away. I'm sure this is the wrong
place for this code, but it gets my idea across.
Acked-by: "Desai Kashyap" <Kashyap.Desai@lsi.com> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch (as1458) fixes a problem affecting ultra-reliable systems:
When hardware failover of an EHCI controller occurs, the data
structures do not get released correctly. This is because the routine
responsible for removing unused QHs from the async schedule assumes
the controller is running properly (the frame counter is used in
determining how long the QH has been idle) -- but when a failover
causes the controller to be electronically disconnected from the PCI
bus, obviously it stops running.
The solution is simple: Allow scan_async() to remove a QH from the
async schedule if it has been idle for long enough _or_ if the
controller is stopped.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-and-Tested-by: Dan Duval <dan.duval@stratus.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
next_pidmap() just quietly accepted whatever 'last' pid that was passed
in, which is not all that safe when one of the users is /proc.
Admittedly the proc code should do some sanity checking on the range
(and that will be the next commit), but that doesn't mean that the
helper functions should just do that pidmap pointer arithmetic without
checking the range of its arguments.
So clamp 'last' to PID_MAX_LIMIT. The fact that we then do "last+1"
doesn't really matter, the for-loop does check against the end of the
pidmap array properly (it's only the actual pointer arithmetic overflow
case we need to worry about, and going one bit beyond isn't going to
overflow).
[ Use PID_MAX_LIMIT rather than pid_max as per Eric Biederman ]
Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com> Analyzed-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This patch fixes severe UBIFS bug: UBIFS oopses when we 'fsync()' an
file on R/O-mounter file-system. We (the UBIFS authors) incorrectly
thought that VFS would not propagate 'fsync()' down to the file-system
if it is read-only, but this is not the case.
It is easy to exploit this bug using the following simple perl script:
use strict;
use File::Sync qw(fsync sync);
die "File path is not specified" if not defined $ARGV[0];
my $path = $ARGV[0];
open FILE, "<", "$path" or die "Cannot open $path: $!";
fsync(\*FILE) or die "cannot fsync $path: $!";
close FILE or die "Cannot close $path: $!";
Thanks to Reuben Dowle <Reuben.Dowle@navico.com> for reporting about this
issue.
The pages attached to a ramfs inode's pagecache by truncation from nothing
- as done by SYSV SHM for example - may get discarded under memory
pressure.
The problem is that the pages are not marked dirty. Anything that creates
data in an MMU-based ramfs will cause the pages holding that data will
cause the set_page_dirty() aop to be called.
For the NOMMU-based mmap, set_page_dirty() may be called by write(), but
it won't be called by page-writing faults on writable mmaps, and it isn't
called by ramfs_nommu_expand_for_mapping() when a file is being truncated
from nothing to allocate a contiguous run.
The solution is to mark the pages dirty at the point of allocation by the
truncation code.
Signed-off-by: Enrik Berkhan <Enrik.Berkhan@ge.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
'simple' would have required specifying current frame address
and return address location manually, but that's obviously not
the case (and not necessary) here.
Unfortunately, one of the callers of that function passes the
address of a smaller data type, cast to fit the type that
xfs_fs_geometry() requires. As a result, this can happen:
Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted
in: f87aca93
Pid: 262, comm: xfs_fsr Not tainted 2.6.38-rc6-493f3358cb2+ #1
Call Trace:
Note: this patch targets 2.6.37 and tries to be as simple as possible.
That is why it adds more copy-and-paste horror into fs/compat.c and
uglifies fs/exec.c, this will be cleanuped later.
compat_copy_strings() plays with bprm->vma/mm directly and thus has
two problems: it lacks the RLIMIT_STACK check and argv/envp memory
is not visible to oom killer.
Export acct_arg_size() and get_arg_page(), change compat_copy_strings()
to use get_arg_page(), change compat_do_execve() to do acct_arg_size(0)
as do_execve() does.
Add the fatal_signal_pending/cond_resched checks into compat_count() and
compat_copy_strings(), this matches the code in fs/exec.c and certainly
makes sense.
Brad Spengler published a local memory-allocation DoS that
evades the OOM-killer (though not the virtual memory RLIMIT):
http://www.grsecurity.net/~spender/64bit_dos.c
execve()->copy_strings() can allocate a lot of memory, but
this is not visible to oom-killer, nobody can see the nascent
bprm->mm and take it into account.
With this patch get_arg_page() increments current's MM_ANONPAGES
counter every time we allocate the new page for argv/envp. When
do_execve() succeds or fails, we change this counter back.
Technically this is not 100% correct, we can't know if the new
page is swapped out and turn MM_ANONPAGES into MM_SWAPENTS, but
I don't think this really matters and everything becomes correct
once exec changes ->mm or fails.
Since the socket address is just being used as a unique identifier, its
inode number is an alternative that does not leak potentially sensitive
information.
CC-ing stable because MITRE has assigned CVE-2010-4565 to the issue.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
If the user-provided len is less than the expected offset, the
IRLMP_ENUMDEVICES getsockopt will do a copy_to_user() with a very large
size value. While this isn't be a security issue on x86 because it will
get caught by the access_ok() check, it may leak large amounts of kernel
heap on other architectures. In any event, this patch fixes it.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Unconditional use of skb->dev won't work here,
try to fetch the econet device via skb_dst()->dev
instead.
Suggested by Eric Dumazet.
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com> Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org>
[jmm: Slightly adapted for 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
We were using nlmsg_find_attr() to look up the bytecode by attribute when
auditing, but then just using the first attribute when actually running
bytecode. So, if we received a message with two attribute elements, where only
the second had type INET_DIAG_REQ_BYTECODE, we would validate and run different
bytecode strings.
Fix this by consistently using nlmsg_find_attr everywhere.
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[jmm: Slightly adapted to apply against 2.6.32] Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Structure sockaddr_tipc is copied to userland with padding bytes after
"id" field in union field "name" unitialized. It leads to leaking of
contents of kernel stack memory. We have to initialize them to zero.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This was noticed by users who performed more than 2^32 lock operations
and hence made this counter overflow (eventually leading to
use-after-free's). Setting rq_client to NULL here means that it won't
later get auth_domain_put() when it should be.
Appears to have been introduced in 2.5.42 by "[PATCH] kNFSd: Move auth
domain lookup into svcauth" which moved most of the rq_client handling
to common svcauth code, but left behind this one line.
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
When writing a contiguous set of blocks, two indirect blocks could be
needed depending on how the blocks are aligned, so we need to increase
the number of credits needed by one.
[ Also fixed a another bug which could further underestimate the
number of journal credits needed by 1; the code was using integer
division instead of DIV_ROUND_UP() -- tytso]
packet_getname_spkt() doesn't initialize all members of sa_data field of
sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13. This structure is then copied
to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
We have to fully fill sa_data with strncpy() instead of strlcpy().
The same with packet_getname(): it doesn't initialize sll_pkttype field of
sockaddr_ll. Set it to zero.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org>
[jmm: Backported to 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Sometimes ax25_getname() doesn't initialize all members of fsa_digipeater
field of fsa struct, also the struct has padding bytes between
sax25_call and sax25_ndigis fields. This structure is then copied to
userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
When calculating the INIT/INIT-ACK chunk length, we should not
only account the length of parameters, but also the parameters
zero padding length, such as AUTH HMACS parameter and CHUNKS
parameter. Without the parameters zero padding length we may get
following oops.
------------------------------------------------------------------
eth0 has addresses: 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e and 192.168.0.21
eth1 has addresses: 192.168.1.21
------------------------------------------------------------------
Reported-by: George Cheimonidis <gchimon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
crash_kexec_wait_realmode() is defined only if CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64
and CONFIG_SMP, but is called if CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 even if !CONFIG_SMP.
Fix the conditional compilation around the invocation.
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
The gdbserial protocol handler should return an empty packet instead
of an error string when ever it responds to a command it does not
implement.
The problem cases come from a debugger client sending
qTBuffer, qTStatus, qSearch, qSupported.
The incorrect response from the gdbstub leads the debugger clients to
not function correctly. Recent versions of gdb will not detach correctly as a result of this behavior.
Backport-request-by: Frank Pan <frankpzh@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Dongdong Deng <dongdong.deng@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
struct aunhdr has 4 padding bytes between 'pad' and 'handle' fields on
x86_64. These bytes are not initialized in the variable 'ah' before
sending 'ah' to the network. This leads to 4 bytes kernel stack
infoleak.
This bug was introduced before the git epoch.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Acked-by: Phil Blundell <philb@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.
'buffer' string is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether it is
zero terminated. This may lead to overflow inside of simple_strtoul().
Changli Gao suggested to copy not more than user supplied 'size' bytes.
It was introduced before the git epoch. Files "ipt_CLUSTERIP/*" are
root writable only by default, however, on some setups permissions might be
relaxed to e.g. network admin user.
Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second is
introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1); the third is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the
second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1). To trigger the bug
one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN.
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <m.selhorst@sirrix.com>
[ Also removed the silly "* sizeof(u8)". If that isn't 1, we have way
deeper problems than a simple multiplication can fix. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
When a hole spans across page boundaries, the next write forces
a read of the block. This could end up reading existing garbage
data from the disk in ocfs2_map_page_blocks. This leads to
non-zero holes. In order to avoid this, mark the writes as new
when the holes span across page boundaries.
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "device"
field is NULL terminated. This potentially leads to BUG() inside of
alloc_netdev_mqs() and/or information leak by creating a device with a name
made of contents of kernel stack.
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
The normal mmap paths all avoid creating a mapping where the pgoff
inside the mapping could wrap around due to overflow. However, an
expanding mremap() can take such a non-wrapping mapping and make it
bigger and cause a wrapping condition.
Noticed by Robert Swiecki when running a system call fuzzer, where it
caused a BUG_ON() due to terminally confusing the vma_prio_tree code. A
vma dumping patch by Hugh then pinpointed the crazy wrapped case.
Reported-and-tested-by: Robert Swiecki <robert@swiecki.net> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
[wt: 2.6.27 has this code in do_mremap()]
There's no reason to write quota info in dquot_commit(). The writing is a
relict from the old days when we didn't have dquot_acquire() and
dquot_release() and thus dquot_commit() could have created / removed quota
structures from the file. These days dquot_commit() only updates usage counters
/ limits in quota structure and thus there's no need to write quota info.
This also fixes an issue with journaling filesystem which didn't reserve
enough space in the transaction for write of quota info (it could have been
dirty at the time of dquot_commit() because of a race with other operation
changing it).
Reported-and-tested-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Thanks to coverity which spotted that UBIFS will oops if 'kmalloc()'
in 'read_pnode()' fails and we dereference a NULL 'pnode' pointer
when we 'goto out'.
This fix makes the 'dbg_check_old_index()' function return
immediately if debugging is disabled, instead of executing
incorrect 'goto out' which causes UBIFS to:
1. Allocate memory
2. Read the flash
On every commit. OK, we do not commit that often, but it is
still silly to do unneeded I/O anyway.
Credits to coverity for spotting this silly issue.
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Invalid nicknames containing only spaces will result in an underflow in
a memcpy size calculation, subsequently destroying the heap and
panicking.
v2 also catches the case where the provided nickname is longer than the
buffer size, which can result in controllable heap corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
The FSGEOMETRY_V1 ioctl (and its compat equivalent) calls out to
xfs_fs_geometry() with a version number of 3. This code path does not
fill in the logsunit member of the passed xfs_fsop_geom_t, leading to
the leaking of four bytes of uninitialized stack data to potentially
unprivileged callers.
v2 switches to memset() to avoid future issues if structure members
change, on suggestion of Dave Chinner.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Reviewed-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Commit da48524eb206 ("Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo
from spoofing the signal code") made the check on si_code too strict.
There are several legitimate places where glibc wants to queue a
negative si_code different from SI_QUEUE:
- This was first noticed with glibc's aio implementation, which wants
to queue a signal with si_code SI_ASYNCIO; the current kernel
causes glibc's tst-aio4 test to fail because rt_sigqueueinfo()
fails with EPERM.
- Further examination of the glibc source shows that getaddrinfo_a()
wants to use SI_ASYNCNL (which the kernel does not even define).
The timer_create() fallback code wants to queue signals with SI_TIMER.
As suggested by Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, loosen the check to
forbid only the problematic SI_TKILL case.
Reported-by: Klaus Dittrich <kladit@arcor.de> Acked-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
[wt: 2.6.27 has no rt_tgsigqueueinfo()]
The pointer '(*auth_tok_key)' is set to NULL in case request_key()
fails, in order to prevent its use by functions calling
ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig().
During device discovery, scsi mid layer sends INQUIRY command to LUN
0. If the LUN 0 is not mapped to host, it creates a temporary
scsi_device with LUN id 0 and sends REPORT_LUNS command to it. After
the REPORT_LUNS succeeds, it walks through the LUN table and adds each
LUN found to sysfs. At the end of REPORT_LUNS lun table scan, it will
delete the temporary scsi_device of LUN 0.
When scsi devices are added to sysfs, it calls add_dev function of all
the registered class interfaces. If ses driver has been registered,
ses_intf_add() of ses module will be called. This function calls
scsi_device_enclosure() to check the inquiry data for EncServ
bit. Since inquiry was not allocated for temporary LUN 0 scsi_device,
it will cause NULL pointer exception.
To fix the problem, sdev->inquiry is checked for NULL before reading it.
enclosure page 7 gives us the "pretty" names of the enclosure slots.
Without a page 7, we can still use the enclosure code as long as we
make up numeric names for the slots. Unfortunately, the current code
fails to add any devices because the check for page 10 is in the wrong
place if we have no page 7. Fix it so that devices show up even if
the enclosure has no page 7.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This field is used to determine the inactivity time. When in AP mode,
hostapd uses it for kicking out inactive clients after a while. Without this
patch, hostapd immediately deauthenticates a new client if it checks the
inactivity time before the client sends its first data frame.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
User-controllable indexes for voice and channel values may cause reading
and writing beyond the bounds of their respective arrays, leading to
potentially exploitable memory corruption. Validate these indexes.
Under certain workloads a command may seem to get lost. IOW, the Smart Array
thinks all commands have been completed but we still have commands in our
completion queue. This may lead to system instability, filesystems going
read-only, or even panics depending on the affected filesystem. We add an
extra read to force the write to complete.
Testing shows this extra read avoids the problem.
Signed-off-by: Mike Miller <mike.miller@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Rmmod myri10ge crash at free_netdev() -> netif_napi_del(), because napi
structures are already deallocated. To fix call netif_napi_del() before
kfree() at myri10ge_free_slices().
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
The dcdbas driver can do an I/O write to cause a SMI to occur. The SMI handler
looks at certain registers and memory locations, so the SMI needs to happen
immediately. On some systems I/O writes are posted, though, causing the SMI to
happen well after the "outb" occurred, which causes random failures. Following
the "outb" with an "inb" forces the write to go through even if it is posted.
Signed-off-by: Stuart Hayes <stuart_hayes@yahoo.com> Acked-by: Doug Warzecha <douglas_warzecha@dell.com> Cc: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
A virtualized display device is usually viewed with the vncviewer
application, either by 'xm vnc domU' or with vncviewer localhost:port.
vncviewer and the RFB protocol provides absolute coordinates to the
virtual display. These coordinates are either passed through to a PV
guest or converted to relative coordinates for a HVM guest.
A PV guest receives these coordinates and passes them to the kernels
evdev driver. There it can be picked up by applications such as the
xorg-input drivers. Using absolute coordinates avoids issues such as
guest mouse pointer not tracking host mouse pointer due to wrong mouse
acceleration settings in the guests X display.
Advertise either absolute or relative coordinates to the input system
and the evdev driver, depending on what dom0 provides. The xorg-input
driver prefers relative coordinates even if a devices provides both.
Fix potential null-pointer exception on disconnect introduced by commit 11ea859d64b69a747d6b060b9ed1520eab1161fe (USB: additional power savings
for cdc-acm devices that support remote wakeup).
Only access acm->dev after making sure it is non-null in control urb
completion handler.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
My testprog do a lot of bitbang - after hours i got following warning and my machine lockups:
WARNING: at /build/buildd/linux-2.6.38/lib/kref.c:34
After debugging uss720 driver i discovered that the completion callback was called before
usb_submit_urb returns. The callback frees the request structure that is krefed on return by
usb_submit_urb.
Signed-off-by: Peter Holik <peter@holik.at> Acked-by: Thomas Sailer <t.sailer@alumni.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This patch (as1453) fixes a long-standing bug in the ehci-hcd driver.
There is no need to set the Halt bit in the overlay region for an
unlinked or blocked QH. Contrary to what the comment says, setting
the Halt bit does not cause the QH to be patched later; that decision
(made in qh_refresh()) depends only on whether the QH is currently
pointing to a valid qTD. Likewise, setting the Halt bit does not
prevent completions from activating the QH while it is "stopped"; they
are prevented by the fact that qh_completions() temporarily changes
qh->qh_state to QH_STATE_COMPLETING.
On the other hand, there are circumstances in which the QH will be
reactivated _without_ being patched; this happens after an URB beyond
the head of the queue is unlinked. Setting the Halt bit will then
cause the hardware to see the QH with both the Active and Halt bits
set, an invalid combination that will prevent the queue from
advancing and may even crash some controllers.
Apparently the only reason this hasn't been reported before is that
unlinking URBs from the middle of a running queue is quite uncommon.
However Test 17, recently added to the usbtest driver, does exactly
this, and it confirms the presence of the bug.
In short, there is no reason to set the Halt bit for an unlinked or
blocked QH, and there is a very good reason not to set it. Therefore
the code that sets it is removed.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Tested-by: Andiry Xu <andiry.xu@amd.com> CC: David Brownell <david-b@pacbell.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Use mask 0x10 for "soft cursor" detection on in function tile_cursor.
(Tile Blitting Operation in framebuffer console).
The old mask 0x01 for vc_cursor_type detects CUR_NONE, CUR_LOWER_THIRD
and every second mode value as "software cursor". This hides the cursor
for these modes (cursor.mode = 0). But, only CUR_NONE or "software cursor"
should hide the cursor.
See also 0x10 in functions add_softcursor, bit_cursor and cw_cursor.
Signed-off-by: Henry Nestler <henry.nestler@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
While mm->start_stack was protected from cross-uid viewing (commit f83ce3e6b02d5 ("proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged
processes")), the start_code and end_code values were not. This would
allow the text location of a PIE binary to leak, defeating ASLR.
Note that the value "1" is used instead of "0" for a protected value since
"ps", "killall", and likely other readers of /proc/pid/stat, take
start_code of "0" to mean a kernel thread and will misbehave. Thanks to
Brad Spengler for pointing this out.
The current code fails to print the "[heap]" marking if the heap is split
into multiple mappings.
Fix the check so that the marking is displayed in all possible cases:
1. vma matches exactly the heap
2. the heap vma is merged e.g. with bss
3. the heap vma is splitted e.g. due to locked pages
Test cases. In all cases, the process should have mapping(s) with
[heap] marking:
It looks like the bug has been there forever, and since it only results in
some information missing from a procfile, it does not fulfil the -stable
"critical issue" criteria.
Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com> Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Orphan cleanup is currently executed even if the file system has some
number of unknown ROCOMPAT features, which deletes inodes and frees
blocks, which could be very bad for some RO_COMPAT features.
This patch skips the orphan cleanup if it contains readonly compatible
features not known by this ext3 implementation, which would prevent
the fs from being mounted (or remounted) readwrite.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@users.sf.net> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
[wt: 2.6.27 does not have do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo()]
Up to 2.6.22, you could use remap_file_pages(2) on a tmpfs file or a
shared mapping of /dev/zero or a shared anonymous mapping. In 2.6.23 we
disabled it by default, but set VM_CAN_NONLINEAR to enable it on safe
mappings. We made sure to set it in shmem_mmap() for tmpfs files, but
missed it in shmem_zero_setup() for the others. Fix that at last.
The test program below will hang because io_getevents() uses
add_wait_queue_exclusive(), which means the wake_up() in io_destroy() only
wakes up one of the threads. Fix this by using wake_up_all() in the aio
code paths where we want to make sure no one gets stuck.
The latest binutils (2.21.0.20110302/Ubuntu) breaks the build
yet another time, under CONFIG_XEN=y due to a .size directive that
refers to a slightly differently named (hence, to the now very
strict and unforgiving assembler, non-existent) symbol.
[ mingo:
This unnecessary build breakage caused by new binutils
version 2.21 gets escallated back several kernel releases spanning
several years of Linux history, affecting over 130,000 upstream
kernel commits (!), on CONFIG_XEN=y 64-bit kernels (i.e. essentially
affecting all major Linux distro kernel configs).
Git annotate tells us that this slight debug symbol code mismatch
bug has been introduced in 2008 in commit 3d75e1b8:
Human reviewers almost never catch such small mismatches, and binutils
never even warned about it either.
This new binutils version thus breaks the Xen build on all upstream kernels
since v2.6.27, out of the blue.
This makes a straightforward Git bisection of all 64-bit Xen-enabled kernels
impossible on such binutils, for a bisection window of over hundred
thousand historic commits. (!)
This is a major fail on the side of binutils and binutils needs to turn
this show-stopper build failure into a warning ASAP. ]
Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
LKML-Reference: <1299877178-26063-1-git-send-email-heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
When trying to flash a machine via the update_flash command, Anton received the
following error:
Restarting system.
FLASH: kernel bug...flash list header addr above 4GB
The code in question has a comment that the flash list should be in
the kernel data and therefore under 4GB:
/* NOTE: the "first" block list is a global var with no data
* blocks in the kernel data segment. We do this because
* we want to ensure this block_list addr is under 4GB.
*/
Unfortunately the Kconfig option is marked tristate which means the variable
may not be in the kernel data and could be above 4GB.
Instead of relying on the data segment being below 4GB, use the static
data buffer allocated by the kernel for use by rtas. Since we don't
use the header struct directly anymore, convert it to a simple pointer.
Reported-By: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-Off-By: Milton Miller <miltonm@bga.com> Tested-By: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
When we are crashing, the crashing/primary CPU IPIs the secondaries to
turn off IRQs, go into real mode and wait in kexec_wait. While this
is happening, the primary tears down all the MMU maps. Unfortunately
the primary doesn't check to make sure the secondaries have entered
real mode before doing this.
On PHYP machines, the secondaries can take a long time shutting down
the IRQ controller as RTAS calls are need. These RTAS calls need to
be serialised which resilts in the secondaries contending in
lock_rtas() and hence taking a long time to shut down.
We've hit this on large POWER7 machines, where some secondaries are
still waiting in lock_rtas(), when the primary tears down the HPTEs.
This patch makes sure all secondaries are in real mode before the
primary tears down the MMU. It uses the new kexec_state entry in the
paca. It times out if the secondaries don't reach real mode after
10sec.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Remove the call to tty_ldisc_flush() from the RESULT_NO_CARRIER
branch of isdn_tty_modem_result(), as already proposed in commit 00409bb045887ec5e7b9e351bc080c38ab6bfd33.
This avoids a "sleeping function called from invalid context" BUG
when the hardware driver calls the statcallb() callback with
command==ISDN_STAT_DHUP in atomic context, which in turn calls
isdn_tty_modem_result(RESULT_NO_CARRIER, ~), and from there,
tty_ldisc_flush() which may sleep.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
According to intel CPU manual, every time PGD entry is changed in i386 PAE
mode, we need do a full TLB flush. Current code follows this and there is
comment for this too in the code.
But current code misses the multi-threaded case. A changed page table
might be used by several CPUs, every such CPU should flush TLB. Usually
this isn't a problem, because we prepopulate all PGD entries at process
fork. But when the process does munmap and follows new mmap, this issue
will be triggered.
When it happens, some CPUs keep doing page faults:
When ext3_dx_add_entry() has to split an index node, it has to ensure that
name_len of dx_node's fake_dirent is also zero, because otherwise e2fsck
won't recognise it as an intermediate htree node and consider the htree to
be corrupted.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This fixes a race in which the task->tk_callback() puts the rpc_task
to sleep, setting a new callback. Under certain circumstances, the current
code may end up executing the task->tk_action before it gets round to the
callback.
Some broken BIOSes on ICH4 chipset report an ACPI region which is in
conflict with legacy IDE ports when ACPI is disabled. Even though the
regions overlap, IDE ports are working correctly (we cannot find out
the decoding rules on chipsets).
So the only problem is the reported region itself, if we don't reserve
the region in the quirk everything works as expected.
This patch avoids reserving any quirk regions below PCIBIOS_MIN_IO
which is 0x1000. Some regions might be (and are by a fast google
query) below this border, but the only difference is that they won't
be reserved anymore. They should still work though the same as before.
The conflicts look like (1f.0 is bridge, 1f.1 is IDE ctrl):
pci 0000:00:1f.1: address space collision: [io 0x0170-0x0177] conflicts with 0000:00:1f.0 [io 0x0100-0x017f]
At 0x0100 a 128 bytes long ACPI region is reported in the quirk for
ICH4. ata_piix then fails to find disks because the IDE legacy ports
are zeroed:
ata_piix 0000:00:1f.1: device not available (can't reserve [io 0x0000-0x0007])
Per ICH4 and ICH6 specs, ACPI and GPIO regions are valid iff ACPI_EN
and GPIO_EN bits are set to 1. Add checks for these bits into the
quirks prior to the region creation.
I picked up a new DAK-780EX(professional digitl reverb/mix system),
which use CH341T chipset to communication with computer on 3/2011
and the CH341T's vendor code is 1a86
Looking up the CH341T's vendor and product id's I see:
1a86 QinHeng Electronics
5523 CH341 in serial mode, usb to serial port converter
CH341T,CH341 are the products of the same company, maybe
have some common hardware, and I test the ch341.c works
well with CH341T
Commit 7f74f8f28a2bd9db9404f7d364e2097a0c42cc12
(x86 quirk: Fix polarity for IRQ0 pin2 override on SB800
systems) introduced a regression. It removed some SB600 specific
code to determine the revision ID without adapting a
corresponding revision ID check for SB600.
When processing a SIDR REQ, the ib_cm allocates a new cm_id. The
refcount of the cm_id is initialized to 1. However, cm_process_work
will decrement the refcount after invoking all callbacks. The result
is that the cm_id will end up with refcount set to 0 by the end of the
sidr req handler.
If a user tries to destroy the cm_id, the destruction will proceed,
under the incorrect assumption that no other threads are referencing
the cm_id. This can lead to a crash when the cm callback thread tries
to access the cm_id.
This problem was noticed as part of a larger investigation with kernel
crashes in the rdma_cm when running on a real time OS.
Signed-off-by: Sean Hefty <sean.hefty@intel.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
They were able to reproduce the crash multiple times with the
following details:
Crash seems to always happen on the:
mutex_unlock(&conn_id->handler_mutex);
as conn_id looks to have been freed during this code path.
An examination of the code shows that a race exists in the request
handlers. When a new connection request is received, the rdma_cm
allocates a new connection identifier. This identifier has a single
reference count on it. If a user calls rdma_destroy_id() from another
thread after receiving a callback, rdma_destroy_id will proceed to
destroy the id and free the associated memory. However, the request
handlers may still be in the process of running. When control returns
to the request handlers, they can attempt to access the newly created
identifiers.
Fix this by holding a reference on the newly created rdma_cm_id until
the request handler is through accessing it.
Signed-off-by: Sean Hefty <sean.hefty@intel.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Avoid removing all of memory and panicing when "mem={invalid}"
is specified, e.g. mem=blahblah, mem=0, or mem=nopentium (on
platforms other than x86_32).
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/553464 Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
LKML-Reference: <1296783486-23033-1-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
ata_qc_complete() contains special handling for certain commands. For
example, it schedules EH for device revalidation after certain
configurations are changed. These shouldn't be applied to EH
commands but they were.
In most cases, it doesn't cause an actual problem because EH doesn't
issue any command which would trigger special handling; however, ACPI
can issue such commands via _GTF which can cause weird interactions.
Restructure ata_qc_complete() such that EH commands are always passed
on to __ata_qc_complete().
stable: Please apply to -stable only after 2.6.38 is released.
When CPU hotplug is used, some CPUs may be offline at the time a kexec is
performed. The subsequent kernel may expect these CPUs to be already running,
and will declare them stuck. On pseries, there's also a soft-offline (cede)
state that CPUs may be in; this can also cause problems as the kexeced kernel
may ask RTAS if they're online -- and RTAS would say they are. The CPU will
either appear stuck, or will cause a crash as we replace its cede loop beneath
it.
This patch kicks each present offline CPU awake before the kexec, so that
none are forever lost to these assumptions in the subsequent kernel.
Now, the behaviour is that all available CPUs that were offlined are now
online & usable after the kexec. This mimics the behaviour of a full reboot
(on which all CPUs will be restarted).
Signed-off-by: Matt Evans <matt@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Kamalesh babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Currently for kexec the PTE tear down on 1TB segment systems normally
requires 3 hcalls for each PTE removal. On a machine with 32GB of
memory it can take around a minute to remove all the PTEs.
This optimises the path so that we only remove PTEs that are valid.
It also uses the read 4 PTEs at once HCALL. For the common case where
a PTEs is invalid in a 1TB segment, this turns the 3 HCALLs per PTE
down to 1 HCALL per 4 PTEs.
This gives an > 10x speedup in kexec times on PHYP, taking a 32GB
machine from around 1 minute down to a few seconds.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Kamalesh babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This adds plpar_pte_read_4_raw() which can be used read 4 PTEs from
PHYP at a time, while in real mode.
It also creates a new hcall9 which can be used in real mode. It's the
same as plpar_hcall9 but minus the tracing hcall statistics which may
require variables outside the RMO.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Kamalesh babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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