From 13283b73cac661557a364512f6e89e032040c927 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasiliy Kulikov Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2011 13:35:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] netfilter: arp_tables: fix infoleak to userspace commit 42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143 upstream. Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1); the third is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index 6671485c60c2..e468bdd97bf9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -1035,6 +1035,7 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len) /* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -1455,6 +1456,7 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -1710,6 +1712,7 @@ static int do_arpt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len ret = -EFAULT; break; } + rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0; try_then_request_module(xt_find_revision(NF_ARP, rev.name, rev.revision, 1, &ret), -- 2.39.5