aio: check for multiplication overflow in do_io_submit

commit 75e1c70fc31490ef8a373ea2a4bea2524099b478 upstream.

Tavis Ormandy pointed out that do_io_submit does not do proper bounds
checking on the passed-in iocb array:

       if (unlikely(nr < 0))
               return -EINVAL;

       if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(iocbpp)))))
               return -EFAULT;                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The attached patch checks for overflow, and if it is detected, the
number of iocbs submitted is scaled down to a number that will fit in
the long.  This is an ok thing to do, as sys_io_submit is documented as
returning the number of iocbs submitted, so callers should handle a
return value of less than the 'nr' argument passed in.

Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index 25c815dc4b96143e16142922b296444e337dfeef..5fb0fd7c80a0eb21f465451dc171dbf8e77c3c03 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -1667,6 +1667,9 @@ long do_io_submit(aio_context_t ctx_id, long nr,
        if (unlikely(nr < 0))
                return -EINVAL;
 
+       if (unlikely(nr > LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp)))
+               nr = LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp);
+
        if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
                return -EFAULT;