From 1ecd3c7ea76488c63b4b0a2561fd7eaf96cc8028 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 17:13:37 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] nilfs2: avoid overflowing segment numbers in
 nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments()

nsegs is read from userspace.  Limit its value and avoid overflowing nsegs
* sizeof(__u64) in the subsequent call to memdup_user().

This patch complements 481fe17e973fb9 ("nilfs2: potential integer overflow
in nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments()").

Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c b/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
index 886649627c3d..2a70fce70c65 100644
--- a/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
@@ -603,6 +603,8 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 	nsegs = argv[4].v_nmembs;
 	if (argv[4].v_size != argsz[4])
 		goto out;
+	if (nsegs > UINT_MAX / sizeof(__u64))
+		goto out;
 
 	/*
 	 * argv[4] points to segment numbers this ioctl cleans.  We
-- 
2.39.5