From 17563484472d8480cd33c7589420d462f41bce5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Rosenberg Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2011 13:27:31 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] pmcraid: reject negative request size commit 5f6279da3760ce48f478f2856aacebe0c59a39f3 upstream. There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages. Not especially relevant from a security perspective, since users must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the character device. First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl() with a type PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. A pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided here, bad things can happen. For example, pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size, which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size. The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked. Prevent this value from being negative in pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg Cc: Anil Ravindranath Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker --- drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c b/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c index 53aefffbaead..bdb72595d535 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c @@ -3528,6 +3528,9 @@ static long pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough( rc = -EFAULT; goto out_free_buffer; } + } else if (request_size < 0) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_free_buffer; } /* check if we have any additional command parameters */ -- 2.39.5