crypto: sahara - checking the wrong variable

[karo-tx-linux.git] / fs / exec.c

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 643019585574956f44bdca47c52c3993046db069..9c73def87642fc8f36624b7fa525504541a59a04 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -110,13 +110,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
        static const struct open_flags uselib_flags = {
                .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
                .acc_mode = MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN,
-               .intent = LOOKUP_OPEN
+               .intent = LOOKUP_OPEN,
+               .lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW,
        };
 
        if (IS_ERR(tmp))
                goto out;
 
-       file = do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, tmp, &uselib_flags, LOOKUP_FOLLOW);
+       file = do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, tmp, &uselib_flags);
        putname(tmp);
        error = PTR_ERR(file);
        if (IS_ERR(file))
@@ -756,10 +757,11 @@ struct file *open_exec(const char *name)
        static const struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
                .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
                .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN,
-               .intent = LOOKUP_OPEN
+               .intent = LOOKUP_OPEN,
+               .lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW,
        };
 
-       file = do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, &tmp, &open_exec_flags, LOOKUP_FOLLOW);
+       file = do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, &tmp, &open_exec_flags);
        if (IS_ERR(file))
                goto out;
 
@@ -930,6 +932,7 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
                 * also take its birthdate (always earlier than our own).
                 */
                tsk->start_time = leader->start_time;
+               tsk->real_start_time = leader->real_start_time;
 
                BUG_ON(!same_thread_group(leader, tsk));
                BUG_ON(has_group_leader_pid(tsk));
@@ -945,9 +948,8 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
                 * Note: The old leader also uses this pid until release_task
                 *       is called.  Odd but simple and correct.
                 */
-               detach_pid(tsk, PIDTYPE_PID);
                tsk->pid = leader->pid;
-               attach_pid(tsk, PIDTYPE_PID,  task_pid(leader));
+               change_pid(tsk, PIDTYPE_PID, task_pid(leader));
                transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_PGID);
                transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_SID);
 
@@ -1135,13 +1137,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
                        set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
        }
 
-       /*
-        * Flush performance counters when crossing a
-        * security domain:
-        */
-       if (!get_dumpable(current->mm))
-               perf_event_exit_task(current);
-
        /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
           group */
 
@@ -1205,6 +1200,15 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
        commit_creds(bprm->cred);
        bprm->cred = NULL;
+
+       /*
+        * Disable monitoring for regular users
+        * when executing setuid binaries. Must
+        * wait until new credentials are committed
+        * by commit_creds() above
+        */
+       if (get_dumpable(current->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+               perf_event_exit_task(current);
        /*
         * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
         * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
@@ -1461,7 +1465,6 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
        struct files_struct *displaced;
        bool clear_in_exec;
        int retval;
-       const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 
        /*
         * We move the actual failure in case of RLIMIT_NPROC excess from
@@ -1470,7 +1473,7 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
         * whether NPROC limit is still exceeded.
         */
        if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED) &&
-           atomic_read(&cred->user->processes) > rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) {
+           atomic_read(&current_user()->processes) > rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) {
                retval = -EAGAIN;
                goto out_ret;
        }