From 14b5b45fc02db990eaa44b943b8f0576421051ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Rosenberg Date: Fri, 6 May 2011 03:27:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] dccp: handle invalid feature options length commit a294865978b701e4d0d90135672749531b9a900d upstream. A length of zero (after subtracting two for the type and len fields) for the DCCPO_{CHANGE,CONFIRM}_{L,R} options will cause an underflow due to the subtraction. The subsequent code may read past the end of the options value buffer when parsing. I'm unsure of what the consequences of this might be, but it's probably not good. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg Acked-by: Gerrit Renker Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/dccp/options.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/dccp/options.c b/net/dccp/options.c index 1b08cae9c65b..b4a853ea0ed9 100644 --- a/net/dccp/options.c +++ b/net/dccp/options.c @@ -131,6 +131,8 @@ int dccp_parse_options(struct sock *sk, struct dccp_request_sock *dreq, case DCCPO_CHANGE_L ... DCCPO_CONFIRM_R: if (pkt_type == DCCP_PKT_DATA) /* RFC 4340, 6 */ break; + if (len == 0) + goto out_invalid_option; rc = dccp_feat_parse_options(sk, dreq, mandatory, opt, *value, value + 1, len - 1); if (rc) -- 2.39.5