From ab513927ab449af00cc70b0269e15ee80dd537f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 20:32:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] perf/x86/hw_breakpoints: Improve range breakpoint validation Range breakpoints will do the wrong thing if the address isn't aligned. While we're there, add comments about why it's safe for instruction breakpoints. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ae25d14d61f2f43b78e0a247e469f3072df7e201.1438312874.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c index 78f3e90c5659..6f345d302cf6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c @@ -291,8 +291,18 @@ static int arch_build_bp_info(struct perf_event *bp) break; #endif default: + /* AMD range breakpoint */ if (!is_power_of_2(bp->attr.bp_len)) return -EINVAL; + if (bp->attr.bp_addr & (bp->attr.bp_len - 1)) + return -EINVAL; + /* + * It's impossible to use a range breakpoint to fake out + * user vs kernel detection because bp_len - 1 can't + * have the high bit set. If we ever allow range instruction + * breakpoints, then we'll have to check for kprobe-blacklisted + * addresses anywhere in the range. + */ if (!cpu_has_bpext) return -EOPNOTSUPP; info->mask = bp->attr.bp_len - 1; -- 2.39.2