From 67cca286caa6e33f3134bd36834d2484538f4f78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Philipp Reisner Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 18:43:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] drbd: Fix a hole in the challange-response connection authentication In the implementation as it was, the two peers sent each other a challenge, and expects the challenge hashed with the shared secret back. A attacker could simply wait for the challenge of the peer, and send the same challenge back. Then it waits for the response, and sends the same response back. Prevent this by not accepting a challenge from the peer that is the same as the challenge sent to the peer. Signed-off-by: Philipp Reisner Signed-off-by: Lars Ellenberg Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c b/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c index 3fa3b78e2ea1..b6c8aaf4931b 100644 --- a/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c +++ b/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c @@ -4846,6 +4846,12 @@ static int drbd_do_auth(struct drbd_connection *connection) goto fail; } + if (pi.size < CHALLENGE_LEN) { + drbd_err(connection, "AuthChallenge payload too small.\n"); + rv = -1; + goto fail; + } + peers_ch = kmalloc(pi.size, GFP_NOIO); if (peers_ch == NULL) { drbd_err(connection, "kmalloc of peers_ch failed\n"); @@ -4859,6 +4865,12 @@ static int drbd_do_auth(struct drbd_connection *connection) goto fail; } + if (!memcmp(my_challenge, peers_ch, CHALLENGE_LEN)) { + drbd_err(connection, "Peer presented the same challenge!\n"); + rv = -1; + goto fail; + } + resp_size = crypto_hash_digestsize(connection->cram_hmac_tfm); response = kmalloc(resp_size, GFP_NOIO); if (response == NULL) { -- 2.39.5