From 113de4111795af1245a84368c233f25699999908 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlad Yasevich Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2008 01:02:19 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] sctp: correct bounds check in sctp_setsockopt_auth_key [ Upstream commit 328fc47ea0bcc27d9afa69c3ad6e52431cadd76c ] The bonds check to prevent buffer overlflow was not exactly right. It still allowed overflow of up to 8 bytes which is sizeof(struct sctp_authkey). Since optlen is already checked against the size of that struct, we are guaranteed not to cause interger overflow either. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sctp/socket.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index d9373c358ab2..05185c772d25 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -3072,7 +3072,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk, goto out; } - if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen) { + if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen - sizeof(struct sctp_authkey)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } -- 2.39.5