From 1a9807fd86f9a112a39720e99be4eeae7b4e3694 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladislav Yasevich Date: Fri, 19 May 2006 14:25:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] [PATCH] SCTP: Validate the parameter length in HB-ACK chunk (CVE-2006-1857) If SCTP receives a badly formatted HB-ACK chunk, it is possible that we may access invalid memory and potentially have a buffer overflow. We should really make sure that the chunk format is what we expect, before attempting to touch the data. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala Signed-off-by: Chris Wright --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 8cdba51ec076..9395e098ae29 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -1030,6 +1030,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_backbeat_8_3(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, commands); hbinfo = (sctp_sender_hb_info_t *) chunk->skb->data; + /* Make sure that the length of the parameter is what we expect */ + if (ntohs(hbinfo->param_hdr.length) != + sizeof(sctp_sender_hb_info_t)) { + return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD; + } + from_addr = hbinfo->daddr; link = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &from_addr); -- 2.39.5